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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the size-growth relationship for banking and manufacturing firms. In particular it 
tests the Law of Proportionate Effect (LPE) which suggests that there is no relationship between firm 
size and growth. Tests of the LPE are carried out for eight European banking markets (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) and for three bank 
types (commercial, co-operative and savings) over the period 1990 to 1994. Employing three 
measures of size (total assets, equity and off balance sheet business) models are estimated that test 
for size effects on growth, and the influences of previous growth, bank type and country membership. 
In the majority of cases, bank growth is independent of bank size, so the LPE holds. However, small 
banks grew faster than their larger counterparts (in terms of assets and equity) in France, Italy and 
Spain. 
The LPE is also investigated for a sample of European manufacturing firms drawn from five countries 
and eleven industry groups. In contrast to the banking industry there is less evidence that the LPE 
holds. In most cases small firms grew proportionately faster than their larger counterparts. 
Using stochastic simulation techniques, the effects of firm growth, entry, exit and merger activity on 
the evolution of bank sizes and market concentration is examined. Using a simulated industry in 
which the LPE holds as the benchmark, the implications of various alternative assumptions regarding 
bank growth were examined. Superimposition of entry leads to a lower mean bank size and lower 
levels of concentration. Exit leads to higher mean bank size and increased concentration. Mergers 
lead to increases in mean bank size and concentration in all simulated industries. 
Using the simulations methodology, hypothetical projections as to the future structure of the banking 
markets in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK are carried out. Overall, the simulations 
suggest that bank numbers are likely to decrease in all countries. The market shares of the largest 
banks are also projected to decline in all countries with the exception of the UK. 
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CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background To The Study 
European banking has experienced widespread changes over the last decade. Through a 
process of structural de-regulation (brought about through the EU's 1992 Single Market 
Programme as well as changes in domestic regulation), banks now find it easier to compete in 
previously inaccessible domestic and foreign markets (Arthur Andersen, 1993). The erosion of 
lines of demarcation between the different types of financial services has led to differences 
between different types of banks becoming blurred, creating greater homogeneity between the 
services and products offered (Gardener, 1997). In addition, technological developments have 
transformed the possibilities for economies of scale and scope. A trend towards 
internationalisation means that there has been greater involvement of foreign banks in European 
countries, leading to intensified competition and the lowering of profit margins in many European 
banking markets (EU, 1997a). 
As a consequence, banks have attempted to adopt strategies aimed at improving efficiency, such 
as mergers and acquisition activity, in order to expand output and increase the range of services 
offered. A major motivation has been to realise potential scale and scope economies, and also to 
reduce labour and other costs in an attempt to eliminate inefficiencies (Molyneux et al, 1996). 
Many banks have pursued strategies of diversification and financial innovation (White, 1998). The 
result of diversification is that banks now offer a wider range of products and services, and now 
conduct much of their business off balance sheet (Morgan Stanley, 1994). The pursuit of financial 
innovation has led to the introduction of sophisticated financial instruments, such as swaps and 
options (Metais, 1997). 
The outcome of these changes has been increasing competition, accompanied by increases in 
concentration through a process of consolidation (Berger et at, 1999). Metals (1997) argues that 
banks have increased in size in order to compete on a European wide basis. This process has 
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been encouraged by the existence of excess capacity in many banking markets, and can be 
viewed as an unforeseen result of de-regulation. However, increased size is not always the sole 
objective for banks. Llewellyn (1995) for instance suggests that, 'Overall, the rate of return on 
equity rather than balance sheet size growth is likely to become the dominant business objective, 
and this could significantly affect the internal culture of banks. ' 
Almost all explanations of the increasing levels of concentration in banking markets rest on the 
assumption that differences between banks lead to some banks obtaining advantages over 
others, causing them to grow and achieve enhanced market power. However, it is possible that 
this process of consolidation is taking place through the workings of chance. These arguments 
are embodied in the Law of Proportionate Effect (LPE). 
The LPE argues that firm size is unrelated to growth, implying that small and large firms share the 
same chance of growing by any (proportionate) amount in any period. If the LPE holds then the 
size distribution of firms observed in an industry at any given time is the cumulative outcome of a 
series of growth shocks to initial firm sizes. Under this type of growth process, the industry will 
tend to become increasingly concentrated through time as a consequence of such shocks. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to test whether or not the LPE holds in eight European banking 
markets over the period 1990-94, using data on bank sizes measured by assets, equity and off 
balance sheet business. For comparative purposes, tests are also carried out on a sample of 
manufacturing firms using an assets measure of size. An investigation of this kind is relevant from 
a theoretical, empirical and policy making point of view. In this introductory chapter, the relevance 
of the thesis from each of these perspectives is discussed, and the structure of subsequent 
chapters is outlined. 
1 Llewellyn (1995), p. 18. 
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Theoretical Perspective 
Concentration is normally defined as the extent to which a small number of firms account for a 
large proportion of industry output, sales or employees. The prevailing assumption is that the 
more concentrated the industry is, the more possibilities exist for abuses of market power by 
dominant firms. Traditional explanations of why industries become highly concentrated centre 
around the assumption that some firms hold advantages over rivals that allow them to grow 
faster, and become large and dominant. These advantages may either arise naturally as a 
consequence of the technical conditions of the industry which confer efficiency advantages on 
larger firms, or through the strategic moves of established firms relating to factors such as 
innovative ability, product differentiation, vertical integration and diversification. It is upon these 
kinds of explanations that the predominant approach to analysing industries and firms has rested 
(Bain, 1956; Schmalensee, 1985). 
In contrast, another body of work has emphasised the role of what are essentially 'random' 
factors in generating industry structure. These arguments are embodied in what has become 
known as the LPE (Gibrat, 1931). This view contends that random factors or chance may 
outweigh any other determinants of firm growth. In essence, firms which end up dominating an 
industry, have simply been lucky and enjoyed a series of years when growth has been high. 
Under this type of growth process, a firm's expected growth rate in any given year is independent 
of its current size. Over time this process generates a size distribution of firms which exhibits a 
positive skew, with a few large firms, rather more medium-sized firms, and a large tail of small 
firms. 
Empirical Perspective 
The traditional view of concentration has produced a large amount of empirical evidence covering 
manufacturing industries. This literature not only uses cross sectional analysis to assess the 
determinants of concentration, but also examines the implications of concentration for the 
behaviour and performance of firms (Bain, 1956) 
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The banking literature also acknowledges the importance of concentration in determining bank 
performance (Berger et al, 1993; Berger, 1995 and Rhoades, 1997). In contrast, there is little 
evidence to explain the evolution of concentration in banking markets. 
A substantial empirical literature exists which tests the LPE for manufacturing. This research has 
been conducted by examining differences in the mean and standard deviation of growth rates of 
different size classes of firms. If no relation exists between firm size and growth, then only 
random factors are important, and the LPE holds (Hart and Prais 1956, Ijiri and Simon, 1977). 
As far as we are aware, there is only limited evidence as to whether or not the LPE holds in 
banking, and these studies all focus on the US banking market (Alhadeff and Alhadeff, 1964; 
Yeats et al, 1975; and Tschoegl, 1983). 
Policy Perspective 
If the LPE holds, this implies that European banking markets will grow more concentrated in the 
future, even in the absence of differences in efficiency between banks, or strategic behaviour by 
large incumbent banks which is designed to enhance their market power. The outcome of 
increased concentration is that it may enable established banks to collude to keep industry output 
at low levels while charging high prices. Regulatory concerns about increased concentration have 
led some to suggest that policy makers should formulate structural measures (such as market 
share ceilings) aimed at reducing concentration to promote competitive outcomes (Gual and 
Neven, 1993). 
1.2 Aims and Structure Outline 
Given the limited attention which has been paid to the determinants of market structure in 
banking and the relationship between the size and growth of banks, the present thesis seeks to fill 
this void. The aim of the thesis is to test empirically the LPE for European banking using data for 
1990-94 for a large sample of commercial, co-operative and savings banks from Belgium, 
2 The assumption here is that concentration may either result in collusion or enable large firms to extend 
market power. 
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Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the UK. An important feature of the 
thesis is that it tests for differences in the nature of the size-growth relationship between banks 
based in different European countries, and between different types of bank. As well as evaluating 
the LPE using conventional (assets and equity) size measures, tests are also applied using off 
balance sheet business data, so as to draw inferences about growth patterns in what has been a 
dynamic and rapidly expanding form of banking activity in the 1990s. Similar tests are also carried 
out for a composite sample of European manufacturing firms. 
The results for the LPE in banking are also used as the basis for various stochastic simulations of 
the possible future evolution of the structure of several major European banking markets. The 
simulations allow for the effects of bank growth, entry, exit and merger in modelling the possible 
long run evolution of the bank size distribution and concentration in each banking market. Overall, 
the thesis seeks to address the following questions: 
1) Does the LPE hold in EU banking and manufacturing markets? 
2) Does the relationship between size and growth differ between different types of bank, or 
between banks in different EU countries? 
3) What are the implications for the evolution of industry structure of different patterns of bank 
growth, and different rates of entry, exit and merger? 
This section provides a summary of the material contained in each chapter, in order to provide an 
overview of the structure of this thesis. In chapter 2, the changing structural and regulatory 
environment of European banking is described, together with an examination of EU banking 
before and after the implementation of the Single Market Programme in Financial Services. The 
chapter examines the programme of structural de-regulation that took place in EU banking 
markets during the 1980s and 1990s, and charts the subsequent supervisory re-regulation that 
accompanied the creation of the Single Market. The impact of these changes on the structure of 
the banking industry, and the implications for bank strategies and performance are also 
highlighted. Recent commentary suggests that a process of consolidation will continue in the EU 
banking industry (EU, 1997a). The overall purpose of the chapter is to describe the background to 
the industry within which the present study is set. 
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Market structure is important in determining the conduct and performance of firms, which in turn 
are instrumental in shaping the future evolution of the industry. Chapter 3 reviews the areas of the 
field of industrial organisation which cover this topic. The chapter discusses the usefulness of the 
Structure Conduct Performance Paradigm (SCP) and Contestable Markets Theory for analysing 
firm performance within a given market structure. The role of economies of scale, entry and exit, 
market growth, innovation, mergers, government regulation and other factors in determining the 
size distribution of firms is highlighted. On balance the evidence reviewed suggests that 
systematic and chance factors may both play a role in the evolution of manufacturing industries. 
Chapter 4 builds on these theoretical insights to examine empirical research in banking markets. 
The chapter discusses early SCP studies of bank performance and empirical studies of 
contestable markets in banking. Recent literature, which tests for the importance of economies of 
scale and scope, technological change, mergers and regulation in determining the structure of 
banking markets, are also examined. Overall, there is some evidence to suggest that economies 
of scale and market growth are instrumental in increasing industry concentration. However, there 
is limited direct evidence on the relationship between firm size and growth in banking, especially 
outside the US. 
Given the scope of this thesis, chapter 5 examines the literature that has tested whether the LPE 
holds in manufacturing industries. This is covered in detail as it provides an important framework 
for the methodological approach which is adopted to examine the LPE in European banking and 
manufacturing in the following chapters. Some evidence on the LPE for various countries and 
industries suggests that many industry firm size distributions may be consistent with patterns of 
growth which are consistent with the LPE. However, different studies have yielded contrasting 
results in this respect, suggesting that the sample used, or the time period under investigation 
may affect the results. 
In chapters 6 and 7, the factual, theoretical and empirical literature discussed in chapters 2,3,4, 
and 5 is used as the basis for the presentation of new evidence as to whether or not the LPE 
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holds in the EU banking industry. The LPE is tested using data on eight EU banking markets 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the UK) over the period 
1990-94, using a data set comprising approximately 600 banks taken from the International Bank 
Credit Agency's (IBCA) Bankscope database. Tests are also carried out for a sample of 
approximately 750 manufacturing firms from five EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the UK) taken from DATASTREAM. This sample is analysed to allow comparisons to be drawn 
between patterns of growth in banking and manufacturing. For example, it could be the case that 
banks grow in order to meet the needs of large corporate customers (Walter, 1988). If so, some 
similarities may exist between the growth processes of banking and manufacturing firms. 
Chapter 6 describes the sources of data and the method of sample selection, and presents 
descriptive statistics for the samples of banking and manufacturing firms. The chapter also 
describes a methodological approach for testing the LPE that allows the relationship between size 
and growth to vary by bank type and country membership. This approach is also applied to the 
manufacturing sample. 
In chapter 7, the banking and manufacturing data are used to test the LPE. The extent to which 
LPE holds is measured by the estimated slope coefficient in a regression of logarithmic growth on 
initial logarithmic size. A coefficient of one implies that the LPE holds. This suggests that 
concentration will tend to increase over time even though large firms do not have any particular 
advantages over small firms. A coefficient below one implies that smaller banks grow 
proportionately faster than their larger counterparts. This suggests that there is no natural 
tendency towards increasing concentration. A coefficient above one implies that large banks have 
advantages over small banks (derived from economies of scale, market power etc. ) which tend to 
accelerate the tendency towards increased concentration. These estimations also yield estimates 
as to whether the LPE holds across different types of banks (commercial, savings and co- 
operative) and for different countries. This chapter also extends the basic growth model to 
examine the impact of age on a bank's growth prospects. Overall, the estimation results suggest 
that the LPE holds for the majority of EU banking markets, with the exceptions of France, Italy 
and Spain, in which small banks grow faster than their larger counterparts. 
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In contrast, the manufacturing results indicate rejection of the LPE for most industries and 
countries. In the majority of cases, smaller manufacturing firms grow faster than their larger 
counterparts, implying that firm sizes tend to converge toward some long run mean value. It is 
suggested that the differences between the estimation results for manufacturing and banking may 
arise fundamentally from differences between competitive conditions and the regulatory 
environment in the two cases. 
Recognising the dynamic nature of the LPE, in chapter 8 stochastic simulation methods are 
adopted in order to examine the possible future evolution of bank size and concentration for five 
EU banking industries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK). The simulations examine the 
implication for bank size distributions of various scenarios regarding patterns of bank growth, and 
rates of entry, exit and merger. The projections suggest that each of these banking markets may 
in future be characterised by smaller numbers of banks arising from merger of existing banks. 
Mean and median bank size may increase in response to increasingly competitive conditions. It is 
argued that this process may result in an increased number of mergers as banks attempt to gain 
a competitive advantage through the realisation of scale and scope economies. The projections 
also suggest there may be a decline in the market shares of the top banks in all banking markets 
except the UK. 
Finally, chapter 9 summarises the discussion and results of preceding chapters. Some limitations 
of the work are identified, and possible directions for future research are suggested. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CHANGES IN THE EU BANKING INDUSTRY 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the past twenty years, the nature of the banking industry has undergone major changes, 
which has led to increased competition at both the national and international level. These 
changes have arisen partly from the de-regulation of financial markets, which to some extent has 
occurred in response to the increasing trend toward global markets in goods and services. This 
trend towards de-regulation has created an increasingly competitive industry, in which banks have 
sought to expand operations in order to reduce costs, while at the same time diversifying into new 
products and services to increase revenues. This chapter provides an overview of the changing 
regulatory and structural characteristics of the EU banking industry. Section 2.2 provides an 
overview of the EU banking industry before any substantial progress was made towards the 
creation of a single market. Section 2.3 examines the regulation, which was implemented to 
create a single market in financial services. Section 2.4 describes subsequent moves toward the 
creation of a single European currency. Section 2.5 discusses the economic issues surrounding 
the single market programme and the potential welfare benefits deriving from the single market. 
Section 2.6 outlines the impact of the single market programme on the structure, conduct and 
performance of EU banking markets. In particular, this section examines the effects of the single 
market on concentration, employment, bank efficiency and performance. Finally, section 2.7 
provides an overall assessment of changes in the EU banking industry. 
2.2 The EU Banking industry in the 1980s 
The single market in goods and services involves free internal trade, the removal of trade and 
tariff barriers and the unhindered movement of goods, services and capital within the European 
Union. 
Vesala (1993) argues that for a single market in financial services to be possible, four main 
criteria must be met. First, credit institutions must be free to establish branches anywhere within 
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the EU without restriction. Second, capital should be able to able to flow freely between countries, 
so allowing customers to buy services wherever they want. Third, a common legal framework is 
required for all countries, leading to equal competitive and regulatory conditions for all market 
participants. Fourth, there must be a single currency. 
Neven (1990) asserts that the internal market has important consequences for EU banking 
markets. He argues two possibilities exist for trade in financial services: 
' ... first, trade can arise, 
in the classical sense, through the cross border movement of a good or 
service. In the banking sector, this would occur if a resident in one country obtains (and pays for) 
services performed by a bank established in a foreign country. Alternatively, rather than supply its 
customer from abroad, the bank could choose to open a subsidiary or branch in the customer's 
country. " 
In the 1980s, before any significant progress was made towards the creation of a single market in 
financial services, EU banking markets were very separate. In each country, banks operated 
under restrictive regulations and practices, which inhibited domestic competition, and provided a 
high degree of protection from banks operating in other countries. The majority of EU banking 
markets (most notably France, Germany, Italy and Spain) followed what has become known as 
the 'bank based system', whereby banks played a dominant role in the financing of industry. In 
contrast, the UK followed a 'market based system' whereby capital markets played a much more 
important role than banks in the financing of industry. 2 Each banking market had some 
distinguishing features. In some markets (Greece, Portugal, Italy and France) a large public 
commercial banking industry operated. In some cases (Germany) universal banking was the 
norm. In other markets (Luxembourg, Netherlands and the UK) foreign banks played an important 
role. 
1 Neven (1990), p. 155. 2 Fraser and Vittas (1984) and Rybcynski (1988) discuss the development of the bank based and market 
based systems. See also chapter 4. 
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Competition was limited by a broad range of barriers which are summarised in Table 2.1. The 
extent to which different types of restrictions were prevalent in each country is summarised 
schematically in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.1: Barriers to a Single Market in Financial Services 
Barriers to establishment in banking 
1. Restrictions on the legal forms banks may adopt. 
2. Limitations on the number of bank branches which may be established. 
3. Restrictions on the take-over of domestic banks. 
4. Restrictions of equity control of domestic banks. 
Barriers to operating conditions in banking 
1. The need to maintain separate capital funds. 
2. Differences in the definition of own capital funds. 
3. The need to maintain certain capital - asset ratios. 
4. Exchange controls. 
Barriers to competing for business in banking 
1. Limitations on services offered. 
2. Restrictions on local retail banking. 
3. Restrictions on acquisition of securities and other assets. 
Barriers to establishment in insurance 
1. Lack of harmonisation of licensing procedures. 
2. Lack of harmonisation in the constitution of technical reserves. 
Barriers to operating conditions and competing for business in insurance 
1. Direct insurance: Restrictions on the placement of contracts with non-established insurers. 
2. Co-insurance: establishment of a permanent presence imposed on lead insurers. 
3. Custom and practice in government procurement policies. 
4. Lack of harmonisation in the supervision of insurance concerns. 
5. Reinsurance: Compulsory or voluntary cessation of a percentage of contracts to a central pool 
or prescribed establishment. 
6. Lack of harmonisation in the fiscal treatment of insurance contracts and premiums. 
Barriers to establishment in securities 
1. Membership of some stock exchanges limited to national citizens. 
2. Constraints on the establishment of offices to solicit and carry out business in secondary 
markets. 
3. Restrictions on the take-over of , or equity participation in domestic institutions. 4. Limitations on the establishment of securities firms in a universal banking system. 
Barriers to operating conditions in securities 
1. Exchange controls and other equivalent measures which prevent or limit the purchase of 
foreign securities. 
2. Conflicting national prudential requirements for investors' protection. 
3. Discriminatory taxes on the purchase of foreign securities. 
Barriers to competing for business in securities 
1. Limited access to primary markets in terms of lead management of domestic issues. 
2. Restricted access to secondary markets because of national stockbroker monopolies on some 
stock exchanges. 
3. Restrictions on dealing with investing public. 
Source: Price Waterhouse (1988, p. 62). 
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Table 2.2 Restrictions In EU Banking Markets In The Early 1980s 
Count B DK F D GR Irl I L NI P E UK 
Interest rate restrictions x X X X X X X X X 
Capital controls x X X x x 
Bank access to stock 
exchange membership 
x X X X X X 
Bank ownership restrictions x x 
Branching restrictions x x x 
Foreign bank entry x x 
Credit ceilings X 
Mandatory investment 
requirements 
x x 
Restrictions on insurance, 
underwriting and brokerage 
x X X X X X X 
Portfolio mans ement x x 
Leasin and factorin x X X 
X- Restrictions in place 
1- Insurance underwriting business not allowed but insurance brokerage business permitted. 
B- Belgium, DK - Denmark, F- France, D- Germany, GR - Greece, Irl - Ireland, I- Italy, L- 
Luxembourg, NI - Netherlands, P- Portugal, E- Spain, UK - United Kingdom. 
Source: Broker (1989), p. 24. 
With reference to specific regulations, interest rate restrictions were in force in all countries 
except Germany, Netherlands and the UK. Capital controls operated in five of the twelve 
countries (Belgium, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain). Significant restrictions on branch 
expansion (France, Italy and Portugal) and areas of specialisation (Denmark, France, Greece, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and UK) were commonplace. 3 
In the 1980s, EU countries could be grouped as to whether regulation was high (France, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain), medium (Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Italy) or low (Germany, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and the UK). 
3 For discussion of these issues for individual countries see: Colmant (1990) and De Boissieu (1990) for France; Llewellyn (1 992b) and Mayer (1990) for the UK; Szego and Szego (1992) and Bruni (1990) for Italy; Maude and Molyneux (1996) for Germany; and Revell (1991) and Carminal et al (1990) for Spain. 
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Most European banking markets were characterised by a concentrated market structure 
dominated by a small number of 'core' banks (Revell, 1987). Table 2.3 shows the 3-firm assets 
and deposits concentration ratios for the banking markets of the twelve EU member countries in 
1985, as well as the number of banks operating in each country and the value of total assets. 
Concentration is generally higher for the smaller banking markets (with the exception of 
Luxembourg) than for the larger, with Germany and the United Kingdom having relatively low 
levels of concentration. 
Table 2 .3 Size and 
Market Concentration of Banking Markets in the EU 1985 
Country Number of 
banks 
Size of Banking 
Industry Assets 
(ECU billion) 
Concentration 
of total market' 
CR3 (Assets) 
Concentration 
of total market' 
CR3 (Deposits) 
Germany 4739 1495 21.2 19.1 
France 1952 1349 42.3 45.5 
UK 605 1294 26.5 21.6 
Italy 1101 547 35.2 41.6 
Spain 364 311 21.9 24.3 
Netherlands 178 227 71.3 83.9 
Belgium 120 286 57.1 59.0 
Luxembour 118 170 16.7 16.5 
Denmark 259 96 36.7 45.3 
Greece 41 69 - 49.7 
Portugal 226 38 49.7 49.6 
Ireland 38 21 71.0 - 
- not available 'Three firm concentration ratios calculated using data from the consolidated accounts published 
in The Banker Top 500. ' 
2 Only 12 of the 120 Luxembourg banks were domestic institutions 
Source: National Central Banks. Reprinted in EU (1997a), p. 15. 
In 1985, Germany had the largest banking market measured by the value of total assets, followed 
by France, UK, Italy and Spain. In terms of the concentration ratios, these ranged from relatively 
highly concentrated markets in Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland to less concentrated markets of 
Luxembourg, Germany and Spain. 4 Germany, France and Italy had the largest numbers of banks, 
while Greece and Ireland had the lowest. 
° The effect of high market concentration on the performance of banks is discussed in chapter 4. 
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At the beginning of the 1980s, of the five largest EU countries France, Italy and Spain had the 
most restricted banking markets, with regulation imposed on interest rates, commissions, fees 
and the extent of specialisation. However, during the 1980s many of these regulations were 
abolished. 
Banks in France had previously been encouraged to compete in specialised banking activities 
(e. g. deposit banking, investment banking). However, since 1984, some de-regulation took place, 
which allowed banks to enter previously restricted areas and offer many types of product (Bertero, 
1994). Canals (1993) notes that '... the new legislation is based on the principle of universality 
and establishes standardised directives. r5 Regulations that fixed the level of fees and commission 
were relaxed. However, some separation of banking business still remained in place (de Boissieu, 
1990) by the end of the 1980s. Towards the end of the 1980s, interest rate regulations and capital 
restrictions were removed leading to intensified levels of competition. 
In Italy, branching and various portfolio restrictions were removed gradually. Since 1985, banks 
(domestic or foreign) were free to open branches providing they had sufficient capital to back 
assets (Szego and Szego, 1992). Italian banks were allowed to offer a variety of merchant 
banking services, although by the end of the 1980s, Italy still remained one of the more highly 
regulated EU banking markets (Bison!, 1990, Bruni, 1990). Gual and Neven (1993) note that'... if 
anything the discrepancy between Italy and the rest of Europe in terms of regulation is all but 
widening. '6 
Restrictions on foreign bank entry were lifted in Spain, along with controls on interest rates and 
capital flows (Caminal et at, 1990). During the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Spain relaxed 
many of the regulations regarding domestic entry, which allowed banks to offer more types of 
service. 
5 Canals (1993), p. 128. 6 Gual and Neven (1993), p. 155. 
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In the UK, since 1986, building societies were allowed to compete for business normally reserved 
for banks, while banks in turn were allowed to diversify into securities business (Llewellyn, 1992b; 
McKillop and Ferguson, 1993). London's 'Big-Bang' in October 1986, deregulated the London 
Stock Market, and allowed banks to acquire stockbroking and jobbing firms (Gardener and 
Molyneux, 1993). 
In Germany, differences between commercial, savings and co-operative banks have lessened, 
with many banks operating in similar business areas. The restrictions that separated the activities 
of insurance firms and banks have also been lifted (Maude and Molyneux, 1996). Bisigano (1992) 
suggests that the de-regulated nature of the German and UK markets have proven very attractive 
to foreign banks. 7 
Overall, throughout the 1980s the changing market environment, increasing use of technology as 
well as the prospect of the single market in financial services, led to substantial de-regulation in 
the financial markets of all EU member states. As we have seen previously, there was substantial 
de-regulation in the major banking markets of the EU. This de-regulation led to increasing 
competitive pressures facing banks. This in turn, some argue, encouraged banks to move into 
riskier activities through financial innovation (Kane, 1987). Masera (1990) notes three important 
trends that increase bank risk, namely securitisation, off-balance sheet activities and the global 
integration of financial markets. These activities can lead banks to holding insufficient capital to 
cover the risks associated with their investments. Masera further contends that this led to a need 
for financial re-regulation to ensure the stability of the banking industry and the integration of 
financial markets. 
Although, the timetable for the creation of a single market programme was specified by the Single 
European Act in 1986, at the time, most industry experts suggested that changing technology 
would affect the future performance of banks more than the single market (Arthur Andersen, 
7 The influence of foreign banks on the competitive structure of EU banking markets is examined in greater 
detail later in the chapter. 
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1986). However, by 1989, survey evidence suggested that the single market was considered the 
most important imminent development affecting banking in the EU (Arthur Andersen, 1989). 
This section examines the regulatory issues involved in the creation of a single market in financial 
services. De-regulation at the national level (see above) was also accompanied by a series of EU 
banking directives aimed at integrating banking markets. This section introduces the main types 
of regulation open to policy makers, and examines regulation that has been implemented in the 
EU. 
Three main types of regulation are open to policy makers, namely structural, conduct and 
prudential regulation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1986). Structural regulation seeks to alter or maintain 
the structure of the banking industry. Measures include the functional separation of banks into 
different activities (e. g. commercial banking and investment banking), entry restrictions and rules 
regarding the operation of foreign banks. Gual and Neven (1993) maintain that structural 
regulation is likely to make entry into banking markets difficult, thereby giving incumbent banks 
the opportunity to exercise market power and increase size. 
Conduct regulation attempts to alter the behaviour of banks by controlling the extent of banking 
activities. These controls can restrict the levels of interest rates offered, regulate fees and 
commissions, the extent of loans granted, and or restrict the rate at which banks can expand their 
branch networks. 
Prudential regulation involves protecting consumers (retail depositors) and ensuring the stability 
of the banking industry. Relevant measures include the imposition of minimum capital 
requirements or solvency ratios, restrictions on ownership, and requirements for banks to 
participate in deposit insurance schemes and lender of last resort facilities. 
Overall, the banking markets of the EU have undergone a process of structural de-regulation, and 
conduct re-regulation, the net effect of which has been to increase competition in EU banking 
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markets. Specific EU legislative measures include: The First Banking Co-ordination Directive 
(1977), The Consolidated Supervision Directive (1983), The Second Banking Directive (1988), 
The Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directives (1989), the Large Exposure Directive (1992), and 
The Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (1994). These directives, and their effects on banking 
in the EU, are outlined below. " The timing of the implementation of the aforementioned 
regulations is summarised in Table 2.4. The table also shows when interest rate de-regulation 
and the liberalisation of capital flows took place in EU member states. 
Baltensperger and Dermine (1990) suggest that the first major progress toward the creation of a 
single market for financial services in the EU was achieved as far back as 1977, with the First 
Banking Directive. This directive allowed banks to set up operations in EU states other than their 
country of origin. However, the supervision and control of such banks was the responsibility of the 
country of origin. In 1983, the Directive of Consolidated Supervision stipulated that if a bank 
owned more than 25 per cent of another bank, they would be supervised on a consolidated basis. 
Although these two directives represented some progress towards the creation of a single 
financial services sector, a number of restrictions still existed. These included controls on capital 
flows, host country regulation, which constrained substantially the activities of guest institutions, 
and rules in a number of countries requiring foreign banks to be backed by endowment capital 
(Baltensperger and Dermine, 1987 and Bisigano, 1992). 
In 1986, The Single European Act outlined the legislative programme for the creation of the single 
market. The general tenet of banking legislation was built around the concepts of mutual 
recognition and home country control. 9 These principles were embodied in the Second Banking 
Directive (1988) and related directives based on capital adequacy, namely the Own Funds 
Directive (1989) and the Solvency Ratio Directive (1989). 
8 White (1994) provides a detailed discussion on the international harmonisation of bank regulation. 9 The concept of mutual recognition involves EU member states recognising the way in which all other 
member states regulate their financial markets. Under the concept of home country control banks are 
supervised by their country of origin even if they operate in other EU countries. However, the host country 
retains control over aspects of monetary policies such as interest rates. 
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The Second Banking Directive (1988), introduced a single licence for EU banks, laid down the 
rules for home and host country control, and introduced guidelines for dealings between EU and 
non-EU banks. '() The single licence allows banks which are established in a member state to 
operate branches in any other member states, subject to the approval of the financial authorities 
in their country of origin. Such banks are allowed to offer any services in other states, which are 
permitted to them in their own country. This licence resulted in the abolition of minimum 
endowment capital requirements for bank branches operating in other EU member states, 
(branches in other EU member states having previously been treated as separate banks). One 
potential problem with this legislation was that banks might seek to identify their home base in a 
country where regulations are the least onerous. To avoid this a minimum capital requirement of 
ECU 5 million was imposed on the establishment on a new bank. " 
The Second Banking Directive also addressed bank investment interests in non-bank industries. 
In an attempt to reduce banks' risk profiles, the Directive stipulated that banks' interests 
(measured by the value of shares held) in any single non-financial institution should not exceed 
50 per cent. For supervision purposes home countries are responsible for supervising banks' 
capital and investment activities, while host countries supervise liquidity and monetary policy. The 
Directive made provision for reciprocal agreements between EU and non-EU countries with 
regard to the establishment of banking presence. 
Overall, the Second Banking Directive laid down the basis for a universal banking model 
throughout the EU. This was done by removing many of the regulatory barriers which had 
prevented commercial banks from carrying out business in various corporate, wholesale, retail, 
10 This act became effective from 1993. 11 This followed an initiative passed by the Bank of International Settlements in 1987, known as the Basle Accord. This accord recommended that banks must hold capital equal to at least eight per cent of total investments. 
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investment and securities sectors. It also established conditions for unfettered provision of 
banking services based on mutual recognition of rules and regulations and home country 
supervision (Vesala, 1993). However, Canals (1993) argues that the ECU 5 million minimum 
capital requirements to set up a new banking entity was excessive, and represented a substantial 
barrier to entry. As a consequence, this part of the legislation may inhibit levels of competition. 
The Own Funds Directive, passed in 1989, sought to ensure that banks maintain enough capital 
to meet their financial commitments. This directive splits banks' funds into internal and external 
capital. Internal (or Tier 1) capital consists of liquid funds which can be used to absorb any losses 
made by the bank. These funds include paid up capital and share premium accounts, profits, 
retained profits and revaluation reserves, working capital and long term securities. External (or 
Tier 2) capital are funds which are at the bank's disposal, but are not owned by the bank. These 
funds include undisclosed reserves and revaluation reserves, and should be approximately 50 per 
cent of internal funds. 
The Solvency Ratio Directive, passed in 1989, established a uniform solvency ratio using capital 
in the numerator, and risk adjusted assets and off-balance sheet assets in the denominator. The 
denominator is calculated as a weighted average of the values of assets in each class. 12 
The Large Exposure Directive (1992) attempts to reduce risk by stipulating that banks should not 
commit more than 25 per cent of their own funds to a single investment, and that the resources 
invested in such activities should not exceed 800 per cent of own funds in total. The directive on 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (1994) attempts to protect investors in the event of bank failure. 
12 Under this Directive different types of borrowers are assigned different risk weights ranging from 0 to 
100 per cent. These categories include central banks, central governments and EU and non-EU private borrowers. Products and services which have risk weights of 100 per cent include standby letters of credit, 
risk participation and asset sales with recourse. Those with a 50 per cent risk weight include revolving 
underwriting agreements and note issuance facilities, while those with 20 per cent risk weights include 
commercial letters of credit. Therefore, if as under the Basle Accord, banks' capital asset ratios are set at 8 
per cent, this means that products with 100 per cent risk require 8 per cent capital backing, while those with 
50 per cent risk and 20 per cent risk require capital backing of 4 per cent and 1.6 per cent backing 
respectively. Dixon (1991), p. 70-71 describes the Directive and the risk weightings. 
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This establishes a minimum guarantee of ECU 20000. Under this directive, banks with foreign 
branches must join the deposit insurance scheme of each host country. " 
The thrust of the EU legislation has been to create a more competitive banking industry, reducing 
barriers to trade in financial services, and creating a level playing field in terms of minimum 
harmonised supervisory requirements (Lewis and Pescetto, 1996). The effect of the EU 
legislation of the 1980s and 1990s has been to establish the universal banking model as the 
'norm' across EU banking markets by reducing barriers to entry and encouraging increased 
cross-border business (Canals, 1997). This has enabled banks to expand the range of products 
and services offered, and allowed them to move freely into new European markets. However, as 
we have noted above, the single market in financial services may expose the banking industry to 
greater risk. Strengthened prudential regulation, along with a strong deposit guarantee scheme 
are required, in order to protect depositors in the event of bank failure. Overall, the regulators 
have had to strike a balance between promoting competition and protecting customers from the 
new risks generated by the enhanced competitive environment. 
2.4 A Note On European Monetary Union (EMU) 
A natural progression from the integration of financial markets is complete monetary integration 
through the establishment of a single currency. Majoni, Rebecchini and Santini (1992) define 
monetary integration as follows: 
' The term monetary integration, in particular, will refer to the process of co-ordination of national 
monetary policies and can be viewed as the progressive achievement of irrevocably fixed 
exchange rates and uniformly low inflation rates within the European area. More generally, 
though, the co-ordination involves the whole set of procedures through which monetary policy is 
13 Although these regulations are aimed at ensuring the efficiency of banks and the protection of 
customers, they can have negative effects. Vives (1991 a) argues that deposit insurance schemes introduce 
a moral hazard problem for both banks and customers. Banks are willing to undertake more risky activities 
aimed at realising higher returns, as they know they will be bailed out if their investments subsequently fail. 
depositors tend to bank with banks which realise high returns through risk taking activities, as they are 
protected if things go wrong. Attempts to overcome these problems include controls on interest rates which 
banks can offer, minimum liquidity requirements and restrictions on the extent to which banks can 
concentrate investments in any single activity. 
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implemented: the definitions of the intermediate and operational targets, the use of the information 
set and the nature of intervention techniques. ' 14 
Barber (1998) argues that '... EMU is not just about money..... it is part of a wider process of 
European integration. It affects not just central and national banks, but companies and 
consumers. It might trigger harmonisation of prices and wages across Europe and ultimately it 
might lead to closer harmonisation of economic policy as well. ' 15 
The Delors report (1989) laid the foundations for the movement towards monetary union and the 
creation of a single currency. 16 The report outlined three phases in moving towards full monetary 
union. " Phase 1, which began in 1990, involved a greater convergence in economic performance 
of member states by active co-ordination of fiscal and monetary policies. During this phase 
member states joined and competed in a system of fixed exchange rates (European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism - ERM) whereby the currencies of the members were fixed within bands of 2.25 
per cent (or 6 per cent in the case of the Peseta and the Escudo). 
In September 1992, exchange rate parities were undermined by investor speculation which 
involved the selling of Sterling and the Lira, and buying of Deutsche Marks. This process 
culminated in the UK and Italy withdrawing from the ERM. After further speculative activity, (most 
notably against the French Franc in August 1993), and the devaluation of several currencies 
including the Escudo and the Peseta, the currency bands were widened to 15 per cent for the 
remaining members (with the exception of the Deutsche Mark and the Guilder). 
Phase 2, which began in 1994, involved the establishment of institutional structures to supervise 
the setting up and operation of the European Monetary System and the promotion of the 
European Currency Unit (ECU) as a unit of currency. These institutional structures included the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI) based in Frankfurt and a system of European Central Banks 
14 Majnoni, Rebecchini and Santini (1992), p. 135. 15 Barber (1998), p. 4. 
16 Tew (1992) gives a discussion of early moves toward monetary integration including the Werner report, 
The Snake and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. See also Baldwin (1991). 17 Bank of England (1994) provides a detailed discussion. 
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(ESCB). The role of these institutions was to control the monetary and fiscal policies while at the 
same time devising a framework for a Single European Central Bank. Phase 3, which took place 
in January 1999, involved the final locking together of member currency exchange rates, a single 
union wide monetary policy, the adoption of a single currency, the pooling of foreign reserves, and 
the establishment of the European Central bank. This bank and the ESCB is responsible for 
following a single European Monetary policy, and has the power to constrain national member 
states fiscal policies. The countries which adopted the EURO was decided in May 1998, when 
eleven of the fifteen EU member states (excluding Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) committed to go ahead with full EMU on January 1" 1999. The Euro has been 
introduced as the single currency, but only for wholesale business. Retail Euro business will 
commence within two to three years of 1`t January 1999.18 
The introduction of a single currency is likely to impose substantial costs on the banking industry. 
Such costs include: 1) administrative costs of changing records and updating other types of 
information; 2) changes in software and hardware used in the delivery services; and 3) re-training 
costs of staff to the new system (Molyneux et al, 1996 and McCauley and White, 1997). 19 Leach 
(1997) argues that the adoption of the Euro will result in the lowering of entry barriers to domestic 
markets, which in turn will increase competition and consolidation. 
The Euro is also likely to reduce the revenue earned by many banks from foreign exchange 
transactions, corporate banking services and government bond trades. Foreign exchange 
revenue will decline as the eleven member currencies are consolidated into a single currency. 
Trade in government bonds will decline as national government borrowing is restrained to 
maintain the EU's stipulated debt to GDP ratio, (currently set at 60 per cent). 20 Finally, large firms 
will no longer require loans, or deposit currencies in national denominations (Economist, 1998b). 
18 See Blanden (1998), Euromoney (1998) and FT (1998) for a discussion of these issues. 19 Recent estimates suggest that these costs will be between $15billion to $20 billion (Economist, 1998b). 20 These ratios were agreed under the terms of the Single European Act (1986). 
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Overall, 'European Monetary Union will confront financial services with much more intense 
competition. It will be the catalyst for trends already evident in the sector, such as dis- 
intermediation, internationalisation and changing customer preferences. '2' 
2.5 The Single Market For Financial Services: Economic Issues 
The aforementioned sections have emphasised how regulatory changes have resulted in an 
increased competitive environment in European banking and financial services. However, the 
impact of these changes has only been justified by a handful of studies. This section discusses 
some of the economic issues relating to the single market in financial services. The section 
describes the welfare gains and losses associated with establishing a single market in financial 
services. Particular focus is placed on the Price Waterhouse (1988) study, which was seminal in 
assessing the impact of the single market in financial services. 
McDonald (1992) summarises the benefits of a single market as follows: 
' The bulk of the benefits are seen to derive from the effects of increased competition and lower 
costs which lead to lower prices, and also stimulate investment. New market opportunities allow 
for increased economies of scale, and the rationalisation of artificially segmented markets. The 
increase in competition allows for considerable improvements in the effective use of inputs, and 
reductions in the anti-competitive practices of companies. This process is further aided by 
reductions in the costs of consumer services by the liberalisation of the service sector. '22 
Many authors argue that a single market in financial services has beneficial effects for EU 
member states. Llewellyn (1992a) argues that if a single market increases competition, then firms 
become more efficient, leading to lower prices for consumers. In addition, cross subsidisation 
disappears as new competitors target markets in which prices are artificially high. Inefficient firms 
are acquired, and collusive agreements collapse due to external competitive pressure, as banks 
diversify into new markets in search of new opportunities. 
21 Deutsche Bank Research (1998), p. 1. 22 McDonald (1992), p. 28. 
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Vesala (1993) asserts that: 
'..... an increase in banking competition accompanying financial integration would give rise to 
significant welfare gains through enhanced price transparency and harmonisation, diffusion of 
banking technologies and the removal of industry-specific inefficiencies. Those countries with a 
low degree of price competition and operating efficiency would be the ones with the largest 
potential benefits to be gained in the long run, but they would also face the largest reorganisation 
pressures. Cross border competition is assumed to grow substantially as the EC legal measures 
provide a "level playing field" for all banking institutions located in the Single Market Area and 
effectively abolish regulatory barriers to entry and cross border provision of banking services. '23 
A single market in financial services effectively increases the potential market for all firms, 
creating the potential for firms to exploit economies of scale and scope, leading to a more efficient 
allocation of resources (European Economy, 1988). 
Price Waterhouse (1988) attempt to estimate the gains in consumer surplus that could result from 
a free market in financial services. The removal of regulatory barriers allows financial services 
firms to expand production leading, to lower costs through economies of scale and scope, 
creating an increase in consumer and producer surplus, and an overall gain in welfare. Existing 
price differentials were examined for a bundle of financial services in a sample of eight countries, 
and the future pricing structure of the industry was estimated. 24 
The price differences between countries were calculated as the difference between the price 
recorded in an individual country and the average of the four lowest prices quoted nationally. The 
findings pointed to substantial price differences between countries for the sixteen products. 25 
23 Vesala (1993), p. 167. 24 The countries studied were France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
Price Waterhouse chose 16 financial products thought to be broadly representative of the EU financial 
sector. 25Llewellyn (1992a) contends that prices can vary for many reasons, including differences in efficiency, 
differences in taxes, differences in the competitive environment allowing monopoly rents, unexploited 
economies of scale and scope, and the existence of cross subsidisation practices. 
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Financial products included in the study came from the banking, insurance and securities 
industries. Banking products included consumer credit, credit cards, mortgages, letters of credit, 
foreign exchange, travellers' cheques and commercial loans. Insurance products included life 
assurance, home insurance, motor insurance, commercial insurance and public liability 
insurance. Finally, securities products and services included private equity, private gilts, 
institutional equity and institutional gilts. 
To assess the future prices of these financial goods and services after 1992, the differences in 
prices for each product were weighted according to their relative importance in their host country. 
This gave the potential reduction in the price of each product arising from the creation of the 
single market. The estimates were adjusted by between 40 per cent and 60 per cent to eliminate 
biases caused by country specific characteristics, which may have contributed to pricing 
differences in products. 
In order to estimate the welfare gains from a single market, consumer surplus was estimated, 
using estimates of future price changes together with the price elasticity of demand, and the 
'value added' for each of the financial products in the sample. The increase in consumer surplus 
was estimated to be between ECU 11 billion and ECU 33 billion. Of this banking contributed 
between ECU 8 billion and ECU 22 billion. The report concludes that substantial welfare gains 
would be derived from a single market in financial services. 26 
Overall, the report found that a single market would lead to enhanced competition within financial 
markets. However, it took little account of strategic reactions, and possible anti-competitive 
outcomes. For example the new competitive environment could lead to consolidation and 
increased concentration, with anti-competitive effects (Gual and Neven, 1993). 
26 For detail see Price Waterhouse (1988), Table 5.1, p. 15. See also Gardener and Teppet (1990) for a 
similar study carried out for EFTA countries. 
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Neven (1990) argues that the study takes no account of the strategic responses of banking and 
other financial firms after 1992, (such as vertical integration, predation and branch proliferation). It 
also fails to recognise any natural non-regulatory barriers that may remain, such as reputation 
effects. 27 Dixon (1991) identifies several problems with the report. The products included may not 
be comparable across countries, which may have affected the results. The prices of the products 
may differ between countries due to variations in risk, or through the practice of cross 
subsidisation. According to Llewellyn (1992a) '... the calculations are based upon identifying 
standardised financial products and comparing each country's prices with the average of the 
lowest prices for the product, making a comparison with a benchmark that no consumer is 
actually paying. 1 28 
In general, since the advent of the single market in financial services, there has been increasing 
competition accompanied by increases in concentration through a process of consolidation. 
Metals (1997) argues that banks have pursued size in order to compete on a European wide 
basis. He contends this is the unforeseen result of de-regulation. A report by EU (1997a) notes 
that' ... there still remain a number of barriers that continue to constrain the exploitation of the full 
benefits of the Single Market. These barriers are quite diverse and vary from one EU country to 
the next. Various legal and fiscal (tax) treatment barriers still remain. Important barriers also 
remain relating to restrictions on marketing activities and the range of products that banks can 
offer outside their territory. ' 29 
Of course, EMU and the introduction of the Euro are natural extensions of the single market 
programme, and it has removed a major barrier to cross-border competition by eliminating 
currency risk within the EMU-bloc of countries. 
27 These strategies are examined in more detail in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 28 Llewellyn (1992a), p. 118. 29 EU (1997a), p. 18. 
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2.6 The Impact of the Single Market on European Banking 
In recent years, the competitive environment in which European banks operate has undergone 
significant changes arising from technology advances, the globalisation of markets, volatility in 
macroeconomic conditions, and the creation of a single market in financial services (De Bandt 
and Davis, 1998). This section examines the implications of the single market for the competitive 
environment of the EU banking industry. 
Increasing levels of competition has ensued as barriers between different banking activities have 
been removed, and as the entry of foreign banks has continued to increase (Vesala, 1993). 
Consequently, market structures have become increasingly concentrated as banks engage in 
merger and acquisition activities in an attempt to increase size (Gual and Neven, 1993). 
Competitive pressure has also prompted banks to make efficiency savings by shedding jobs and 
eliminating x-inefficiencies, and expanding the scale and scope of operations by diversifying into 
new product areas (Conti and Maccarinelli, 1993). The increasingly competitive environment has 
put pressure on interest margins and encouraged banks to develop fee and commission based 
services (White, 1998). Overall, the single market has produced an industry where incumbent 
banks are larger, generally more efficient and strategically focused (Morgan Stanley, 1994). 
The rest of this section explores these changes using recently published data (EU, 1997a). 
Section 2.6.1 describes structural changes in the EU banking industry during the period 1985 to 
1994. Section 2.6.2 examines the conduct of banks in response to these structural changes. 
Section 2.6.3 analyses the performance of banks, reflected in efficiency and profitability 
measures, in response to the changes in structure and conduct. 
2.6.1 Structural Characteristics of EU Bankina Markets Pre and Post 1992 
In recent years, the level of competition has increased substantially in the EU banking industry. 
This has been partly due to de-regulation, freeing up the areas within which different types of 
banks operate (e. g. savings banks can compete directly for the business of commercial banks; 
commercial banks can compete for insurance business etc. ). Most countries within the EU have 
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experienced an increase in the size of their banking markets over the past decade or so. Table 
2.5 shows total banking assets of each banking market over the period 1985-1994. 
Table 2.5: Total Banking Assets. 12 EU Countries (ECU billion In current prices) 
Country 1985 1990 1994 
Belgium 285.9 420.7 589.4 
Denmark 96.3 143.5 125.5 
France 1348.8 2111.0 2513.7 
Germany 1495.1 2555.4 3584.1 
Greece 69.2 74.8 94.0 
Ireland 21.0 27.7 45.8 
Italy 546.8 816.9 1070.5 
Luxembourg 169.8 294.2 445.5 
Netherlands 226.7 485.5 650.0 
Portugal 38.0 60.1 116.3 
Spain 311.3 542.0 696.3 
UK 1293.6 1774.1 1999.5 
Source: National Central Banks, Reprinted in EU (1997a), p. 70. 
There has been some consolidation. Table 2.6 shows that the total number of banks in the twelve 
EU countries taken together, fell between 1985 and 1994. In each of the five countries with the 
largest numbers of banks in 1985 (Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Spain), there were also 
fewer banks in 1994 than in 1985. 
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Table 2.6: Number of Banks by EU Country (includes commercial. public and 
co-operative banks) 
Country 1985 1990 1994 
Belgium 120 121 131 
Denmark 259 222 202 
France 1952 2048 1608 
Germany 4739 4710 3872 
Greece* 41 47 53 
Ireland 42 36 48 
Italy 1101 1043 1002 
Luxembourg* 120 179 224 
Netherlands 178 180 173 
Portugal 226 265 259 
Spain 364 327 316 
UK 772 665 586 
TOTAL 9914 9843 8474 
* Includes foreign commercial banks 
Adapted from EU (1997a), Table 4.19, p. 68. 
The fall in the number of banking institutions has also been accompanied by changes in the 
number of employees and bank branches. Table 2.7 shows the numbers of branches fell in 
France, Belgium, Denmark and the UK between 1985 and 1994. This has been accompanied by 
decreases in employee numbers in France, Belgium and the UK. The decreases in employee 
numbers have been particularly pronounced in France and the UK, since 1990. The table also 
shows increased numbers of employees and bank branches for Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
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Table 2 .7 The Numbers of Branches And Employees (in 000's) in Each EU County 
Country 1985 1990 1994 
Branches Employees 
(000's) 
Branches Employees 
(000's) 
Branches Employees 
(000's) 
Belgium 8207 71 8314 62 7791 60 
Denmark 3411 52 2965 55 2245 50 
France 25782 449 25742 440 25389 406 
Germany 39925 591 44345 637 48721 675 
Greece 1815 27 2125 52 2417 54 
Ireland - - 75 - 808 - 
Italy 13033 319 19080 334 23120 341 
Luxembourg 19 10 30 16 69 19 
Netherlands 6868 92 8992 117 8269 120 
Portugal 1494 59 1999 59 3401 60 
Spain 32503 244 32234 252 35591 247 
UK 22224 350 20081 445 17522 384 
Total 149101 2264 165982 2469 175343 2416 
- denotes not available. 
Source: National Central Banks. Adapted from EU (1997a), Table 4.21, p. 71 and Table 4.24, 
p. 77. 
Overall, the combination of decreasing numbers of banks and increasing branch numbers 
suggests consolidation in many EU banking markets. 
According to EU (1997a), competition has also intensified as the result of the increased influence 
of foreign banks in EU banking markets. Table 2.8 shows increase in the absolute numbers of 
banks, while Table 2.9 shows changes in the market shares of foreign banks. 
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Table 2 .8 Number of 
Foreign Banks Operating in Selected EU Countries 
Country 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Belgium 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 
Denmark 65 68 70 74 78 79 84 92 
France 117 131 157 216 217 261 277 285 
Italy 36 34 36 37 38 40 41 45 
Luxembourg - - 121 125 127 146 129 127 
Netherlands - - - - - 40 71 104 
UK 254 256 259 255 255 255 254 257 
- denotes not available 
Source: EU (1997a), p. 56. 
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Table 2.9: Market share of Foreign Banks Operating in Selected EU Countries (%1 
Country 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Belgium 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.4 -- - - 48.1 
Denmark - - - - - - - - 
France 11.4 12.4 13.2 13.0 13.2 14.1 14.2 14.2 
Germany 4.2 4.4 4.4 3.9 3.8 4.4 4.5 4.5 
Greece 13.1 - - 10.0 - - 11.3 - 
Ireland 24.0 - - 24.0 - - - 37.0 
Italy 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.1 2.1 2.7 3.4 3.5 
Portugal 4.1 4.2 4.7 - - - - - 
Spain 9.7 9.0 9.7 10.0 - - - - 
UK 61.6 60.8 59.1 57.2 54.9 56.3 56.6 57.4 
- denotes not available 
Source: EU (1997a), p. 56. 
The number of foreign banks operating in France increased by more than 100 per cent between 
1987 and 1994. Over the same period substantial increases were also recorded in Denmark and 
the Netherlands. Although there was relatively little growth over this period, foreign banks 
maintained a significant presence in the UK and Luxembourg. With the exception of the UK and 
Greece, foreign banks increased their market share in all of the markets for which complete data 
were available. 
Along with the increasing influence of foreign banks, there has also been an increase in 
acquisition and merger activity, strategic alliances between banks and insurance firms, and cross 
border alliances between commercial banks. 30 All of these initiatives can be interpreted as 
30 Examples of cross border alliances include Credit Lyonnais with Commerzbank and Banco di Roma, 
and BNP with Dresdner Bank, Credit Romagnolo and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya. 
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attempts on the part of existing banks to diversify income streams and increase their own market 
power against a background of increasing competitive pressure. The trend toward larger size is 
illustrated in Table 2.10, which compares concentration in selected EU banking markets pre and 
post 1992. 
Table 2.10: Five Bank Concentration Ratio 1979-1994 
Country Average CRS: 
1979-1992 
Average CRS: 
1993-1994 
Percentage 
Change (+ or -) 
Belgium 56.1 61.2 +5.1 
Denmark 59.6 87.0 +27.3 
France 49.1 44.2 -4.9 
Germany 26.8 28.4 +1.6 
Greece 66.0 59.9 -6.1 
Italy 40.6 42.1 +1.5 
Luxembourg 23.0 19.0 -4.0 
Netherlands 86.1 89.9 +3.8 
Portugal 57.2 55.0 -2.2 
Spain 47.1 59.5 +12.4 
UK 37.0 46.1 +9.1 
Source: OECD, Central banks, Banking Associations. Adapted from EU (1997a), Table 4.23, 
p. 76. 
The large increases in the concentration ratios in Denmark and Spain can be attributed to 
mergers between large banks, as well as a number of acquisitions by large commercial banks of 
smaller savings and co-operative banks. Examples of merger between large Spanish banks 
include the 1988 amalgamation of Banco de Bilbao and Banco de Vizcaya, creating Banco Bilbao 
de Vizcaya; and Banco Central and Banco Hispanoamericano, creating Banco Central Hispano. 
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In the Netherlands ABN and Amro merged to create ABN Amro (1990), and NMB and Postbank 
merged to create NMB Postbank (1991) 31 In Denmark consolidation mainly resulted from 
restructuring as a consequence of poor performance of domestic banks in the early 1990s (EU, 
1997a). Although not shown in the table, significant increases in concentration occurred in 
Scandanavian markets during the 1990s in the aftermath of their banking crisis in 1991-1992. In 
Greece, concentration has fallen as more efficient banks have entered what was previously a 
heavily regulated market. In France, the substantial losses of Credit Lyonnais in the early 1990s 
led to a fall in its market share, which partly explains the fall in market concentration. 32 
Overall, since the single market, the structure of the banking industry has substantially altered. 
Most banking markets have increased in size. In general, the industry post 1992 is characterised 
by fewer numbers of large banks operating larger branch networks. 
2.6.2 Conduct Characteristics of EU Banking Markets Pre and Post 1992 
The conduct of EU banks is influenced by factors including, competition from domestic and 
foreign banks, changes in national and supra-national legislation, changes in technology and 
variations in general macroeconomic conditions. Using the data from two surveys, Table 2.11 
summarises the perceptions of EU banks concerning the importance of these factors in 
influencing their own behaviour. 
31 The importance of acquisition and merger activity as a bank strategy is examined in the following section. 
For further detail see Lafferty Business Research (1990) and Canals (1993). 32 See Morgan Stanley (1995) for further detail. 
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Table 2.11 Relative Importance of Factor Affecting Bank Conduct 
Factor Importance of factor Importance of factor 
(Arthur Anderson, 1993)1 (EU postal study, 1996 2 
Technological Chan e 5 83 
Competition From Domestic - 76 
Financial Firms 
Competition Between Banks 2 68 
And Non-banks 
Domestic Regulatory 4 65 
Developments 
EU Sin le Market Pro ramme 1 53 
Competition From Financial 3 53 
Firms In Other EU Countries 
Competition From Financial 3 47 
Firms In Other Non-EU 
Countries 
- not available ' Ranking in terms of importance on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1= most important and 5= least 
important. 
2 Where 0 is ' not important', 25 is ' of little importance', 50 is 'quite important', 75 is 'very 
important', and 100 is 'critically important! 
Source: Arthur Andersen (1993) and EU postal survey 1996. Adapted from EU (1997a), Table 
4.38, p. 109. 
In 1993, a survey carried out by Arthur Andersen revealed that bankers viewed the EU single 
market programme as the main factor likely to shape their conduct in future years. Competition 
from other banks and non-banks also appeared to play an important role, followed by changes in 
domestic regulation and technology. In 1996, an EU survey suggested that bankers' attitudes to 
many of these factors had changed. Technological change was now perceived to be the most 
important element in determining the strategies which banks pursued, while the single market in 
financial services now appeared less important This change in attitudes can be partly explained 
by the fact that as banking markets have become harmonised across EU countries, banks have 
placed greater emphasis on searching for cost efficiency savings. In addition, the universal 
banking model permits banks to offer different types of products and services. Banks have further 
sought to improve their competitive position by focusing on cost efficiency and shareholder value 
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issues, and engaging in forms of non-price competition such as product and process innovation 
(Canals, 1993). 33 
In order to exploit fully opportunities for product and process innovation, and to provide a 
comprehensive service to their customers (such as large multinational firms), banks now have to 
be large. This is true especially for those banks which have large corporate customers (Walter, 
1988). The responses of banks to changes in the competitive environment are summarised in 
Table 2.12. 
Table 2.12: Strategic Responses of Banks to Structural Change 
Product area Increased cross Product Merger I Alliance 
border activity diversification I Take-over 
innovation(both 
cross border and 
retail) 
Investment 21 41 10 
mans ement 
Off balance sheet 22 46 4 
activities 
Corporate customer 17 50 4 
loans 
Corporate customer 13 46 4 
deposits 
Retail deposits (sight 9 54 6 
and time 
Retail customers 8 51 7 
loans 
Other retail saving 4 64 7 
products 
Retail customer 4 48 8 
mortgages 
Retail insurance 2 42 20 
products 
All figures are number of' Yes' responses from a total sample size of 115 banks. 
Source: EU (1997a), Table 4.41, p. 113. 
In all of the product areas covered, some European banks have adopted strategies of product 
diversification or innovation. Reasons given include: 1) reducing the variability of revenues 
33 The Second Banking Directive has encouraged this type of competitive trend. 
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through offering a wider range of services; 2) reducing the risks inherent in certain types of 
banking services; and 3) making more efficient use of market presence in a particular area 
(Canals, 1993). For instance, respondents from 21 different banks stated that structural change 
encouraged them to undertake more cross border investment management business. In general 
most increases in cross border activity tended to be in the wholesale area of banking business. 
As part of a strategy of diversification and innovation, many banks have begun to offer off balance 
sheet and fee based services in an attempt to capture market share, and partly to move beyond 
traditional areas of business in which competition has intensified (Gardener and Molyneux, 1993, 
chapter 5). The importance of these new areas of business is reflected in the increase in fee and 
other non-interest income as a proportion of the total income of many banks, (Arthur Anderson, 
1993), as shown in Table 2.13. 
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Table 2.13: Fees. Commission and other Non-Interest Income as a Proportion of Gross 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
European Union 21.5 24.9 28.1 36.0 31.6 
Belgium 25.5 25.1 25.3 33.1 26.7 
Denmark 20.3 18.6 18.2 17.6 17.9 
France 20.8 23.7 29.1 34.6 31.1 
Germany 16.1 13.7 21.9 26.9 23.1 
Greece 14.5 16.7 25.5 49.7 54.1 
Ireland 43.2 29.8 25.6 30.0 31.8 
Italy 26.8 27.4 20.1 32.2 25.9 
Luxembourg 65.6 62.1 54.6 45.0 38.6 
Netherlands 22.9 23.4 30.5 64.5 61.8 
Portugal 18.0 18.8 21.8 26.1 21.7 
Spain 14.2 17.9 19.4 25.7 17.0 
UK 34.3 36.9 41.9 47.8 42.3 
Source: IBCA Bankscope. Adapted from EU (1997a), Table 4.36, p. 105. 
Table 2.13 shows the proportion of banks gross income accounted for by fees, commissions and 
other non-interest income. For the EU as a whole, the proportion of non-interest income has risen 
from 28.1 per cent in 1992, to 31.6 per cent by 1994. All countries except Spain, Denmark and 
Luxembourg show increases in fee and commission income since 1992, with the largest 
increases recorded in Netherlands and Greece. 
Strategic responses to changes in the competitive environment include mergers and acquisitions, 
and strategic alliances. Banks may merge to achieve economies of scale to boost profitability 
through efficiency gains; to achieve a presence in another market segment or establish a foreign 
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presence; to increase size to discourage any future take-over threat; to satisfy managerial 
objectives; or to increase profits by the exercise of market power (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 
1999). 
Abraham and Lierman (1991) and Gual and Neven (1993) study merger and acquisition activity, 
and other types of co-operation agreements over the periods 1984 to 1989, and 1984 to 1991 
respectively. Merger and acquisition activity increased during the period leading up to the creation 
of the single market. Most of this activity involved domestic institutions. Since 1992 there have 
been a number of cross border acquisitions and co-operation deals. These deals range from 
loose arrangements relating to marketing activities to tighter agreements involving the swapping 
of ownership stakes (Vesala, 1993). M These agreements involve trying to penetrate foreign 
markets through existing branch networks, or reducing the likelihood of take-over (Lafferty 
Business Research, 1990,1993). 
According to EU (1997a), merger and acquisition activities increased in EU banking markets that 
were characterised by a high degree of regulation in the 1980s, including France, Italy and Spain. 
Banks also increased domestic and cross border activities by becoming bigger. The extent of 
acquisition and merger activity is shown in Table 2.14. 
34 Vesala notes the historical development of what he terms as banking clubs. He outlines five main 
banking clubs including, 1) ABECOR which consists of Algemene Bank Nederland, Banque Bruxelles 
Lambert, Banque Internationale a Luxembourg, BNP, Barclays Bank, Hypo-Bank, Dresdner Bank and 
Osterriche Landesbank; 2) EBIC which consists of ABN AMRO, Deutsche Bank, Generale Bank, Midland 
Bank and Societe Generale; 3) EUROPARTNERS which consist of Commerzbank, Credit Lyonnais, Banco Hispano Americano and Banco di Roma; 4) INTER-ALPHA which consists of Allied Irish Banks, Banco 
Bilbao Vizcaya, Banco Espirito Santo e Commercial de Lisboa, Berliner Handels und Frankfurter Bank, Credit Commercial de France, Instituto Bancario San Paolo di Torini, Kredietbank, Nederlandsche, 
Middenstandsbank, Unibank, and Royal Bank of Scotland and 5) SCANDANAVIAN BANKING PARTNERS 
which consists of Suomen Yhdyspankki, Bergen Bank, Unibank, S-E Banken, and Scandinavian Banking 
Partners. 
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In the UK a large number of domestic mergers took place. Target banks for cross-border 
acquisitions were primarily located in France, Italy, Spain and the UK. In the main, acquiring 
banks were from the UK, France and Germany (Gual and Neven, 1993 and EU, 1997a). 
In summary, changes in the competitive structure of EU banking appear to have affected the 
strategies which banks follow. In particular, the single market programme has led to increased 
cross-border activity, especially in wholesale banking. Strategies of product diversification and 
innovation, strategic alliances and merger activities have contributed to the growth of many 
banks. These strategies are likely to affect substantially the performance of the industry as a 
whole. This proposition is now examined. 
2.6.3 Performance Characteristics of EU Banking Markets Pre and Post 1992 
This section examines the effects of structural change in EU banking on the performance of EU 
banks. The competitive pressures faced in EU banking markets has encouraged banks to 
become more efficient by reducing costs, eliminating inefficiencies and increasing productivity, 
while at the same time expanding the scale and scope of operations. Increased competition has 
also exerted pressure on the revenues, margins and the general profitability of banking 
institutions. This section examines briefly trends in costs and performance of EU banks in recent 
years. Section 2.6.3.1 examines the implications for the efficiency of banks, while section 2.6.3.2 
examines the effects of these structural changes on the performance of banks. 
2.6.3.1 Efficiency Levels 
Previous research by Salomon Brothers (1993) and Morgan Stanley (1994) suggests that cost 
minimisation is an important objective for many banks. The expansion opportunities offered by 
the single market can enable banks to reduce average costs, if they expand operations to exploit 
economies of scale and scope. The extent to which x-inefficiencies have increased or decreased 
depends partly on the market for corporate control, and partly on the frameworks in place to 
prevent the failure of banks. If corporate governance structures are strong, it is likely that 
managers will be pressured to eliminate x-inefficiencies (Lohneysen et al, 1990). However, if 
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banks are protected from failure by strong depositor insurance schemes, x-inefficiencies are likely 
to remain (Neven, 1990). 
A study of efficiency on the cost side normally involves testing for the existence of economies of 
scale and scope and x-inefficiencies. EU (1997a) tests for the existence of economies of scale in 
ten EU banking markets, and examines the relationship between output and costs pre and post 
1992.35 Using data from 1987 to 1994 for certain countries, and 1990 to 1994 for others, the 
report finds evidence that smaller banks made substantial cost savings by growing to exploit 
economies of scale. They also find that economies of scale tend to increase during 
recovery/boom periods and decrease in periods of recession. 
Variation in bank costs can be also be examined in respect of changes in staff and non staff costs 
as a proportion of total assets. Conti and Maccarinelli (1993) find that over the period 1982-1991, 
staff and non staff costs declined for banks in most EU banking markets. EU (1997a) examine 
trends in these costs pre and post single market. They find that non-staff costs as a proportion of 
total assets have-fallen since 1992, while the reduction in staff costs have been greatest in 
relatively high cost countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
Cost-income ratios also provide useful evidence concerning efficiency. Recent research by 
Morgan Stanley (1994) and EU (1997a) suggest that cost-income ratios have declined in Belgium, 
Germany and the UK suggesting efficiency gains. However, for the EU banking industry as a 
whole, the average cost-income ratio has remained relatively constant at around 68 per cent (EU, 
1997a). Changes in these ratios immediately before and after 1992 are summarised in Table 
2.15. 
3s The ten banking markets examined included UK, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Denmark. 
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Table 2.15: Cost Income Ratios for EU Banking Markets 1990-1994 (in percentage terms) 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
European Union 68.26 68.24 66.28 63.46 68.66 
Belgium 80.42 77.28 74.20 70.26 71.60 
Denmark 61.88 64.39 57.83 40.83 68.33 
France 74.71 72.26 69.60 66.57 73.08 
Germany 74.15 72.39 65.47 60.57 61.02 
Greece 64.03 66.88 61.23 78.65 76.82 
Ireland 66.23 63.85 63.06 63.71 63.12 
Italy 64.94 67.26 70.39 63.84 79.02 
Luxembourg 46.69 46.30 50.77 48.14 57.54 
Netherlands 75.34 75.85 69.32 81.70 80.77 
Portugal 44.72 51.55 53.71 59.52 65.01 
Spain 59.18 63.74 65.91 62.82 71.91 
UK 63.55 62.45 61.97 59.42 62.43 
Source: Adapted from EU (1997a), Table 4.26, p. 87. 
Several explanations can be forwarded as to why cost income ratios have not uniformly fallen in 
the 1990s. Firstly, restrictive employment legislation in various EU countries (e. g. France and 
Italy) makes it difficult and costly for banks to shed staff. Secondly, banks that engage in merger 
and acquisition activity often incur substantial costs associated with such deals. It therefore may 
take some time for scale and scope economies of such merged entities to be realised. 
In recent years the increased use of information technology has offered the possibility for banks 
to offer a number of products and services from the use of the same sets of inputs into the 
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production process. Revell (1987) argues that although new technologies such as electronic 
banking give banks the opportunities to expand and diversify to exploit economies of scope, they 
confer an advantage upon smaller banks. As technology becomes less expensive smaller banks 
become able to enter markets and offer similar services as large banks. They are also able to 
offer such services at lower cost, as they do not incur the costs of maintaining large branch 
networks. Since the advent of the single market, banks have diversified into offering other types 
of financial services by the pooling of information (EU, 1997 a). This has led to costs savings in 
the joint production of goods and services. 36 
The extent to which banks have become more or less efficient over time can be measured by 
calculating x-inefficiencies. Following Liebenstein (1966) x-inefficiencies are the difference 
between actual average cost of banks and the minimum attainable long-run average cost. Recent 
evidence suggests that since the advent of the single market, x-inefficiencies have fallen for many 
banks (see Table 2.16). 37 
36 EU (1 997a) shows that economies of scope exist for banks with assets between ECU 1000-9999 million, 
and for banks with assets of greater than ECU 50 billion. The report finds for that in France, Germany, Italy 
and Spain banks in the size range ECU 1000-9999 had dis-economies of scope for the period preceding 
the formation of the single market and economies of scope thereafter. 37 EU (1997a) calculates x-inefficiencies for an individual country by estimating a long-run cost function, 
and then measuring by how much the banks in each country deviate from the function, thus yielding an 
efficiency score for each country. The results for ten countries are shown in Table 2.16. 
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Table 2.16: X-inefficiencies In EU Banking Markets 1987 -1994 (%) 
Country 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Belgium - - - 21.6 19.2 20.0 19.0 17.6 
Denmark - - - - - 21.2 21.7 12.2 
France 18.0 19.8 22.1 21.0 21.3 21.4 20.2 18.7 
Germany 19.1 18.3 19.9 20.2 21.3 19.9 18.4 17.4 
Italy 15.4 15.2 17.2 14.3 16.6 19.2 19.2 13.3 
Luxembourg - - - 15.2 15.3 13.8 13.6 11.5 
Netherlands - - - 18.1 17.1 25.7 26.9 24.5 
Portugal - - - - - 24.5 18.2 12.3 
Spain 16.0 14.8 15.1 17.9 21.2 20.4 22.0 16.1 
UK - - - 18.1 19.0 19.5 18.2 18.0 
- denotes insufficient data was available to allow the necessary computations. 
Source: Adapted from EU (1997a), Table 4.28, p. 93. 
Table 2.16 shows that there were significant deviations from the efficient long-run average cost 
function for the period 1987-1994. However, x-inefficiencies appear to have decreased towards 
the end of the period. 
Bringing all the available evidence on EU banking industry efficiency together, it appears that the 
single market programme in financial services has resulted in more efficient banks, through the 
realisation of greater scale, scope and x-efficiencies (EU, 1997a). EU (1997a) contends that if 
universal banking is now the norm, there should be greater opportunities for scope economies. 
46 
2.6.3.2 Performance Levels 
In recent years, the performance of banks operating within the EU is likely to have been 
influenced by the process of de-regulation (OECD, 1992). Conti and Maccarinelli (1993) assert 
that increased competition has led to pressure on incumbent banks to sustain interest margins 
and boost returns on equity. Such pressures have intensified as savings and other types of 
institutions move into areas traditionally dominated by commercial banks. De-regulation of 
financial markets and the increasing influence of foreign banks in many markets have threatened 
the profitability of incumbent banks (White, 1998). 
However, the general decline in national interest rates brought about by the low inflation 
environment of the 1990s, coupled with EMU convergence criteria, means that margins are likely 
to be low. Especially, as the competition for savings and lending services has intensified (OECD, 
1992). Table 2.17 shows the trend in net interest margins over the period 1990-1994. 
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Table 2.17: Net Interest Margins 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
European Union 2.46 2.29 2.19 2.16 2.09 
Belgium 2.19 2.08 1.98 1.69 1.76 
Denmark 2.81 2.77 2.74 2.58 2.37 
France 2.53 2.37 2.15 1.99 1.91 
Germany 1.63 1.63 1.71 1.84 1.81 
Greece 4.51 4.15 5.62 2.03 1.80 
Ireland 1.90 2.30 4.72 4.12 3.39 
Italy 3.41 3.09 2.96 3.25 2.77 
Luxembourg 0.62 0.57 0.86 1.07 1.05 
Netherlands 1.87 1.76 1.77 1.89 1.90 
Portugal 3.21 3.04 3.62 3.90 4.05 
Spain 4.92 4.02 3.43 3.00 3.06 
UK 2.39 2.33 2.25 2.22 2.28 
Note: Data in percentage terms 
Source: IBCA Bankscope (1996) Adapted from EU (1997a), Table 4.35, p. 103. 
Net interest margins have fallen in the EU banking industry as a whole. By individual banking 
market, margins have declined by the largest amount in countries which were previously among 
the most heavily regulated, including Spain, Italy, and Greece. On the other hand, increases in 
margins were recorded in Portugal, Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg and Ireland. 
Returns on equity have, in the majority of cases also fallen, in response to consumers exercising 
greater choice between competing products and services, and movements in the business cycle 
(Conti and Maccarinelli, 1993). Table 2.18 shows average returns on average equity by banking 
market for the period 1990-1994. 
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Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
European Union 10.9 8.05 5.53 7.38 5.53 
Belgium 9.18 7.76 8.86 10.65 10.38 
Denmark -2.49 2.50 -7.70 17.01 -3.64 
France 9.18 7.37 4.15 2.77 1.37 
Germany 6.39 6.53 5.57 7.08 6.36 
Greece 17.50 19.12 16.43 12.71 11.32 
Ireland 11.71 13.19 16.40 13.03 14.64 
Italy 11.16 8.51 4.58 4.76 0.70 
Luxembourg 9.40 7.72 11.71 14.98 13.22 
Netherlands 9.56 8.68 8.70 10.99 10.61 
Portugal 18.66 20.54 15.56 8.73 10.73 
Spain 15.60 14.23 11.20 9.19 10.25 
UK 11.95 8.89 8.20 14.18 14.86 
Note: Data in percentage terms 
Source: IBCA Bankscope (1996) Adapted from EU (1997a), Table 4.37, p. 107. 
In the EU banking industry as a whole the average return on equity has declined from 10.9 per 
cent in 1990, to 5.53 per cent in 1994. In most countries, returns on equity fell between 1992 and 
1994 including Spain, Italy, France, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. The less regulated banking 
markets in the EU enjoyed an increase in the return on equity including the UK, Germany, 
Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. This is partly because these markets were better 
prepared for the consequences of the single market, and consequently found it easier to compete 
than banks which had previously been protected from intensive competition. Undoubtedly, 
however, the business cycle and re-structuring of many of these banking markets is also likely to 
influence the performance of banks. 
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Metais (1997) commenting on banking profitability in the 1990s observes that: 
' Bank profits did not only decline, they also seem now more volatile. More generally the 
economic environment has grown riskier during the past decade for banks and their customers 
alike: exchange rates, interest rates, assets prices all show higher volatility. This is often 
considered as an (unforeseen? ) outcome of financial innovation and de-regulation. i38 
Section 2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the various changes which have taken place in European banking over 
the past 20 years. The banking industry in Europe has moved from a system of segmented 
national markets towards a more integrated market for financial goods and services. These 
changes have greatly affected the structure of the competitive environment under which banks 
operate. There are now fewer banks operating extensive branch networks, while employing less 
workers. Competition between commercial and other types of banks (as well as other financial 
services firms) has increased as a consequence of de-regulation and technological advances. In 
response to increasing competitive pressure, banks have pursued policies (such as merger and 
acquisition) aimed at differentiating themselves from rivals, through becoming larger, and / or 
more efficient. This has led to increases in concentration in some banking markets. In pursuit of 
these objectives banks have diversified into new product areas and services in order to pool risk, 
increased size to realise economies of scale and scope, and reduce x-inefficiencies. However, 
the falling costs of technology implementation, may in future give small banks or non-banks a 
competitive advantage (Llewellyn, 1995). Overall, the increased competition has led to declines in 
interest margins and increases in non-interest income. However, while the single market has 
increased competition, significant barriers still remain. For example the retail banking market is 
still organised at a national, not a European wide level. However, EMU is likely to make the 
market more contestable. ' Banks are thus likely to pursue a broad range of strategies to add 
shareholder value in tighter market conditions, including in-market and cross-border mergers. 
Deeper strategic alliances could well be forged, emulating developments in other global 
industries. '39 
38 Metals (1997), p. 23. 
39 Oxford Analytica / Citibank (1998), p. 8. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND THE PERFORMANCE AND EVOLUTION OF MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRIES 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the importance of market structure in determining the performance and 
evolution for manufacturing industries from a theoretical and empirical perspective. The first part 
of the chapter examines the likely behaviour and performance of firms under different market 
structures. This includes a discussion of the neo-classical theories of market structure that 
evolved into theories of industrial organisation. Many of the manufacturing studies discussed in 
this chapter have been influential in determining the research in banking markets. Therefore, a 
discussion of these is essential in understanding the rationale behind banking studies, which are 
examined in the following chapter. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 
examines market structure within the confines of deductive micro-economic theory. Section 3.3 
discusses how concentration is measured. Section 3.4 examines industrial organisation theory 
placing emphasis on the Structure Conduct Performance Paradigm (3.4.1), entry and exit barriers 
(3.4.2), the Theory of Contestable Markets (3.4.3), game theory (3.4.4), the persistence of profits 
(3.4.5), the Law of Proportionate Effect (3.4.6) and other determinants of concentration (3.4.7). 
Conclusions are drawn in section 3.5. Overall, the aim of this chapter is to examine performance 
outcomes arising from different types of market structure, and the most important factors in 
determining market concentration. 
3.2 A Micro-economic Analysis of Industry Structure 
There are four main theoretical market structures outlined in micro-economic theory, namely 
perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition and oligopoly. The basic components of 
market structure include the number and size distributions of firms, the type of product produced 
(homogenous or differentiated), the extent of control over prices by incumbents, and the ease 
with which firms can enter or exit markets. 
51 
Neo-classical competition analysis began using a static framework first developed by Cournot 
(1838), who specified the effects of competition at its limit (i. e. competitive equilibrium). Cournot 
also developed a theory of oligopoly, which suggests that as the number of sellers in an industry 
increase price falls towards marginal cost. Emphasis is placed on the condition of equilibrium and 
not the process undertaken to reach such a state. Subsequent contributions by Jevons (1871), 
Edgeworth (1881), Clark (1899) and Knight (1921) led to the present day model of perfect 
competition. 1 Paradoxically, long run equilibrium under perfect competition implies an absence of 
rivalry. If the firm can do nothing to influence price, and all market participants are perfectly 
informed about all production possibilities in the market, then the competitive process has run its 
course. 
A perfectly competitive industry has five main characteristics. First, there are many buyers and 
sellers such that the action of any individual buyer or seller has negligible influence on the market 
price. Second, producers and consumers have perfect knowledge of events in the market and act 
upon this knowledge. Third, the product is homogenous so consumers are indifferent between 
each producer's product. Fourth, firms act independently of each other in such a way as to 
maximise profits. Finally, there is perfect mobility of resources. Firms are free to enter or exit and 
to supply markets with the quantities they wish. 
If these conditions are satisfied, a competitive equilibrium may exist in which all firms earn a 
normal profit. In the short run firms can earn supernormal profits, defined as returns in excess of 
normal profits (the minimum necessary to induce the firm to remain within the market it occupies). 
However, in the long run, new firms enter the market and bid these profits away, so eventually all 
firms earn normal profits. If the firm is unable to earn normal profits then in the long run resources 
leave the firm for other firms, or the firm withdraws from the market. 
The theory of perfect competition assumes that all firms are free to enter and exit markets, which 
ensures that large numbers of small firms make normal profits. However, in reality, competitive 
1 Stigler (1957) discusses the development of the theory of perfect competition. 
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conditions often give rise to many industries consisting of a few large firms which may have 
considerable influence over the prices charged, enabling these firms to earn abnormal profits. 
Drawing on the earlier insights of Marshall (1890), Sraffa (1926) formulates a theory of monopoly. 
Sraffa argues that as firms grow in size they enjoy lower average costs through economies of 
scale advantages, which ultimately lead to a highly concentrated industry structure consisting of 
small numbers of large firms. In the extreme, the industry could become a monopoly in which a 
single firm normally selling a highly differentiated product can charge a high price and earn 
abnormal profits. 
Influenced by Sraffa, Chamberlin (1933) brings together the previously separate theories of 
monopoly and perfect competition, to formulate theories of oligopoly and monopolistic 
competition. 2 Under the theory of monopolistic competition, markets contain elements of 
monopoly and competition. Chamberlin emphasises non-price as well as price competition. This 
non-price competition can come in the form of product differentiation, trademarks and brand 
names. Though a large number of sellers may exist in a market (this being the competitive part of 
monopolistic competition), each firm's product has some unique characteristics, which give the 
firm some discretion over price (this being the monopolistic part of monopolistic competition). As 
in perfect competition there is free entry and exit. However, unlike perfect competition each firm's 
product is slightly different. As a result, firms do not face perfectly elastic demand curves and are 
not price takers. An individual firm can charge more for a product than its competitors because 
there is brand loyalty. In the short run the firm can earn supernormal profits, but because there is 
free entry, only normal profits are earned in the long run. 
2 Robinson (1933) forwards similar arguments, under the heading of imperfect competition. 
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Chamberlin also contributes to the theory of oligopoly. 3 Under oligopoly, firms realise that their 
actions are interdependent (i. e. a change in output by one firm will alter the profits of rival firms 
and cause them to adjust their output). Competitive behaviour under oligopoly ranges from 
vigorous price competition which can often lead to competing firms making substantial losses, to 
collusion. Firms can collude either tacitly, (through dominant firm or barometric price leadership), 
or explicitly through a formal cartel agreement, with the most extreme version of this being joint 
profit maximisation, with the colluding firms operating as a single monopolist to maximise the 
industry profits (Machlup, 1952 and Bain, 1956). 
3.3 Measurement Of Market Concentration4 
An empirical analysis of the competitive environment usually involves examining the effects of 
market structure on the behaviour and performance of firms. Market concentration has been the 
predominant measure of market structure used. Any measure of concentration attempts to 
capture the prevailing structure and the extent of competitive forces operating in an industry. The 
behaviour of firms is affected by the number of firms, and whether or not there is mutual 
recognition of interdependence. The structure of the industry is also characterised by the size 
distribution of firms. For example, an industry consisting of ten equal sized firms will be very 
different to an industry with a dominant firm and a smaller competitive fringe. This section 
examines the more commonly used measures of concentration. These include Concentration 
Ratios, Gini Coefficient, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, Hannah and Kay Index, Entropy Coefficient, 
The Variance of Logarithms in Firm Size and the Lerner Index of Monopoly Power. 
3 This work has its roots in earlier theories of oligopoly forwarded by Coumot (1838), Bertrand (1883) and 
von Stackleberg (1934). In Coumot's model, firms compete on output, while in the Bertrand model firms 
compete on the basis of price. In both models, firms sell homogenous products. Von Stackleberg updates 
this work by developing a model where one firm leads other member(s) of the industry and sets output, and 
leaves the rest to follow. Although, Chamberlin acknowledges these contributions, he extends the analysis 
by emphasising competition amongst firms selling differentiated products. See Chamberlin (1933) for a full 
discussion. 
4 Appendix 1 reviews studies which test for the importance of economies of scale, market growth and 
product differentiation in explaining the level and change in concentration. 
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The concentration ratio measures the market share of the top N firms in an industry where N is 
normally taken as 3,4 or 8.5 
N 
CRN =ý x1 xi = market share of firm i. (1) 
For example, a four firm concentration ratio measures the sum of the shares of the top four firms. 
Traditionally, market share is measured as sales, assets or number of employees. The measure 
suffers from the problem that it only focuses on the top firms in the industry, and so takes no 
account of the distribution of remaining firms. 
As a result many researchers have adopted summary measures of concentration, which take into 
account all firms. The Gini Coefficient is based on the Lorenz curve. The value of the coefficient is 
determined by the extent to which the Lorenz curve deviates from the line of absolute equality. A 
value of zero indicates that all firms are equal sized, while a value of one indicates that a single 
firm dominates the industry. The measure ignores the number of firms in an industry. For 
example, an industry with two equal sized firms would have the same Gini coefficient as an 
industry with one hundred equal sized firms. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index uses every point in the firm size distribution. It is defined as the 
sum of the squares of the market shares of each firm. 6 
N 
H-H=E (x; )2 xi = market share of firm i. 
i-I 
(2) 
5 Bailey and Boyle (1971) find a strong correlation between concentration ratios using varying numbers of 
firms. 
6 This measure is due to Hirschman (1945) and Herfindahl (1950). 
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As a result larger firms receive a higher weighting to reflect their relative importance in the 
industry. A numbers equivalent measure can be calculated as H1H, which gives 
the number of 
equal sized firms that an industry can sustain. 
Using a similar measure to the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index, Hannah and Kay (1977) argue that 
firm market shares can be given weights ranging from a=0.6 to 2.5 depending on the 
importance the researcher wishes to attach to the larger firms in the industry. The index can be 
expressed as follows: 
N 
H-K=L (x; )a xi = market share of firm i. 
i-I 
The larger the value of a, the more importance is given to larger firms. 
(3) 
The Entropy coefficient (E) is a measure that quantifies the degree of uncertainty. It is defined to 
be the sum of each firm's market share multiplied by the logarithm of its reciprocal, as follows: 
N 
E= xi Jog 
1 
xi = market share of firm i. 
i-I xi 
(4) 
The higher the value of the coefficient the greater the certainty as to the established firms' future 
relationships with buyers in the market. A value of E=1 indicates a monopoly position, which will 
ensure that the firm will have a captive market, as no substitute goods exist. 
In reality, many industries have firm size distributions that correspond closely to the log normal 
distribution, with large numbers of small firms, fewer medium sized firms, and small numbers of 
large firms. As a result many researchers have used the variance of the logarithms of market 
shares to measure the inequality in firm sizes (Aitchison and Brown, 1966). This can be 
expressed as follows: 
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VL =Nx; = market share of firm i; xi / N. (5) 
This measure suffers from the same limitations as the Gini coefficient. 
Based on textbook models of profit maximising behaviour under perfect competition and 
monopoly, the Lerner Index (L) is a measure of monopoly power and specified as follows: 
L_ 
P-MC 
P (s) 
where P= price charged and MC = marginal cost. L can take a value between zero and one. L=0 
denotes a perfectly competitive industry where all firms are of equal size setting prices equal to 
marginal costs, while values of L>0 indicate an element of monopoly power, allowing firms to set 
price above marginal cost. 
Although most of these measures have their limitations they normally tend to correlate highly with 
one another (Scherer and Ross, 1990). 7 Hannah and Kay (1977) argue that if a measure is to 
capture the structure of an industry it must satisfy the following criteria. Concentration measures 
should rank one industry as more concentrated than another if the cumulative share of output of 
the largest firms is everywhere greater than the shares of firms from the other. A transfer of sales 
from smaller to larger firms should increase concentration. Entry of smaller firms should decrease 
concentration, while exit of small firms should increase concentration. The mergers of two firms 
within an industry should increase concentration. Random influences on firms' growth should 
increase concentration. If firms have the same proportionate chance of growth, then any growth 
7 See Curry and George (1983) for a full discussion of the problems associated with various measures of 
concentration. 
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will affect large firms' size to a greater degree than smaller firms, and so increase the level of 
concentration. 8 
3.4 The Theory of Industrial Organisation 
Much of Chamberlin's work on oligopoly, and product differentiation (discussed in section 3.2) has 
been pursued in the field that has become known as industrial organisation. The originators of 
this area of study are Edward Mason and Joe Bain, who both concentrate on empirical rather than 
theoretical studies. Later work focuses on competitive behaviour, using game theoretic models. 
However, in recent years there has been a renaissance in empirical research (Bresnahan and 
Schmalensee, 1987). In contrast to the deductive approach of standard micro-economic theory, 
the field of industrial organisation analyses empirical data, and by a process of induction develops 
theories that purport to explain the real world behaviour of firms and industries. 
3.4.1 The Structure Conduct Performance Paradigm 
From Mason's seminal articles (1939,1949) many writers, most notably Bain (1951,1956,1959) 
have developed what has become known as the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm to analyse competitive conditions in markets. The SCP paradigm studies how the 
structure of industry relates to the conduct and performance of firms. This approach attempts to 
explain and predict the performance of an industry (normally measured by profitability) as a 
consequence of market structure (normally measured by a concentration ratio or index). An 
analysis of structure involves examining the number of firms, their relative and absolute size, the 
extent of product differentiation and entry conditions. Market structure is expected to influence the 
conduct of firms that make up the industry. Conduct variables include price setting, collusion, 
strategic moves, advertising and innovation. Performance variables include profits, growth, 
8 This relates to the stochastic explanation of industry concentration discussed under the heading of the 
Law of Proportionate Effect in section 3.4.6. 
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market share, technological progress and efficiency. The emphasis is therefore on the structure 
of industry and how it influences conduct and performance. The approach assumes that the 
smaller the number of firms in an industry, the greater the likelihood of the abuse of market power 
and the greater the profitability of these incumbent firms. However, it is possible that conduct and 
performance can have feedback effects on the structure of an industry (Phillips, 1976). Most 
early research focuses on the extent to which markets become concentrated, and how this affects 
performance. Therefore, a positive correlation between concentration and profits is caused by 
firms acting in a collusive manner to achieve high profits. 
The SCP school views market structures as imperfect, requiring government regulation to check 
the abuse of market power. However, the Chicago School argues that government interference 
leads to less competition. (Stigler, 1968 and Demsetz, 1973). A positive relationship between 
concentration and profits does not necessarily imply collusive behaviour. It may be that bigger 
firms are more efficient and make higher profits as a result. Therefore, in markets with a small 
number of large firms, profits tend to be higher. These opposing views have formed the basis for 
a substantial empirical debate. This is now discussed. 
At a theoretical level the traditional Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) view of industrial 
organisation considers the industry as a single unit consisting of firms which are assumed to be 
alike in all respects except size. As an industry becomes more concentrated, firms find it easier to 
collude and erect barriers to entry to earn excess profits. All firms are expected to earn similar 
profits if market power is shared. This view of industrial organisation has provided the basis for 
numerous studies that have found a weak positive correlation between concentration and profits. 
These findings have become known as the traditional market concentration doctrine. In brief, the 
traditional view of industrial organisation focuses on industry specific sources of market power. 
Bain (1951) tests the concentration hypothesis for US manufacturing industries between 1936 - 
1940, and finds that in industries with eight-firm concentration ratios (CR8) of more than 70%, 
profits were significantly higher than in those with CR8 less than 70%. These results have been 
interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that concentration facilitates collusion and limits rivalry. 
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Bain's findings were confirmed by numerous studies that provided empirical justification for 
government intervention aimed at increasing competition. 9 Bain's findings went unchallenged for 
more than twenty years, until the early 1970s. 
Demsetz (1973,1974) and others challenge this traditional view of industrial organisation, forming 
what has become known as the "revisionist" school. 10 Revisionists argue that market structure 
affects profitability not through concentration, but by the association between market share and 
profitability. They argue that because by definition, concentrated industries contain firms with high 
market shares, the average level of profit is greater in more concentrated industries. Therefore, a 
positive relationship between market share and profitability at the firm level implies a relationship 
between profit and industry concentration, even if higher concentration has no effect on conduct. 
The revisionists assert that if the positive relationship between market concentration and 
profitability reflects the exercise of market power, it should affect all firms equally. If large firms in 
concentrated industries have higher profits than small firms, then the correlation between profits 
and concentration is the result of the underlying relationship between profits and efficiency which 
has allowed these firms to become large. Firms with a competitive advantage in production 
become large and attain large market shares, and as a consequence the industry becomes 
concentrated. If all firms operate at similar levels of efficiency, concentration and average profits 
are low. If some firms are more efficient than others, these firms capture a larger share of the 
market, so concentration is high. Efficient firms earn higher profits, so average profits are 
positively correlated with concentration levels, even though there is no collusion. This implies that 
a policy aimed at de-concentration to promote greater competition is not appropriate. 
Demsetz (1973) tests the efficiency hypothesis and challenges the findings of Bain and others. 
Demsetz uses data from the US Internal Revenue Service for 95 industries. The data is classified 
9 For a summary of these studies see Weiss (1974), p. 204-15. Weiss reviews the results of a large number 
of concentration-profits studies, and finds that virtually all of these studies report a significant positive 
relationship between profits and industry concentration. 
10 The term revisionist is due to Schmalensee (1985). For related arguments see Peltzman (1977). 
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by industry concentration and firm sizes. Rates of return are measured by profit plus interest 
divided by total assets. The results are shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Rates of Return by Size and Concentration (weighted by assetsl 
CR4 Number of 
Industries 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R 
10-20 14 7.3% 9.5% 10.6% 8.0% 8.8% 
20-30 22 4.4% 8.6% 9.9% 10.6% 8.4% 
30-40 24 5.1% 9.0% 9.4% 11.7% 8.8% 
40-50 21 4.8% 9.5% 11.2% 9.4% 8.7% 
50-60 11 0.9% 9.6% 10.8% 12.2% 8.4% 
Over 60 3 5.0% 8.6% 10.3% 21.6% 11.3% 
CR4 is the four firm concentration ratio measured on industry sales in 1963. 
R1 is average rate of return for firms with assets <$ 500,000 
R2 is average rate of return for firms with at least $ 500,000 assets but <$5 million. 
R3 is average rate of return for firms with at least $5 million assets but <$ 50 million. 
R4 is average rate of return for firms with assets >$ 50 million. 
Source: Demsetz (1973), page 6, Table 2 
According to Demsetz, the association between collusion and concentration has little effect on the 
profits of firms in classes R1, R2 and R3. Profits of individual firms in these groups do not rise 
with concentration. However, in the largest class R4, profits do increase with concentration, 
lending support to the efficiency hypothesis. By regressing differences in profit rates on 
concentration ratios, Demsetz finds a significant positive non linear relationship between 
concentration and relative rates of return, which decreases in strength over the range R1 to R3. 
Smirlock, Gilligan and Marshall (1984) test the efficiency against the collusion hypothesis using 
Fortune data on 132 US manufacturing firms covering the period 1961-69. 
The estimated equation is: 
q*=a0 +AMS+, ß2CR4+/33HBTE+ß4 MBTE+ß5MSG (7) 
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where q* is Tobin's q averaged over the sample period (ratio of the market valuation of the firm to 
replacement cost of its assets); MS is market share; CR4 is the concentration ratio of four largest 
firms; HBTE and MBTE are dummy variables measuring entry barriers (high or medium); MSG 
measures the firm's growth over the period as the ratio of its market share in 1968 to its market 
share in 1961. /11 >0 and ß2 =0 would support efficiency arguments. ß2 >0 and A1=0, 
A 
would support the traditional concentration hypothesis. Overall, they find that X33 and 
A are 
A 
insignificant. ý3 is significant, perhaps because MSG influences investors' expectations about 
whether the firm's market share will increase in the future. More importantly, however, they find 
AA 
X31 is significantly greater than one and iß2 is also positive, but insignificant. These results 
provide general support for the efficiency hypothesis. 
Schmalensee (1985) uses US 1975 Federal Trade Commission line-of-business data for 456 
firms in 261 industries to investigate the relative importance of firm and industry effects. The 
estimated equation is: 
ni, =p+a1 +ß, +1'Sij +s;, (8) 
where: fIij is the accounting rate of return on firm i's production in industry j; S1 is firm i's share 
in the market for industry j's product; a; is the component of Ili, which is specific to firm i 
(measured as the deviation of firm i's profits from the industry average, and is the same for all 
industries in which firm i operates); ßj is the component of fI; j which is specific to industry j 
(measured as the average profits of the industry, and is the same for all firms which operate in 
industry j) and E; j is an error term. a. =0 and fly # 0, would support the traditional SCP 
hypotheses, whereas a, *0 and 6, =0 would support the revisionist view. Schmalensee finds 
that industry effects are very important, explaining 75% of the variations in profits, while firm 
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effects are less important. 11 This, he argues, is supportive of the traditional view of industrial 
organisation. However, Schmalensee's study can be criticised for omitting important firm and 
industry level variables, which may cause bias in the observed results. 
Eckard (1995) uses US data for five cohorts of firms (based on size) to examine the relationship 
between changes in profits (measured by the price-cost margin), arising from changes in market 
share between 1967-1972 and 1972-1977. If the efficiency hypothesis holds, a positive 
relationship should be observed between changes in profit and market shares, implying that 
profits change in response to changes in efficiency. He finds a positive relationship between 
market shares and profits for all firm size bands. These results suggest '... a market process in 
which firms become large and profitable through superior efficiency... '12 
The empirical evidence as to whether firms earn high profits through collusion or differential 
efficiencies appears to be somewhat inconclusive. 13 
3.4.2 Entry and Exit Barriers 
Entry barriers play a crucial role in defining industry structure. By deterring entry, established firms 
can grow, causing industry structures to become more concentrated over time. Bain (1956) 
defines barriers to entry as factors that allow established firms in an industry to earn supernormal 
profits without attracting entry. Stigler (1968) defines barriers to entry as '... a cost of producing (at 
some or every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but 
is not borne by firms already in the industry. '14 Entry barriers can be created by incumbents' 
superior access to high quality inputs which are in short supply, cheaper long term finance or from 
learning economies of scale. Caves and Porter (1977) argue that such barriers apply not only for 
entrants, but also between different groups of existing firms. Groups may arise due to differences 
in products, vertical integration or ownership. 
11 Schmalensee (1985), p. 349. 
12 Eckard (1995), p. 223. 
13 Economist (1998a). 
14 Stigler (1968), p. 67. 
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Shepherd (1997) differentiates between exogenous and endogenous barriers. Exogenous 
barriers arise from basic structural characteristics of the industry, such as product characteristics 
and production technology, while endogenous barriers arise from firms taking conscious 
decisions to impede entry through strategies which may ultimately influence the future structure of 
the industry. Shepherd's classification of exogenous and endogenous entry barriers is reproduced 
in Table 3.2. 
I. EXOGENOUS CAUSES: EXTERNAL SOURCES OF BARRIERS 
1. Capital Requirements: related to minimum efficient scale of plants and firms, capital intensity, 
and capital market imperfections. 
2. Economies of Scale: both technical and pecuniary, which require large-scale entry, with 
greater costs, risks, and intensity of retaliation. 
3. Absolute Cost Advantages: many possible causes including lower wage rates and lower cost 
technology. 
4. Product Differentiation: may be extensive. 
5. Sunk Costs: any cost incurred by an entrant that cannot be recovered upon exit. 
6. Research and Development Intensity: requires entrants to spend heavily on new technology 
and products. 
7. High Durability of Firm-Specific Capital (Asset Specificity): imposes costs for creating 
narrow use assets for entry, and losses if entry fails. 
8. Vertical Integration: may require entry at two or more stages of production, for survival; raises 
costs and risks. 
9. Diversification by Incumbents: mass resources deployed among diverse branches may 
defeat entrants. 
10. Switching Costs: complex systems may entail costs of commitment and training, which 
impede switching to other systems. 
11. Special Risks and Uncertainties: entrants' higher risks may raise their costs of capital. 
12. Gaps and Asymmetries of Information: incumbents' superior information helps them bar 
entrants and may raise entrants' cost of capital. 
13. Formal, Official Barriers Set by Government Agencies or Industry-wide Groups: 
examples are utility franchises, bank entry limits, and foreign trade duties and barriers. 
II. ENDOGENOUS CAUSES: VOLUNTARY AND STRATEGIC SOURCES OF BARRIERS 
1. Pre-emptive and Retaliatory Actions by Incumbents: including selective price discounts to 
deter or punish entry. 
2. Excess Capacity: the incumbent's excess capacity lets it retaliate sharply and threaten 
retaliation credibly. 
3. Selling Expenses, Including Advertising: increases the degree of product differentiation. 
4. Segmenting the Market: segregates customer groups by demand elasticities and makes 
broad entry more difficult. 
5. Patents: may provide exclusive control over critical or lower-cost technology and products. 
6. Exclusive Controls over other Strategic Resources: such as superior ores, favourable 
locations, and unique talents of personnel. 
7. Raising Rival's Costs: actions that require entrants to incur extra costs. 
8. Packing the Product Space: may occur in industries with high product differentiation. 
Source: Shepherd (1997), p. 210, Table 9.1. 
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Bain (1956) defines entry as the establishment of a new firm, which introduces new capacity that 
did not exist before the establishment of the new firm. Bain argues that a firm can enter either by 
building new capacity or by converting existing plant and machinery used in another industry for 
use in the new venture. However, Bain focuses mainly on the former. This assumption has been 
criticised, as it is unlikely that an established firm in another industry will set up a new legal entity 
in order to enter a market. 
The following examines the sources of exogenous and endogenous entry barriers. 
Exogenous Barriers to Entry 
The study of exogenous sources of entry barriers began with the work of Bain (1956). Bain 
defines four types of exogenous barriers, namely, economies of scale, capital requirements, 
absolute cost advantage and product differentiation. 
A capital requirements barrier can occur if the nature of the production process requires 
substantial set up costs. As a result the entrant finds it difficult or impossible to raise the finance 
to meet set up costs. 
Economies of scale can also act as a barrier to entry. If the incumbent firm has a scale 
advantage, two possibilities exist. Firstly, the potential entrant can enter producing less output, in 
which case it will incur higher average costs. Secondly, the potential entrant can produce similar 
levels of output, in which case it may need to spend heavily on establishing capacity and 
capturing market share. 
An absolute cost advantage for the incumbent firm may arise from control of the supply of key 
raw materials, superior production techniques, exclusive deals with suppliers and discounts for 
bulk buying. For example, a new firm normally has difficulty in hiring trained labour, and given a 
finite supply of skilled labour the entrant may have to pay more to attract labour away from 
incumbent firms. 
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Product differentiation can act as a barrier to entry, because an established firm gains 
advantages through customer brand loyalty and goodwill. The entrant then has to overcome this 
barrier in order to establish its product in the market. Even if the entrant does become 
competitive, the costs incurred initially in establishing the product are unrecoverable. 
A substantive literature on the sources of entry barriers has developed from the initial 
contributions of Bain. Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) and Sutton (1991) identify the role of 
sunk costs as an entry barrier. Sunk costs are costs that once incurred are non-recoverable. 
Sunk costs are important for both the incumbent and the entrant because in both cases they 
imply commitment to a chosen course of action. The recognition of sunk costs as a barrier to exit 
therefore in itself acts as a barrier to entry. 
Shepherd (1997) observes that in certain hi-tech industries such, as pharmaceuticals and 
electronics, substantial investment in research and development may be required to establish the 
capability to produce some products. This is essentially another capital requirements entry barrier. 
Williamson (1975) asserts that the degree of specialisation required to produce a good or service 
can often deter entry into a market. If the assets required to supply certain goods or services are 
specialised, then expenditure on such assets is essentially a sunk cost. This is likely to deter 
potential entrants because if entry fails, the assets cannot be used to produce alternative goods 
and services. 
The extent to which incumbent firms are vertically integrated also has implications for ease of 
entry into markets (Davies, 1987). Vertical integration occurs when a firm operating at one stage 
of a production process moves into production at another stage. Movement into an earlier part of 
the production process is backward integration, and movement into a later stage is forward 
integration. A vertically integrated incumbent can make it difficult for non-integrated firms to enter 
the market, for example by charging the entrant high prices for a necessary input. The entrant 
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could overcome this by integrating into another stage of the process, but this increases the cost of 
entry. 
The extent to which established firms are diversified can create a formidable barrier to entry. If a 
firm diversifies into several industries, this can lead to increased concentration in these industries 
(Lyons, 1987). Furthermore, the diversified firm may be able to compete fiercely in a price war if 
necessary, as losses in one market can be recouped in another. This type of behaviour is likely to 
deter entry leading to higher concentration. 
New entrants can incur high costs if capturing market share requires customers to bear switching 
costs. If customers face substantial costs in moving from an established firm to an entrant, then 
the entrant may provide outlays to assist with this switch, thus raising the costs of entry 
(Klemperer, 1987). 
Special risks and uncertainties of entry can often lead to entry being deterred. New entrants are 
likely to make more mistakes than incumbent firms, as they are unaware of many of the pitfalls of 
operating in a particular market (Shepherd, 1997). As a result, financing costs for expansion are 
likely to be higher for entrants. 
Gaps and asymmetries of information can also create advantages for incumbent firms. The more 
experienced the incumbent firm is, the more likely it is to have specialised knowledge of the 
market (Spence, 1981). Consequently, it may be able to keep costs down, especially if initial 
production is at low prices. The incumbent's demand is therefore likely to be high, creating 
opportunities for "learning by doing", enabling the incumbent to maintain its absolute cost 
advantage over the entrant. 
Finally, legal barriers to entry are often a potent force in preventing competition in certain 
industries. Barriers may only persist if they are erected and supported by the state, for example 
through restrictions on the numbers of firms allowed to operate. Other such barriers include 
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various forms of registration and licencing requirements. Governments can also raise such 
barriers indirectly through tax policies and labour laws (Demsetz, 1982). 
Endogenous Barriers to Entry 
Incumbent firms can actively affect industry structure by acting strategically to raise entry barriers. 
These strategies can ultimately lead to increasing concentration via feedback effects. 
Endogenous barriers include pre-emptive and retaliatory pricing actions by established firms; the 
building of excess capacity; the imposition of extra selling costs on entrants by excessive 
advertising; market segmentation; pre-emptive patenting activity; raising entrants' costs through 
control over key resources; and brand proliferation. 
Kay (1993) argues that firms can draw on what he terms 'distinctive capabilities' including 
architecture and reputation in order to achieve a competitive advantage over competitors and 
achieve growth. Architecture refers to the firm's internal organisation, and contracts with suppliers 
and distributors. For example, knowledge of the industry may yield substantial advantages that 
allow the firm to grow over successive periods. However, if market structure or production 
technologies change, this advantage may be quickly eliminated. Reputation effects can also 
provide advantages over competitors. If a firm has a reputation for providing high quality and 
service, it will help add value and generate more sales. Kay argues that reputation can be 
sustainable over long periods, making it difficult for entrants to compete on equal terms with a 
reputable incumbent. Overall, Kay argues that in industries in which selective firms can draw on 
'distinctive capabilities', these firms are likely to grow and achieve dominance for long periods. 
Firms can implement certain pre-emptive and retaliatory pricing strategies that make new entry 
unprofitable, and so act as a deterrent to potential entrants. Incumbent firms could forestall entry 
by following a strategy of limit pricing (Bain, 1956). The limit price is the highest price the 
incumbent can charge without inviting entry. The effectiveness depends upon the cost structure of 
the potential entrant. Limit pricing theory is based on the assumption that potential entrants will 
behave as though they expect incumbent firms to maintain output at pre-entry levels even after 
entry takes place (Sylos-Labini, 1957). An incumbent operating with an absolute cost advantage, 
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over entrant firms, could charge a mark up equal to the average cost differential, preventing new 
firms from entering profitably. If the potential entrant assumes that the incumbent maintains the 
same output post-entry, the entrant's output is a net addition to industry output. If the incumbent 
firm keeps the price as equal to the average cost differential, the entrant's demand curve lies 
below its average cost curve at all points, so there is no level of output at which the entrant can 
make a profit. 
If entry is not deterred, and new firms enter the industry, the incumbent may wish to pursue a 
policy of predatory pricing. This involves the dominant firm cutting prices in the short run to force 
other firms out of the market. If successful, this allows the incumbent to raise prices in the long 
run. Alternatively, to exclude entry on a non-price basis, the incumbent could offer loyalty 
discounts to customers, or force customers into exclusive deals, thus starving potential entrants 
of retail outlets. 
An incumbent firm can raise barriers to entry strategically by building excess capacity (Spence, 
1977). If the established firm commits itself to building up capacity in excess of current demand, a 
clear signal is sent to the potential entrant about the incumbent's future behaviour if entry occurs, 
because once spare capacity is built the costs are likely to be 'sunk', i. e. non-recoverable. The 
existence of excess capacity may indicate that the incumbent is willing to fight a price war, if entry 
takes place. 
Incumbent firms can also increase barriers to entry by large advertising outlays (Comanor and 
Wilson, 1967). This can be achieved through increasing returns from expenditure on advertising, 
(which arise from increasing consumer awareness of the incumbent's product), or discounts on 
bulk advertising. Heavy advertising outlays are likely to strengthen existing entry barriers. 
The extent to which established firms can segment a market could determine the extent to which 
new firms can enter. If incumbent firms can successfully segment the market for a product by 
customer attributes or geographical location it may also be possible to engage in price 
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discrimination (Shepherd, 1997). If successful this strategy may yield extra returns which could be 
used to fight entry in some future period. 
Pre-emptive patenting can also be used to deter entry by lowering a potential entrant's 
expectation of profit (Gilbert and Newbury, 1982). Incumbents may have an incentive to pursue 
pre-emptive patenting, to deter potential entrants from using new technologies. This strategy is 
attractive if the cost is less than the profits preserved by discouraging entry. 
Exclusive controls over strategic resources can also raise rivals' costs and so deter entry. An 
incumbent may deliberately seek to acquire key resources such as managers, patents or 
designers in order to gain an absolute cost advantages over rival firms. This in turn makes it 
difficult for potential entrants to compete (Salop and Scheffman, 1983). 
Brand proliferation is an entry deterring strategy whereby the established firm fills the market with 
numerous closely related products or brands, making it difficult for the entrant to find a niche in 
the market (Schmalensee, 1978). 
Overall, industrial organisation theory argues that whether barriers are exogenous or 
endogenous, if they are effective the outcome is normally anti-competitive. However, several 
theorists maintain that it is not only actual entry that determines industry performance, but also 
the threat of potential entry (Baumol et at, 1982). 15 
The literature reviewed above contends that barriers to entry and exit are crucial determinants of 
market structure and competitive conditions in that market. Drawing on the literature discussed 
above, the work of Schumpeter (1942) and Chandler (1990), and also empirical evidence on entry 
and exit, Geroski (1991) reformalises the relationship of entry conditions and market structure in a 
dynamic setting. When markets are first created, there is considerable confusion due to brand 
15 The importance of potential entry is highlighted in section 3.4.3 
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proliferation, perhaps with large numbers of competing firms. As time goes by, consumers assess 
the usefulness of competing brands, and eventually a 'core' product becomes established. 
'At some stage, a wide enough consensus amongst users develops to make an investment in 
large-scale production viable, and learning and economies of scale that lead to price cuts 
persuade even more consumers that they may as well climb on board. The emergence of these 
mass producers leads to sharp increases in market concentration, and these are the ' first 
movers' or dominant firms who often dominate their markets for decades. In short, much of what 
is interesting about what a market develops into and when it does so seems to be bound up with 
this process of standardisation. '16 
However, domination does not last indefinitely because as the industry matures, consumer tastes 
change and the 'core' products become obsolete. 17 New firms enter by introducing new products 
and the market undergoes a new phase of expansion and moves toward another equilibrium. 
Therefore, past patterns of entry determine the structure of markets at any time. Geroski 
assumes that firms leave the market relatively easily when their products are no longer 
demanded. On the other hand, according to Porter (1980) 'When exit barriers are high, excess 
capacity does not leave the industry, and companies that lose the competitive battle do not give 
up. Rather they grimly hang on. ' 18 
3.4.3 Contestable Markets 
Traditional micro-economic and industrial organisation theory examines how established firms 
can be protected by entry barriers to gain advantages and exercise control over prices. However, 
in contestable markets theory, concentration does not always lead to this type of behaviour. 
Baumol, Panzer and Willig (1982) emphasise the role of potential rather than actual competition. 
16 Geroski (1991), p. 268. 
17 Klepper (1996) refers to this process as the Product Life Cycle. He notes that as a market matures the 
rate of product innovation declines, and increased process innovation takes place to improve the 
production of existing products. 
18 Porter (1980), p. 110. 
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Contestable markets are those in which competitive pressures from potential entrants act as 
constraints on the incumbent's behaviour. For a market to be truly contestable there must be no 
significant entry or exit barriers. This is the case whether the market consists of one or many 
firms, because it is potential rather than actual competition that actively constrains the equilibrium 
behaviour of the established firm(s), and ultimately dictates the structure of the industry. 
Baumol et al introduce the concept of the perfectly contestable market, in which potential entrants 
have access to the same technology as incumbents, there are no sunk costs, and there is free 
entry and exit. In a perfectly contestable market, it is possible for a new firm to enter, sell goods at 
prices below those of existing firms, and leave again. It can do so provided it can identify 
customers and complete the sale of products, cover all necessary costs and exit before the 
incumbent firm has time to react. Baumol et al define this process as hit and run entry. 
'... in a PCM any economic profit earned by an incumbent automatically constitutes an earnings 
opportunity for an entrant who will hit and if necessary run (counting his temporary supernormal 
profits on the way to the firm). Consequently, in contestable markets zero profits must 
characterise any equilibrium even under monopoly and oligopoly. ' 19 
Therefore, according to the theory of contestable markets, it is entry or exit barriers that 
determine the performance of firms operating in that market. 
3.4.4 Game Theory 
Using the empirical findings of many of the studies discussed above, attempts have been made 
to utilise game theory to formulate theories to explain the behaviour of firms. This work has 
become known as the New Industrial Organisation (New 1.0. ). The New I. O. examines the 
strategic behaviour of firms with reference to output, price and non-price strategies. Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1989) define the game theoretic approach as: '... a way of modelling and analysing 
situations in which each player's optimal decision depends on his belief or expectations about the 
play of his opponents. ' 20 
19 Baumol et at (1982), p. 4. 
20 Fudenberg & Tirole (1989), p. 261. 
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In game theory opponents do not hold a priori beliefs about one another, but instead try to predict 
the other player's moves using previous knowledge of past encounters while assuming that their 
opponents' decisions are rational. Schelling (1960) defines a strategic move as 
'.... one that influences the other person's choice, in a manner favourable to one's self, by 
affecting the other person's expectations on how one's self will behave.... The object is to set up 
for one's self and communicate persuasively to the other player a mode of behaviour (including 
responses to other's behaviour) that leaves the other a simple maximisation problem whose 
solution for him is the optimum for one's self, and to destroy the other's ability to do the same. '21 
In brief, in any game of strategic moves each player is assumed to act rationally to make optimal 
decisions given the behaviour of their opponents. 
Game theory has been used extensively to examine competitive behaviour, where threats, 
commitments and reputation are deemed important. Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) argue that any 
strategy adopted by a firm must appear credible to its rivals. Therefore, it pays a firm to build up a 
reputation for 'toughness' over time in order to gain credibility (Axelrod, 1984). The firm can do 
this by making an irreversible commitment. Commitments include strategies of vertical 
integration, diversification, additional expenditure on increasing capacity, product differentiation 
and research and development expenditure. 
Dixit (1982) presents a scenario where an incumbent monopolist seeks to deter the entry of a 
new firm. The success of such a strategy depends crucially on whether the incumbent firm is 
committed to the strategy (i. e. has prepared for the fight by prior spending on excess capacity) or 
is passive (in which case has not prepared itself to fight in the event of entry). These two 
possibilities are now discussed. 
21 Schelling (1960), p. 160. 
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Passive Incumbent 
There are three outcomes if the incumbent has not prepared itself to fight in the event of entry. If 
the incumbent has not prepared to fight, and the entrant stays out of the market, then the 
incumbent continues to make monopoly profits while the entrant earns zero (Pm, 0). If entry does 
occur, the incumbent must decide whether to fight the entrant in a price war, (in which case both 
firms make losses (Pw < 0), or share the market in which case both firms earn positive profits 
(Pd> 0). Dixit argues that the incumbent's threat to fight in the event of entry is not credible, as it 
has no incentive to fight. Therefore, the solution is where the incumbent and entrant share the 
market, which is not as profitable as a monopoly, but more profitable than a price war (Pd, Pd). 
Committed Incumbent 
If the incumbent is committed to the market by making a prior commitment (C), and the entrant 
knows this, the incumbent finds it optimal to fight entry through a price war (Pw), if this is more 
profitable than sharing the market (Pd-C, Pd). The rational entrant realises the threat of price war 
is credible and stays out of the market. Therefore, the solution occurs where the incumbent firm 
earns monopoly profits minus the cost of the commitment, while the entrant earns zero (Pm-C, 0). 
As long as the incumbent's commitment is visible and irreversible, the threat is credible. 
Although offering some additional insights into how firms and industries behave under different 
competitive conditions, the importance of game theory within the field of competition analysis has 
declined in recent years. Instead, empirical research has increased substantially, by making use 
of new sources of data and econometric techniques (Bresnahan and Schmalensee, 1987). This 
empirical research has focused on the dynamic nature of competition by examining the time 
series behaviour of profits and the relationships between firm size and growth. 
3.4.5 The Persistence of Profits 
Research that examines the time series behaviour of firm profits has cast doubt on the static 
approach adopted by proponents of the SCP approach. Geroski (1990) argues that the SCP 
cross-sectional results only provide a snapshot at some point in time, and can say little about the 
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process of competition. There is no certainty that profits or other measures of performance 
observed at one point in time represent long run equilibrium levels of the performance variable. 
An empirical association between concentration and high profits may result from observation 
during a period of disequilibrium. If so, the cross-sectional studies do not capture (unless by luck) 
the long run equilibrium. Also, cross-sectional estimations usually do not contain enough 
information on which to base reliable policy decisions. For example, any monopoly profits found in 
one period could disappear in the next, rendering anti-trust intervention by regulatory 
organisations unnecessary. 
A body of work, which has collectively become known as the 'Persistence of Profits' literature 
examines the process of competition via the following model. 
rl;, = a; + 2j n i,., +V is (9) 
flit is a measure of firm i's profits in time t. 2. is the speed at which a firm's short run profits are 
competed away. 2. =0 implies there is no association between profit in successive years, or 
zero persistence. The closer 2i is to one, the greater the persistence of profits. a; determines 
whether long run (permanent) profits are positive or negative. rij, is the long run equilibrium 
a; 
profit at which II; t =1-ln. 1..... = U11, , where U11, = 1-A; 
The implicit hypothesis tested in these studies is that entry and exit into any market are 
sufficiently free to bring any abnormal profits quickly into line with the competitive rate of return. In 
other words, competitive forces are sufficiently powerful to ensure that no firm can persistently 
earn profits above the norm. Because each period brings new random shocks, profits are never 
the same for all firms. However, if the market is responsive to excess profits and losses, returns 
tend to gravitate towards some competitive level. The alternative is that some firms possess 
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special knowledge or other advantages which enable them to react, preventing imitation and 
enabling them to earn profits above the norm, which persist from one period to the next. 
Mueller (1990) uses a sample of 551 US firms covering the period 1950-1972 to test for 
persistence of profits. Mueller splits his sample of firms into six equal sized groups based on 
initial profitability (Ilia ). He then estimates the partial adjustment equation for each firm to yield 
estimates of long run profit (fI; P) and the speed at which short run profits adjust 
to long run 
values (% ). Long run profitability differences are found, and there are differences in the speeds 
at which short run excess profits are competed away. The average profitability of the six groups 
remains stable over time. For example, in the initial period the top group of firms in the sample 
were earning 5.49 per cent above the norm, while the least profitable firms were earning 4.66 per 
cent below the norm. Over the entire sample period, the most profitable group were earning 4.68 
per cent above the norm, and the least profitable firms were earning 2.83 per cent below the 
norm. Although Mueller finds differences in long run profitability differences between firms, there 
is some movement toward the average. The speed at which entry causes short run profits to be 
competed away and so adjust towards long run equilibrium also differs. In the top group this 
speed of adjustment is at its quickest with an average ' of 0.121, indicating that these firms are 
relatively unsuccessful in insulating themselves against entry. Overall, the average 
ý; is 0.167, 
which relative to corresponding estimates reported in other studies, implies a relatively rapid 
convergence of short run profits to long run equilibrium. This may reflect a strong anti-trust 
regulatory tradition in the United States. Mueller also observes differences in long run profitability 
across firms. By regressing Hip on IIio, he finds that 69% of initial deviations of profits from the 
average are permanent. 
Odagiri and Yamawaki (1990) test for persistence of profits in Japanese manufacturing using a 
sample of 376 firms for the period 1964-82. Profits are measured as net profit after tax plus 
interest payments divided by total assets. These profits are normalised by taking the firm's profits 
as an absolute deviation from the norm. The estimation results indicate some movement of profit 
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rates of firms above and below the norm towards long run equilibrium levels, with an average 2i 
of 0.47. However, there is evidence of differences between firms in the long run equilibrium rate 
of profit. 
Cubbin and Geroski (1990) estimate the partial adjustment model for a sample of 243 UK 
companies, over the period 1951 to 1977. The sample is split into six groups based on initial 
profitability, and it is found that the groups are ranked in the same order by average profitability 
over the entire sample period. UK firms' profit rates show some tendency to converge over the 
sample period. For the first three years of the sample period the difference in profitability between 
the top and bottom groups is 13.3 per cent, but for the sample period as a whole this gap is 
narrowed to 2.58 per cent. However, there is a relatively high average value of . ii of 0.491, which 
may be indicative of barriers to entry which prevent short run excess returns adjusting to long run 
values. 
Goddard and Wilson (1996) present evidence on the persistence of profits for 335 UK 
manufacturing and 90 service firms for the period 1972-1991. They find an average value of 2; of 
0.45 for manufacturing, and an average of 0.46 for services. Some variation is found around 
these averages. For 22.7 per cent of manufacturing and 25.6 per cent of service firms, A<0.3 
while for 17.1 per cent of manufacturing and 17.7 per cent of service firms Ai > 0.7. Overall, very 
little difference is found between the distribution of ý; for manufacturing and services as a whole. 
Goddard and Wilson (1999) argue that in the persistence of profit literature, the standard test 
procedures, based on individual estimations of the partial adjustment model, allow only limited 
inferences to be drawn regarding values of 2.. They argue that the standard univariate tests do 
not have enough power to enable reliable inferences to be drawn concerning the distribution 
across firms of true values of Ai, and that procedures which pool data across firms should be 
capable of yielding stronger inferences. Adopting a simulation approach to generate profit data, 
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the authors construct sampling distributions for ai and Ai based on varying assumptions about 
the distributions of the true values of these parameters. They then use standard goodness of fit 
tests to establish which distribution for the true parameters produces sampling distributions which 
are most consistent with the actual distributions of a, and 1i observed in the sample of 335 UK 
manufacturing firms (i. e. for which distribution is the goodness of fit test statistic minimised). 
Although, some evidence is presented that 0< 2i <1 for most firms, the authors are unable to 
rule out the possibility of zero persistence of profits (% = 0) and complete persistence of profits 
(2i = 1) for up to 15 and 24 per cent of firms respectively. 
Overall, the persistence of profits literature finds evidence that there are differences in the long 
run equilibrium rate of profit (measured by fI; P) and varying 
degrees of year-to-year persistence 
(measured by £; ), and so differences in the rate at which firms' profits are eroded through the 
process of entry. It is argued that these results may also reflect differences in efficiency across 
firms. Differences in the dispersion of long run equilibrium profits have also been found across 
countries, with the greatest dispersion found in UK and the smallest differences in Japan. 22 The 
smallest estimated i are found for the US and the highest estimated )t for the UK. Whatever 
the reason for international differences, a general conclusion is that competitive pressure does 
not appear to be sufficiently strong to completely eliminate differences between firms in 
profitability, even in the long run. 
3.4.6 The Law of Proportionate Effect 
The persistence of profits literature discussed above generally focuses on the implications of 
profit performance in determining the long run configuration of industries. The relationship 
between growth and firm size also has important consequences for trends in concentration, and 
22 See also Khemani and Shapiro (1990), Jenny and Weber (1990) and Schwalbach and Mahmood (1990) 
for evidence concerning the persistence of profits for Canada, France and Germany respectively. 
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therefore market structure. In a seminal work, Gibrat (1931) examines the relationship between 
firm growth and size. This formulation later became known as the Law of Proportionate Effect 
(LPE). There are numerous factors that have an influence on growth, many of which are random 
in nature. These factors may include growth of demand, managerial talent, innovation, 
organisational structure and luck. According to the LPE, growth is unrelated to firm size, and a 
large firm has the same chance of growing by say ten per cent in any year as a small firm. 
Furthermore, the growth of any firm in time t+1 is unrelated to its growth in time t. However, over 
time, some firms will be lucky and grow in successive periods and so become very large, while 
others remain the same size or decline. This will eventually result in a firm size distribution that is 
skewed with a small number of large firms, several medium sized firms and numerous smaller 
firms. Many authors have found that this description accords with the actual size distribution of 
firms observed in many industries. 23 As a result the size distribution of firms at any time is a 
function of the initial size distribution plus any additional growth in successive periods. 24 If the 
LPE holds, industry concentration will increase even in the absence of economies of scale and 
other efficiency advantages, mergers and government regulation. 
3.4.7 Other Determinants of Concentration 
This section discusses briefly a number of other determinants of concentration. These include 
vertical integration, innovation, industry growth, mergers and government regulation. 
Vertical Integration 
Stigler (1951) examines the interaction between an industry's life cycle and the extent of vertical 
integration. In the early stages there are no specialist suppliers of raw materials, so 
manufacturers engage in backward integration. Alternatively, they may integrate forward to 
ensure proper sales service. As the industry grows specialists in the supply of raw materials and 
the distributions of goods and services appear, which leads to vertical dis-integration. As the 
23 See Quandt (1966) and Silberman (1967) for a discussion of how closely the actual size distribution of 
firms in a particular industry conform to the log normal distribution. Clarke (1979) provides evidence for the 
UK. 
24 Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion of tests of the Law of Proportionate Effect for manufacturing, 
while chapter 4 does the same for the limited evidence that exists for banking. 
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industry matures and demand levels off, firms may again engage in vertical integration to protect 
declining market share. 
Innovation 
Nelson and Winter (1982) use simulation analysis to identify the impact of different types of 
innovative behaviour by firms on industry structures. In their model, firms can either invest in 
innovation or imitation depending on which is more profitable. The model assumes that the more 
firms invest in research and development, the more likely they are to achieve success. By 
producing at high output levels to meet the demand for their product, successful firms will gain 
economies of scale advantages over rivals, enabling them to expand further, and leading 
ultimately to increased concentration. 25 
Industry Growth 
Market concentration is likely to be inversely related to the industry growth rate. With rapid 
growth, incumbent firms are unlikely to be able to expand capacity sufficiently to satisfy demand, 
so the opportunity exists for smaller firms to enter, leading to de-concentration. If sales are static 
or declining, incumbents are likely to collude or exercise market power in order to protect current 
and future profitability, leading to increased concentration (Dalton and Rhoades, 1974) 
Mergers 
Mergers can also lead to increased concentration, as firms continue either to exploit technical 
economies of scale or exercise market power advantages. Weiss (1965) examines the effects of 
merger on industry concentration over the period 1926-1959 for six US manufacturing 
industries. 26 A merger takes place whenever a plant in operation in the start of the period is taken 
over by an existing firm before the end of the sample period. Weiss calculates changes in plant 
25 Scherer and Ross (1990), ch. 17 contend that the speed at which a firm innovates will determine the 
success or otherwise of any investment. Early innovation allows the firm to exploit the market over a longer 
period of time, and improves the firm's position relative to its rivals. However, if the firm innovates too 
quickly, mistakes can follow which can lead to increasing costs. 
26 These industries consist of steel, cars, petrol, cement, flour and brewing. 
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size for four separate years at approximately ten year intervals. 27 He decomposes changes in the 
concentration ratio into changes arising from merger, internal growth, exit and changes in the 
identity of the top firms in the industry. He finds that internal growth and exit had a large effect on 
concentration, while mergers played a lesser role. 
For the period 1957-1969, Hannah and Kay (1981) find that mergers play a crucial role in raising 
concentration in the UK. Furthermore, if growth attributable to merger is ignored, then smaller 
firms grew more than large firms over this period. 
'Merger has been the dominant force in increasing concentration in the UK since 1919... Its role 
has been growing and it now accounts for essentially all of currently observed net concentration 
increase. '28 However, Hart (1981) suggests that Hannah and Kay exaggerate the role of mergers 
in raising concentration. Drawing on government statistics, he finds that: '... even if all the 122 
large mergers (involving over £5 million) had been prohibited, aggregate concentration would 
have continued to increase... '29 Although mergers are an important source of increases in 
concentration, Hart argues they are less important than internal growth by individual firms. 
Regulation 
Government policy can also influence levels of concentration. Strong policies aimed at increasing 
competition by discouraging restrictive practices and disallowing mergers, which may be against 
the public interest, tend to inhibit concentration. Conversely, policies which impose restrictions on 
the numbers of firms allowed to operate in specific industries and grant exclusive property rights 
to selected firms tend to encourage concentration (Burke, 1991). 
27 The sample periods for the six industries are as follows: Steel, 1926-1957; Cars, 1948-1958; Cement, 
1928-1958, Brewing 1947-1958; Flour, 1932-1959; and petrol 1946 -1956. 28 Hannah and Kay (1981), p. 312. 
29 Hart (1981), p. 318. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the role of market structure, in particular market concentration in 
determining the ways in which firms and industries behave and ultimately perform. The general 
view that emerges is that firms in highly concentrated industries outperform those in industries 
which are less concentrated. Empirical evidence as to whether this is due to collusion between 
incumbent firms or differential efficiencies tends to be inconclusive. The examination of the 
determinants of market structure has shown that both the level and rate of change in market 
concentration can be explained by the existence of entry barriers and strategic behaviour, 
mergers, government regulation, technological change and random disturbances. Overall, the 
evidence suggests that economies of scale, high levels of product differentiation and advertising, 
slow industry growth, small firm numbers and the operation of random factors lead to increased 
industry concentration, while high entry rates and industry growth lead to falling levels of 
concentration. Having examined the theoretical and empirical importance of market structure for 
research on manufacturing industries, chapter 4 examines the applications of the same 
methodological approach in banking. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND THE GROWTH AND PERFORMANCE OF BANKS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of market structure in determining the performance of the banking 
industry. It also evaluates how market structure shapes competitive conditions in the banking 
industry. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 examines the application of the 
Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) framework to the banking industry. This section examines 
whether market power or differential efficiency determines the performance of banking firms 
(section 4.2.1); evaluates the SCP approach (section 4.2.2); and the application of Contestable 
Markets Theory to banking (section 4.2.3). Section 4.3 examines the forces which determine the 
size distribution of firms within the banking industry. Factors such as economies of scale, barriers 
to entry, technological change, market growth, mergers, government regulation, strategic 
behaviour of incumbent banks and stochastic influences are considered. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn in section 4.4. 
4.2 The Structure Conduct Performance Paradigm in Banking 
This section describes research that applies the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) paradigm 
to the banking industry. This research aims to quantify the influence of market structure on the 
conduct and performance of banks. 
' Analysis of the SCP relationship in banking is used to help evaluate the main policy issue of 
which type of banking structure best serves the public in terms both of cost and the availability of 
banking services. In general two main objectives have been sought; firstly, the attainment of an 
"efficient" banking system which in some way, secondly, minimises the likelihood of bank failure. " 
4.2.1 Collusion versus Efficiency 
The underlying assumption of early SCP based research in banking was that there is a strong 
causal link between market structure and the performance of banks. However (as in 
1 Molyneux et al (1996), p. 93. 
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manufacturing), it is questionable whether high profits enjoyed by incumbent banks are a 
consequence of concentrated market structures and collusive price setting behaviour, or of 
superior production and management techniques that allow larger banks to keep costs low and 
make high returns. Gilbert (1984) finds that in 27 of 45 US studies surveyed, concentration is 
positively related to profits. Empirical studies have addressed whether high profitability arises 
from concentration or superior efficiency using data on US, Japanese, Canadian and Australian 
banks, as well as banks from most major Western European countries. 
Short (1979) tests whether profits are a function of ownership type, concentration levels, growth in 
assets and capital scarcity, for a sample of 60 banks from Canada, Western Europe and Japan. 
A positive relationship between profits and concentration is found, implying that banks are able to 
earn high profits through collusion or the exercise of market power. Scarcity of capital also 
appears to provide banks with the opportunity to grant loans at higher interest rates. However, the 
rate of bank growth exerts a negative effect on profitability. Privately owned banks tend to be 
more profitable than state owned banks. Short's results '... support the view that greater market 
power leads to higher bank profit rates. s2 
High profitability, however, may be the result of efficient banks securing large market shares and 
not collusive behaviour. Drawing on previous work, Smirlock (1985) investigates the relationship 
between profits, market share and concentration for a sample of 2700 US banks. The model 
includes an interaction term to test the relationship between' concentration and market shares, 
and industry profitability. Smirlock's model also includes a set of control variables which reflect 
differences in the size and growth of the banking market, varying sources of finance, bank size 
and holding company affiliations. Smirlock finds a positive relationship between market share and 
profitability; an insignificant relationship between concentration and profits; and a negative 
relationship between the interaction of concentration and market share with profits, which leads 
him to reject the collusion hypothesis. If the market is growing quickly, banks can expand their 
2 Short (1979), p. 214. 
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lending in search of increased profit opportunity. 3 Larger banks are slightly less profitable than 
smaller banks, perhaps as a result of diversification advantages, which permit them to settle for a 
lower return on capital. Overall, Smirlock concludes that no relationship between concentration 
and profits is evident after controlling for market share, and that successful banks are profitable 
through efficiency advantages. 
Rhoades (1985) carries out a similar analysis for 6492 US banks between 1969-1978. He argues 
that the observed relationship between profits and market share does not reflect efficiency 
differences between banks, but rather differentiation advantages which allow some banks to 
charge higher prices than others, thereby earning higher profits. 
Rhoades splits his sample of banks into concentration deciles to examine the relationship 
between profits, concentration and market share, and finds a positive relationship between 
profitability, and market share and concentration across groups. He tests whether this relationship 
varies within deciles by examining the relationship between market share and profitability for the 
highest and lowest ten per cent of banks based on market share. The results suggest that banks 
with higher market share make higher profit regardless of the concentration decile membership. 
Regression analysis is used to explain profitability for the sample as a whole, and by 
concentration decile. Explanatory variables include bank size, to proxy for economies of scale. 
There is a positive relationship between market share and profitability regardless of concentration 
decile membership. Rhoades concludes that the most profitable banks are those that can 
exercise market power through differentiation advantages. 4 
Evanoff and Fortier (1988) test the collusion against the efficiency explanation of excess 
profitability for a sample of 6300 banks located in 30 US states for 1984. Their model includes 
3 Intuitively one may expect a negative relationship between market growth and profitability as incumbent 
banks may find it difficult to expand to meet increased customer demand, which may ultimately lead to 
inefficiencies or the entry of other banks. However, given that entry of new banks is tightly regulated, a 
? rowing market yields new clients for incumbent banks in an uncontested market. 
He also finds significant relationships between profitability and many of the control variables. These 
include positive relationship between risk and profits, market growth and profits (which arises from the 
protection of incumbent banks from outside entry). 
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concentration and market share as determinants of profit, as well as a set of control variables 
which account for differences in risk, costs and demand factors. 5 They examine the effects of 
regulation on bank performance (by estimating the model for banks in markets protected from 
entry through government regulation and those that are not). Market share has a strong influence 
on profitability, especially when regulatory entry barriers are high. Market growth has a negative 
effect on profitability for banks that are not protected by regulatory barriers. 
Bourke (1989) examines the determinants of bank profitability for a sample of 90 banks drawn 
from twelve countries for the period 1972-1981.6 The explanatory variables are grouped into 
those specific to the bank itself (internal) and those facing all banks (external). Bank specific 
variables include capital and liquidity ratios. External variables include regulatory variables, bank 
size, market concentration, market growth, capital scarcity and inflation. Using three separate 
measures of bank profitability, he finds that concentration, capital ratios, liquidity ratios and the 
level of interest charged lead to the increased profitability of banks. 
Berger and Hannan (1989) examine the relationship between concentration and prices using 
quarterly data for a sample of 470 US banks covering the period 1983 to 1985. They argue that 
prices should be high in collusive markets and low in efficient markets. Using interest paid on 
retail deposits as a dependent variable, a negative relationship between concentration and 
deposit interest rates is found. A pooled model including interaction terms between concentration 
ratios and time trends and market share produces similar results. Overall, support is found for the 
price-concentration relationship. Banks in concentrated markets tend to exercise market power by 
paying lower rates of interest to depositors. 
5 Variables to control for risk include capital asset and loan asset ratios. Cost variables include asset size to 
account for efficiencies associated with scale economies, and a cost of capital variable which consists of 
the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits. Market demand variables include market size and growth, 
and population density. 6 The sample banks were in the top 500 largest in 1980. The twelve geographic areas sampled were 
Australia, California, Massachusetts, New York, Ireland, England, Wales, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, 
Norway and Spain. 
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Amel and Froeb (1991) present evidence for a sample of 156 US banks, covering the period 
1982-1987. The data is defined by the geographic market covered by each bank. It is argued that 
a geographical classification provides a more appropriate definition of a market than the Standard 
Industrial Code. Using an approach similar to that of Schmalensee (1985) (see chapter 3), they 
find that the variation in profitability between banks within each market is greater than the 
variation across markets. This may suggest that some banks earn high returns as the result of 
efficiency advantages, and not through collusive practices. The authors also find that 
concentration and market share are unimportant. 
Jackson (1992) tests the price-concentration relationship for 221 banks in 104 different local 
banking markets in the US, using monthly data from November 1983 to November 1985. He finds 
a negative price-concentration relationship across the full sample. He also tests the relationship 
for three sub-samples from low, medium and high concentration industries, finding a negative 
price-concentration relationship for banks operating in low or medium concentration markets, but 
no relationship for those operating in highly concentrated markets. This implies banks in highly 
concentrated markets are likely to be more efficient, and as a result can pay higher deposit 
interest rates (i. e. charge lower prices) than banks operating elsewhere. 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) present evidence for a sample of banks drawn from 18 European 
countries over the period 1986-1989.7 They use various measures of profitability including before 
and after tax returns on total assets and total equity. Explanatory variables for profitability include 
concentration (measured by the market share of the top ten banks in a given market), capital and 
liquidity ratios, inflation, growth in money supply and staff expenses. They find a positive 
relationship between profitability and concentration, interest rates, and staff expenses, and a 
negative relationship between profits and liquidity. Molyneux (1993) also incorporates market 
7 The sample banks are drawn from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the 
UK. Each year of the sample period covers a different numbers of banks. The sample consists of 671 
banks in 1986,1063 banks in 1987,1371 banks in 1988 and 1108 banks in 1989. 
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share variables. He finds that SCP relationships hold in Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands and 
Spain, while the efficiency hypothesis holds for Norway. 
Molyneux and Forbes (1995) test whether efficiency or collusive practices determine profitability 
in European banking, using pooled data on 18 European countries for the period 1986-1989. 
Using return on assets as a dependent variable, their explanatory variables include the market 
shares of individual banks, concentration ratios (measured as the percentage of industry loans 
accounted for by the top ten banks), and a set of control variables including bank capital / assets 
ratios (as a proxy for risk), bank assets (as a measure of bank size) and a dummy variable to 
differentiate state owned and privately owned banks. The model is estimated for the period 1986- 
1989, and also for each individual year. Market share is insignificant in every model, while 
concentration is positive and significant. Overall, '... the results suggest that concentration in the 
European banking markets lowers the cost of collusion between banks and results in higher than 
normal profits for all market participants. ie 
Berger (1995) undertakes an evaluation of the SCP relationship in US banking. He identifies two 
'market power' and two 'efficiency' theories of bank profitability. Banks can exploit market power 
by charging higher prices by differentiating products, or enter into collusive agreements to raise 
prices. Efficiency advantages can arise through superior management or innovative techniques 
that allow banks to capture market share (x-efficiency), or to produce at larger scale (economies 
of scale). 
Berger argues that these competing hypotheses can only be tested if bank specific efficiency 
controls are included, allowing unambiguous interpretation of the market share term. This is 
necessary because a positive relationship between market share and profits has been interpreted 
as supporting the efficiency hypothesis (Rhoades, 1985; and Evanoff and Fontier, 1988). 
8 Molyneux and Forbes (1995), p. 158. 
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Berger estimates a model to examine the determinants of profitability. Explanatory variables of 
profitability include market concentration, market share and efficiency. 9 The data set comprises 
thirty separate samples of between 1300 and 2000 banks from three types of regulatory 
environment, namely unit banking, limited branching and state wide branching states. 
Using return on assets and return on equity as dependent variables, Berger finds that profits are 
positively related to x-efficiencies. There is little evidence to support that economies of scale 
influence profitability. With reference to the market power theories, he finds that profits are 
positively related to market share, but not to concentration. This suggests that banks can use 
differentiation advantages to raise prices and make high profits. 
Although Berger has some success in discriminating between the various theories as 
explanations of bank profitability, the regressions leave large proportions of the variation in banks 
profit rates unexplained. 
' Our results also suggest that future research may benefit from looking beyond the current 
versions of the ES (efficiency) and MP (market power) hypotheses for explanations of the 
observed variation in bank profitability. ' 10 
Berger and Hannan (1998) examine the relationship between operational efficiency and 
concentration, to test the hypothesis that ' ... market power exercised by 
firms in concentrated 
markets allow them to avoid minimising costs without necessarily exiting the industry. '" Using a 
sample of 5263 banks, the authors estimate a model in which bank efficiency is determined by 
concentration and a vector of dummy variables that control for differences in ownership structure 
and geographic location. 
9 Concentration is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The efficiency variables are 
constructed to reflect advantages arising from scale economies (SEFF) and those arising from superior 
managerial talent (x-efficiencies, XEFF). The former are measured by constructing a cost function and 
estimating the minimum efficient scale, while the latter are estimated by examining changes in the residuals 
of the cost function over time. 
10 Berger (1995), p. 430, brackets added. 
II Berger and Hannan (1998), p. 464. 
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The evidence suggests that banks in highly concentrated markets are less efficient. The authors 
suggest that these results could be used to argue for stronger anti-trust policy such as limiting the 
number of bank charters and powers of established banks in concentrated markets. 
4.2.2 Critique of SCP Studies 
Overall, there is no conclusive evidence as to whether collusive practices or superior efficiency is 
the main determinant of supernormal profits in banking markets. While Berger (1995) shows that 
market share and x-efficiencies are positively correlated with profits, statistically, the relationships 
are relatively weak. 
Several authors have been critical of the application of SCP to banking. Gilbert (1984) provides a 
useful summary of the early SCP banking literature, and finds that of the 45 studies examined, 27 
find support for a direct link between concentration and profitability. However, in many cases he 
finds deficiencies in the theoretical basis of the models estimated, the measurement of structure 
and performance variables, and the specification of the regression models. He argues that many 
authors apply the SCP approach to banking without taking into account the regulated nature of 
banking markets (including legal restrictions on entry and interest rate ceilings) when measuring 
structural and performance variables. However, several authors including Heggestad (1984) 
maintain that most US SCP studies do control for the effects of regulation by incorporating 
dummy variables to control for differences in regulatory regimes. Because SCP studies are cross- 
sectional in nature, then changes in regulation over time are of little concern. However, as we 
have seen, the static nature of cross-sectional studies is itself open to criticism. 12 
Furthermore, Gilbert points out that many SCP studies suffer from difficulties in measuring 
structure and performance variables. For, example many studies have used the price of a single 
banking product as a measure of performance. However, given that banks produce many 
products, a single performance measure is likely to be uninformative. Later studies (Molyneux 
and Forbes, 1995 and Berger, 1995) use profits to measure performance. 
12 Geroski (1990) provides an extensive analysis of these issues (see chapter 3). See also Berger, 
Demsetz and Strahan (1999). 
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Differences in bank objectives may also make the SCP relationship tenuous. For example, if 
banks are sacrificing potential profits in order to reduce risk by investing in more certain activities, 
then researchers should be more interested in variability in profit rates and not profits levels per 
se (Neuberger, 1998). Alternatively, if managers are maximising utility by adopting expense 
preference behaviour, then large banks in concentrated markets will not necessarily make 
abnormal returns (Berger and Hannan, 1998). 
Overall, many of Gilbert's criticisms have been addressed in the later SCP studies. According to 
Heggestad (1984) 
'... Gilbert is unduly harsh on the empirical literature in banking. While much of the literature 
deserves criticism, not all of the studies are incorrect. They have provided overwhelming 
evidence of the link between market structure and limitations on entry on firm behaviour and 
performance in commercial banking. ' 13 
More recently, Berger (1995) argues that many regression models used to test SCP relationships 
may be mis-specified due to the omission of variables which could reveal differences in x- 
efficiency across banks. As a result some researchers (such as Rhoades, 1985 and Evanoff and 
Fortier, 1988) who have found a positive relationship between profitability and market share, may 
have wrongly concluded that the relationship is due to large banks exercising market power, and 
not superior efficiency. 
4.2.3 Contestable markets in banking 
The theory of contestable markets was developed in an attempt to address many of the criticisms 
of the SCP approach. 14 If markets are contestable then even under oligopoly, incumbent banks 
will be unable to collude or exercise market power to raise prices. In other words if entry and exit 
to banking markets are free, banks are forced to charge competitive prices. Even the mere threat 
13 Heggestad (1984), p. 647. 14 Chapter 3 discusses the theory of contestable markets. 
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of entry constrains the actions of established banks. If banking markets are contestable, then 
entrants would not be deterred from entering a particular banking market. This is because even if 
entry is unsuccessful, these entrants can leave the market again having incurred no sunk costs. 
Only a few attempts have been made to empirically investigate evidence of contestable markets 
in banking. In contrast to the SCP approach, this type of study is more concerned with evaluating 
competitive conditions in banking markets, than with their underlying structural characteristics. 
Evidence of contestability can be inferred by investigating the competitive conditions in banking 
markets, using the following model 
In TRASS =a+ binPL + clnPK + dInPF + e1nAS S+ flnLNASS 
+ g1nCAPAS S+ h1nIBTDEP +u 
(1) 
where In is the natural logarithm; TRASS denotes the total interest revenue per $ of assets; PL 
denotes personnel expenses per dollar of assets (proxy for the unit price of labour; PK denotes 
capital expenses per dollar of fixed assets (proxy for unit price of capital); PF denotes the ratio of 
annual interest expenses to total funds; ASS is bank assets; LNASS is the loans to assets ratio; 
CAPASS is total risk capital to assets ratio; and IBTDEP is the ratio of interbank deposits to total 
deposits. Several of these variables are included to account for differences in size and risk. 
CAPASS and LNASS are included to proxy for differences in risk, ASS proxies for scale 
economies, while IBTDEP is included to account for differences between banks in the structure of 
their deposits. The Rosse-Panzar H-statistic is the sum of the estimated elasticities of output with 
A respect to each input, i. e. H=b+c+d. H is interpreted as follows: 
1) H<0, implies a collusive oligopoly or a monopoly, where increases in input prices and 
marginal costs lead to a fall in equilibrium output and total revenue. 2) 0<H<1, implies 
monopolistic competition, where increases in input prices and marginal costs do not affect the 
equilibrium output of firms. 3) H=1 denotes a perfectly competitive industry, or a natural 
monopoly in a perfectly contestable market. 
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Shaffer (1982) uses this approach to test for competitive conditions for a sample of US banks. He 
finds a value of 0<H<1 suggesting that the New York banking market is characterised by 
monopolistic competition. This finding, Shaffer suggests, is consistent with New York based 
banks operating in a contestable manner, given that the market is relatively concentrated yet 
entry and exit conditions are relatively free. 
Nathan and Neave (1989) test for competitive conditions for samples consisting of banks, trust 
companies and mortgage companies over the period 1982-1984. The authors test the model 
above on a cross sectional basis. For the sample of 72 banks, 39 trust firms, 37 mortgage 
companies the authors find 0<H<1. 'The significantly positive values of the elasticity measure 
indicate that Canada's financial system does not exhibit monopoly power. ''5 
Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams and Thornton (1994) test the theory of contestable markets using 
European banking data over the period 1986-1989. The authors find 0<H<1 for Germany, 
France, UK and Spain, and H<0 for the Italy. This suggests that monopolistic competition 
prevails in the former four countries, while collusion or monopoly prevails in Italy. Negative 
relationships exist between assets and profits, and between loans to assets ratio and profit, 
implying that smaller banks with a higher percentage of total assets in the form of loans tend to be 
more profitable. 
De Bandt and Davis (1998) update the Molyneux et at study, for a sample of 757 banks drawn 
from France, Germany, Italy and the US over the period 1992-1996. The authors find 0<H<1, 
implying that monopolistic competition prevails in all of the banking markets sampled. 
Competition appears to be at its most intense in the US. However, small banks tend to enjoy a 
degree of monopoly power within the German and French markets. It is argued that these general 
findings provide some support for the view that European banking markets exhibit contestable 
market features. 
15 Nathan and Neave (1989), p. 576. 
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4 .3 The Determinants of 
Market Concentration 
In the previous section the empirical evidence concerning the consequences of market structure 
(often measured by concentration) on the performance of banks was examined. This section 
examines the factors that may explain the size distribution of banks in a given market. Such 
factors include economies of scale and scope, barriers to entry and exit, technological change 
and the stage of the industry life cycle, market growth, government regulation, the strategic 
behaviour of banks and stochastic influences. 
4.3.1 Economies of scale 
Molyneux et al (1996) suggest an analysis of bank costs can yield useful information for a number 
of reasons. First, it can aid banks in making pricing and output decisions at the point where 
average costs of production are at a minimum. Second, costs determine the most efficient size of 
production for incumbent banks and the numbers of banks which can successfully operate in a 
particular industry. 16 Third, low average costs can lead to concentrated industry structures if 
incumbent banks raise barriers to entry. Fourth, cost information can aid banks in taking long 
term strategic decisions such as to whether to expand existing levels of services into new areas 
or to acquire another bank to make gains in efficiency.. Fifth, information on bank costs is 
important for the industry regulator when formulating policies which attempt to ensure an efficient 
and equitable allocation of resources. This section examines the role of costs in determining the 
structure of banking markets, by considering economies of scale in particular. The assumption is 
that banks seek to become large to achieve cost efficiencies, which may ultimately lead to a 
concentrated market structure. 
Economies of scale result from cost savings that occur as banks change in size. Economies may 
be internal to the bank or branch. Revell (1987) classifies economies according to whether they 
's The extent to which there is a unique bank size depends on the slope of the long-run average cost curve. 
If the long-run average cost curve is steep, and U-shaped, there is one optimum bank size. A bank not 
operating at this scale would incur substantially higher average costs. However, if the long-run average 
cost curve is flat, banks can operate at various points without incurring substantially higher average costs. 
v 
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arise from more efficient labour usage, technology, marketing or managerial functions. He argues 
that each bank can be broken down into many branches, processes and divisions. Some 
branches will benefit from economies of scale, some may have excess capacity, and some may 
suffer from diseconomies of scale. Bank level economies are thus the summation of all of the 
branch level economies. Economies may also be identified at the industry level, for example if 
improvement in technology and automation leads to lower costs for all banks. 
If a bank can widen the scope of its activities by engaging in related types of production, average 
costs may fall. Economies of scope are cost savings arising when a bank produces two or more 
outputs using the same set of resources, which result in the costs for the group of goods or 
services being less than the sum of the costs if they were produced separately. Economies of 
scope permit the bank to spread fixed costs across a larger product range. In particular, the 
increased use of computing and telecommunications are important sources of economies of 
scale and scope in the banking industry (Canals, 1993). For example, economies of scale can be 
realised because large banks handle thousands of transactions, making the average cost of a 
single transaction low. Economies of scope can be realised because computers possess excess 
capacity, so the information collected on clients can be used to service other accounts and 
provide additional services. 
Extensive research has been conducted to examine the extent to which banks minimise long-run 
average costs. " Various measures of inputs and outputs and various functional forms for the cost 
function have been used, to test for economies of scale and scope. Two broad approaches have 
been followed. With the production approach, the bank collects funds and uses these to offer 
goods and services. Banking output can be measured by the number of accounts offered or 
number of loans granted, and costs by the capital and labour costs incurred in this production 
process. With the intermediation approach, banks are treated as financial intermediaries, which 
17 Early examples include Benston (1965a, b), Bell and Murphy (1968), Schweitzer (1972), Murphy (1972) 
and Mullineaux (1975). 
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put borrowers in touch with lenders. The value of loans granted or investments are the output 
measures, while operating costs and interest payments to depositors, are measures of costs. 1s 
Early research adopted the production approach, and used the Cobb-Douglas Functional form to 
test for economies of scale (Benston, 1965; Mullineaux, 1975; Benston et al, 1982; and Gilligan, 
Smirlock and Marshall, 1984). This research was carried out for relatively small banks, and found 
either economies of scale or constant costs at fairly low levels of output, suggesting that 
economies of scale exist for small and medium sized banks only (Gilbert, 1984). 
Later research adopted the intermediation approach and used more advanced statistical 
techniques to test not only for economies of scale, but also for scope economies (Hunter and 
Timme, 1986; Hardwick, 1989; and Coscutta et al, 1988). These later studies tested for scale and 
scope economies on samples which consisted of a wider dispersion of bank sizes. Results 
suggest that banks face U-shaped average costs curves, so there may be substantial cost 
penalties for operating at a sub-optimal scale. Overall, these studies suggest that economies of 
scale exist for small and medium sized banks. Only limited evidence is found for the presence of 
economies of scope (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999). Appendix 2 summarises selected 
studies which have tested for economies of scale in individual European countries. 
Altunbas and Molyneux (1993) test for scale and scope economies for French, German, Italian 
and Spanish banks for 1988. Using the translog cost function, they regress the logarithm of total 
costs on the natural logarithm of output and the natural logarithm of input prices. Separate 
estimations are carried out for samples of 201 French banks, 196 German banks, 244 Italian 
banks and 209 Spanish banks, and for banks in the asset size bands $0-$100miliion dollars, 
$100-$300million, $300-$600 million, $600-$1000million, $1000-$3000 million, and greater than 
$5000 million. Economies of scale are found in all banking markets. For Italy, economies of scale 
18 A full discussion of issues of measurement of output and inputs, and the specification of cost functions 
(such as Cobb-Douglas, Trans-log etc. are given in Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987), chapter 2. Berger, Hunter 
and Timme (1993) and Berger and Humphrey (1997) give a detailed review of the research in US markets, 
while Molyneux et al (1996) provides a synthesis of the European literature. 
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are found for the sample as a whole and for each size band. For Spain economies of scale are 
found for banks with assets less than $100million. For France economies of scale are found for 
the sample as a whole and for banks with 'assets below $3000million. No significant evidence of 
economies of scale is found for German banks, although there is some weak evidence of 
diseconomies of scale at low levels of output. 
The authors also examine whether there are scope economies between loans and securities in 
each of the four countries. For Spain, there are substantial economies of scope for banks with 
total assets between $0-$1000m, and for the sample as a whole. Significant diseconomies of 
scope are found for the smallest Italian banks (confirming the earlier findings of Baldini and Landi, 
1990), and for the largest French banks (confirming the earlier findings of Dietsch, 1993). The 
study also finds diseconomies of scope for German banks with assets below $1000million and for 
the sample as a whole. 'The results suggest noticeable differences in cost characteristics across 
European banking markets and evidence of economies of scale and scope. ' 19 
Allen and Rai (1996) test for economies of scale over the period 1988-1992, using a sample of 
194 banks drawn from 15 countries. They find that scale economies exist for banks with assets 
less than ECU 10 billion. Banks with asset size between ECU 10 billion and ECU 100 billion 
experience constant costs, while diseconomies of scale are experienced for banks with assets 
greater that ECU 100 billion. 
Vennet (1998) uses a translog functional form to examine cost and profit efficiency for a sample 
of 2375 EU banks drawn from 17 countries over the period 1995-1996. He splits the sample into 
universal and specialist banks, and finds that universal banks are more cost and profit efficient 
than their specialist counterparts. Vennet's overall estimates of scale economies are similar to 
those found by Allen and Rai (1996). 
19 Altunbas and Molyneux (1993), p. 15. 
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Altunbas, Molyneux, Gardener and Moore (1999) add to the literature by testing for scale 
economies for a large sample of European banks over the period 1989-1996. Using the Fourier 
flexible form and stochastic frontier methods, the authors test for scale economies, x- 
inefficiencies and technical change. They find that scale economies are prevalent across all 
countries sampled ranging between five and ten per cent. Furthermore, these economies tend to 
increase with bank size. Some evidence is also found of substantial x-inefficiencies which tend to 
vary by country, size class and time period examined. 
The authors conclude that: 
' This suggests that banks can obtain cost savings through reducing managerial and other 
inefficiencies and also by increasing the scale of production i2° 
The early research tends to find that economies are exhausted at low levels of production. More 
recent research for US and European banks have found stronger evidence of scale economies 
for large banks (Berger and Humphrey, 1997 and EU, 1997a). In a review of 133 studies, Berger 
and Humphrey (1997) note that in the majority of cases, larger banks are more efficient than their 
smaller counterparts. The literature suggests that x-inefficiencies are also often important 
(Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999). 
Overall, there appears to be potential scale economies available to banks by increasing the scale 
of their operations. If these economies are realised, it is likely to lead to European banking 
markets becoming increasingly concentrated. 21 
The scale economies hypothesis concerns the number of banks that can operate given existing 
cost and demand conditions. However, it says little about the inequalities between bank sizes, 
suggesting that other forces may also be important in shaping industry structure. 
20 Altunbas et al (1999), p. 13. 21 EU (1997a) and chapter 2 of this thesis provide an extended discussion of these issues. 
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4.3.2 Entry and Exit 
Several barriers to entry are likely to feature quite prominently in the banking industry. This 
section examines the four main barriers proposed by Bain (1956) (economies of scale, cost 
advantages, product differentiation, and capital requirements) in the context of banking. 
Economies of scale can act as a barrier to entry if a new bank cannot produce at the minimum 
efficient scale. If a new bank enters below the minimum efficient scale, it will do so at higher 
costs, making entry unprofitable. EU (1997a) finds that banks entering at below the minimum 
efficient scale are likely have average costs which are around 5 per cent higher than those of 
established counterparts operating at the minimum efficient scale. 
Absolute cost advantages arise due to superior managerial ability, preferential access to an 
important input, or learning economies of scale, causing costs of offering banking products and 
services to fall over time as the organisation becomes more experienced. As a consequence, a 
new bank will incur higher costs due to lack of experience. 
Capital requirements can act as a barrier in two respects. Firstly, the EU Second Banking 
Directive, passed in 1988, requires that any new bank must have a minimum capital base of ECU 
5 million. Secondly, large investments are required to invest in the necessary technology to meet 
the day to day demands of the banking business. 
Product differentiation advantages can create a barrier to entry in three ways. Firstly, a bank 
which is established and built up a reputation over time is likely to enjoy the loyalty of customers 
(Neven, 1990). Ballarin (1986) asserts that ' ... it is hardly surprising that image plays such a 
decisive role in financial services. After all, confidence has always been a key element for a 
banking system based on fractional reserve. What we are learning now are the important side 
effects that this confidence may have. Public trust has always been advocated to foster the 
necessary stability of the financial system. In a deregulated environment enhanced reputation 
may also turn out to be a powerful competitive weapon for a particular organisation, if used 
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wisely. ' 22 Secondly, barriers may arise if substantial switching costs are involved in moving from 
one bank to another (Klemperer, 1987 and Vives, 1991b). Finally, if incumbent banks proliferate 
branches across geographical space, or products over product space, it becomes difficult for new 
banks to enter the market (Schmalensee, 1978). 
Using data for 184 banking markets (based on the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area for the 
period 1968-1974), Rhoades (1980) examines the effects of entry on competition in banking 
markets. He uses two measures of the extent of competition, namely mobility and turnover. 
Mobility is measured by the number of times the top five banks changed their rank over the 
sample period, while turnover is measured by the number of times banks which are not in the top 
five moved into this category over the sample period. Entry is measured in three ways. Firstly, net 
entry is the number of new banks entering minus the number of banks exiting. Secondly, 
significance of entry is the total number of new entrants as a percentage of the total number of 
banks operating. Finally, a dummy variable is included to distinguish between banking markets 
that experienced net entry and those that did not. As additional explanatory variables, Rhoades 
includes concentration, market growth, market size, numbers of mergers, and dummies for unit 
and branch banking markets. He finds that entry does not affect competition in the markets 
sampled. However, concentration and mergers tend to have a negative impact on competition, 
while market growth has a positive effect. 23 
4.3.3 Technological Change and Industry Life Cycles 
Changes in technology, customer attributes and the natural life cycle of an industry can influence 
concentration. Revell (1987) identifies certain trends in the evolution of the banking industry, 
which are common to all major industrialised countries. Two types of bank were operating at the 
beginning of the 20th century. The first were banks in larger towns, which financed the activities of 
domestic and international business, while the second were smaller banks responsible for the 
financing of small firms and industries. Banking activity tended to be on a single (unit) bank basis. 
Originally most bank growth was internal, but as growth opportunities were exhausted and bank 
22 Ballarin (1986), p. 223. 
23 See Rose (1987), chapter 3 for an extensive review of entry studies in the US. 
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failure became more common, growth began to take place by merger and acquisition (as smaller 
banks were rescued from failure by their larger and more successful counterparts). Banks in large 
towns generally had more opportunities to grow, due to access to larger markets. 
The industrial revolution led to the growth of large industrial firms, and as a result banks had to 
grow in size to keep pace with the capital requirements of these firms. 
' Just as banks became large to provide the funds needed by their large customers, so they had 
to spread their presence geographically. '... This was perhaps the first critical point in the 
development of a modern banking system. ' 24 
Revell argues that until the 1920s, the size of an individual bank depended on three factors: the 
size and wealth of the market area served, the size of its largest customers, and the growth and 
concentration of industry. Eventually this led to what Revell terms a 'core' group of banks that 
were so big that governments could not allow them to fail, lest the rest of the financial system 
crash. Revell argues that these banks were instrumental in the evolution of the financial system 
and responsible for supporting industry and commerce. 25 
Rybczynski (1988) also draws links between the evolution of manufacturing and the development 
of the banking industry. He identifies three phases in the evolution of the banking industry: the 
bank orientated, the market orientated and the securitisation phases. In the bank orientated 
phase, industrial and service sector firms raised external finance in the form of loans from banks, 
and the banks decided which firms could grow. In the market orientated phase, industrial firms 
raised some external finance directly on the open market. If successful these firms gained access 
to large amounts of capital, and investors gained ownership stakes in the firms. Finally, in the 
securitision phase, industrial firms raise most of their capital through capital markets, while banks 
are involved in off-balance sheet activities and the underwriting of equity issues. This phase 
coincides with de-industrialisation or re-industrialisation with large amounts of capital required to 
invest in new and possibly risky industries. 
24 Revell (1987), p. 20. 
25 See Kindleberger (1984) for a related discussion. 
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Crucial in dictating the pace at which the banking industry evolves is the role of technology. Revell 
(1987) argues that although new technologies such as electronic banking give banks the 
opportunities to expand and exploit economies of scale and scope, it may also give smaller banks 
an advantage. As technology becomes less expensive, small banks can start to offer services 
similar to those of large banks. As the smaller banks do not incur the costs of maintaining a large 
branch network, they may be able to do so at lower cost than the large banks. 
Several empirical studies have examined the life cycle of individual banking markets investigating 
trends in concentration over time. Aliber (1975) examines concentration in international banking 
over the period 1965-1974. As a measure of concentration, Aliber uses the percentage of total 
deposits of the world's 100 largest banks accounted for by the ten and twenty largest banks. Over 
the period, concentration amongst the top banks remained relatively steady. 
Tschoegl (1982) uses assets data (at two yearly intervals) for the world's largest banks over the 
period 1969-1979. Six measures of concentration comprising three static measures and three 
dynamic measures are used. The static measures include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
Entropy Index and an index to reflect bank dominance. The dynamic measures reflect the stability 
of a bank's market share over time, the relationship between bank size and growth, and 
correlation coefficients between successive growth rates. In contrast to Aliber, Tschoegl finds that 
concentration fell during the 1970s in all countries. 
Rhoades (1983) examines trends in concentration of banking deposits amongst the world's 
largest banks, and the stability of the rankings of various countries' banks within this group over 
the period 1956-1980. Using the total deposits of the 500 largest banks in the denominator, 
Rhoades calculates concentration ratios for the world's top 100 banks, along with banks ranked 
(by size) 1 to 5,6 to 10,11 to 25,26-50 and 51-100. He finds that the concentration ratio for the 
top 100 banks increased from 63.3 per cent in 1956 to 70.5 per cent in 1979. Over the same 
period, the share of the largest banks fell from 14.3 per cent to 9.4 per cent. Concentration also 
increased for the other size bands. Country rankings are calculated as the proportion of the 
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deposits of the 100 largest banks controlled by banks from each country. Japan, US, Germany 
and France were the highest ranked countries. Japanese banks gained the most rapid increase in 
their share of total deposits over the sample period. 
Baer and Mote (1985) examine trends in banking concentration in Canada, France, Germany, 
Japan, UK and US over the period 1930 to 1980. Using five bank concentration ratios, they find 
for Canada and Germany, concentration fell over the period, from 84 per cent to 80 per cent, and 
44 per cent to 24 per cent respectively. In Japan concentration remained at around 22 per cent, 
while in the UK it fell from 70 per cent to 68 per cent. In the US and France concentration doubled 
with increases from 9 per cent to 18 per cent in the US and 41 per cent to 81 per cent in France. 
Revell (1987) compares concentration for Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, Australia, France, 
Belgium, Ireland, Switzerland and Sweden. Three, five and ten bank concentration ratios are 
calculated for commercial banking and for the banking industry as a whole. For concentration in 
the commercial bank industry, Revell finds (with reference to the 5-bank concentration ratio) that 
all commercial bank industries in individual countries tend to be concentrated, and that this result 
applies to the banking industries as a whole in these respective countries. The most concentrated 
banking industries are found in Australia, Sweden, Belgium and Switzerland, while Japan, Italy 
and Spain are the least concentrated. 26 
Thornton (1991) uses data on the world's 500 largest banks to examine trends in concentration, 
over the period 1979 to 1989. Concentration ratios are calculated for various groups of banks 
within the top 500. The share of the top 100 in the total assets of the top 500 declined slightly 
during the sample period. However, the share of assets accounted for by the top five banks 
increased from 8.77 per cent to 10.18 per cent. Overall, evidence suggests that aggregate 
concentration in international banking has fallen slightly over the past twenty years, but certain 
large banks may be increasing their share of total world deposits. 
26 For a detailed discussion see Revell (1987), p. 27. 
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Overall, most evidence suggests that the majority of developed banking markets have moved 
from being relatively unconcentrated and technically backward, to technically advanced market 
structures where a small number of 'core' banks dominate. 
4.3.4 Market Growth 
The rate of growth of a market will influence the intensity of competition. If there is free entry, then 
rapid growth is likely to lead to entry which is likely to intensify competition and reduce 
concentration (Rhoades, 1980). However, if entry is restricted (as in many banking markets) then 
rapid growth gives incumbent banks the opportunity to expand, leading to more highly 
concentrated markets dominated by large banks (Smirlock, 1985). 
4.3.5 Mergers 
Banks may decide to merge for several reasons, namely 1) to achieve economies of scale and 
scope through the increased size and possibly diversity of operations; 2) to gain enhanced market 
power by eliminating competitors in the short-run, so prices can be raised in the long-run; 3) to 
pursue managerial objectives such as growth and size maximisation; and 4) to meet changes in 
customer attributes. For example, banks have had to increase their international presence in 
response to the growth of multinational manufacturing firms (Walter, 1988). 
A number of studies have investigated whether mergers increase efficiency and improve 
performance. Most, (but not all), examine performance indicators before and after the merger 
event. The results have been rather mixed. 
Rhoades (1986) using data on a sample of over 4000 US banks compares the performance of 
banks that were acquired over the period 1968-1984 and those which were not. He finds no 
difference in performance between the two groups. Spindt and Tarhan (1992) also compare the 
performance before and after merger of merged banks with non-merged banks for the US. They 
find that the profitability of many merged banks improved in the years after merger. Shaffer 
(1992) uses a simulation approach to estimate average cost functions to examine the potential 
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reduction in costs from a merger. His sample includes US banks with total assets greater than $1 
billion. He finds that the majority of simulated mergers lead to an increase in costs. 
The earliest European studies of Revell (1987) and Berg (1992) find little evidence of efficiency 
gains through merger. More recently, Vennet (1995) examines the implications for bank conduct 
and performance using data on 492 take-overs. Mergers are categorised into domestic majority 
acquisitions, domestic integral acquisitions (a large bank takes over a small bank), domestic 
mergers among equal partners, and cross border acquisitions. He examines the performance of 
acquiring, acquired and merged entities using a variety of measures to account for risk levels and 
profitability. In general, he finds that domestic majority acquisitions result in acquiring banks 
maintaining above average performance by exercising market power (through increasing interest 
margins), while acquired banks often under perform compared with industry averages. For 
integral mergers, the combined values of the merged banks do not differ significantly from their 
pre merger levels, but liquidity decreases. Vennet speculates that in this type of deal, banks 
typically, pursue managerial motives such as utility, size and growth maximisation. For domestic 
mergers between banks of similar size, he finds that the combined bank experienced significant 
decrease in costs through economies of scale advantages, and improved profitability. Cross 
border acquisitions normally involve large profitable banks acquiring less efficient banks. After 
acquisition, the acquiring bank remains profitable, while the acquired bank's performance 
improves. However, the acquired bank tends to adopt more aggressive lending policies, as 
technologies and managerial practices are transferred from one bank to another. 
Following Shaffer (1992), Molyneux, Altunbas and Gardener (1996) adopt a simulation approach 
to examine possible efficiency gains arising from hypothetical mergers in Spain, France, Germany 
and Italy. They find that merger activity in Spain is likely to lead to falling costs as banks realise 
economies of scale. However, for France, Germany and Italy increased merger activity is likely to 
lead to higher costs. 
Using a case study approach, Rhoades (1998) uses sixteen financial ratios to examine the effects 
of merger on efficiency and profitability for a small sample of US banks. He finds that in the nine 
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mergers studied, all achieved significant cost cutting objectives. Rhoades also finds that four of 
the nine merged entities showed substantial efficiency gains relative to the average achieved by 
banks in the same peer group, while seven of the nine showed improvements in profitability. 
Overall, mergers are likely to result in higher concentration (Rhoades, 1980). The empirical 
evidence on merger suggests that in many cases there is little improvement in the efficiency or 
performance of the merged entities. It is likely that many mergers take place in order to increase 
market power (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999). 
4.3.6 Regulation 
Governments have felt it necessary to supervise and regulate the activities of individual banks. 
Regulation is designed to increase the efficiency of banks, while at the same time protect the 
interests of depositors. Regulators can ensure that banks remain solvent by building up reserves, 
and ensure that depositors are protected, by instituting deposit insurance schemes, providing 
lender of last resort facilities and by bailing out failed banks. Given that banking is highly 
regulated, the nature of regulation is likely to have a substantial effect on the structural 
composition of the industry. 
There are three main types of regulation which may influence the current and future structure of 
the industry, namely structural regulation, conduct regulation and prudential regulation. Structural 
regulation seeks to alter or maintain industry structure. Measures include the functional 
separation of banks into different activities (e. g. commercial banking and investment banking), 
the imposition of entry barriers including minimum capital requirements and restrictions on the 
type of business banks can undertake. Regulatory authorities can limit the numbers of banks by 
placing restrictions on the number of bank licences granted. This type of regulation is likely to 
make entry into banking markets difficult, giving incumbent banks the opportunity to exercise 
market power and increase size (Gual and Neven, 1993). Conduct regulation attempts to alter the 
behaviour of banks. Controls can be imposed on the levels of interest rates, the extent of loans 
granted and branch expansion. Finally, prudential regulation attempts to safeguard the stability of 
banks and protect the interests of consumers. Relevant measures include participation in deposit 
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insurance schemes and provisions for the central bank to act as lender of last resort 
(Baltensperger and Dermine, 1990). 
The extent to which regulation increases or decreases concentration depends upon whether the 
regulator wishes to increase competition (by making it easier for new banks to enter the market), 
or to increase the stability of the industry (by imposing high minimum capital requirements, which 
may act as entry barriers). 
4.3.7 Strategic Behaviour of Incumbent Banks 
Drawing on Porter (1980), Canals (1993) discusses the value chain. The value chain dis- 
aggregates a bank into its strategically relevant activities, i. e. those that reduce costs or are 
potential sources of differentiation. 27 Activities can be split into primary and support activities. 
Primary activities are those which are associated with the physical creation of the product or 
service. Support activities are those activities that support the primary activities and each other, 
for example, by providing purchased inputs, technology and human resources. Once the bank's 
activities have been dis-aggregated, the process of appraisal can take place. Each of the support 
activities is linked to each of the primary activities to a greater or lesser extent. The analysis 
examines how these links can be improved in order to increase the margins on each product. 
Canals contends that a bank must select and follow a generic strategy to add value, and gain a 
competitive advantage over competitors. These generic strategies consist of cost leadership, 
differentiation and focus. Cost leadership is a strategy, by which a bank attempts to keep its costs 
lower than that of the competition. 28 To do this the bank must identify cost savings at some point 
in its value chain and produce at lower cost, or alternatively change the structure of the value 
chain. For example, the bank may be able to strike an exclusive deal with suppliers for raw 
materials such as auto teller machines. Differentiation is a strategy by which a bank gives its 
product some unique characteristic that appeals to its customers, leading to higher margins and 
27 Gardener (1992) also applies Porter's work to the EU banking industry. For applications of Porter's ideas 
to the US banking industries see Ballarin (1986), chapter 2. 28 Salomon brothers (1993) identify the importance of low costs in determining the success or otherwise of 
a bank. 
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profits relative to competitors. Finally, focus is a strategy that can apply to cost leadership and 
differentiation. In both cases, the strategy requires the bank to focus on a particular segment of 
the market. In the case of differentiation this may involve gearing a product towards a particular 
group of customers. Only banks following generic strategies will add value and gain a competitive 
advantage over rivals. 
Competitive advantage can arise in four main areas within the banking industry: human 
resources, financial resources, physical assets and intangible assets. With human resources, 
banks can gain advantages through the quality of their workforce or through training. Banks can 
also build up financial resources to become large and exercise market power or realise efficiency 
gains from building up the capital base or total deposits. By using physical assets (such as branch 
networks, information systems and telecommunications systems), or intangible assets (such as 
brand image, experience, managerial talent, and product and service quality), banks can gain and 
sustain a competitive advantage over rivals. This will lead ultimately to a market structure where a 
few large banks dominate. 
4.3.8 Stochastic Factors 
The discussion thus far has assumed that bank can grow either through superior efficiency, 
access to economies of scale and scope, or by deterring entry of rival banks. Whatever the 
reason, the consequence is an increasingly concentrated market structure. However, industries 
can become concentrated even if banks do not have efficiency or market power advantages. If 
bank sizes are the result of random influences, this can eventually lead to a skewed size 
distribution of banks. In other words if the distribution of growth rates in any year is independent of 
size, over time some banks will be lucky and become large, while others will be unlucky and 
decline. These arguments are embodied in The Law of Proportionate Effect (LPE) (see section 
3.4.6). There are few empirical studies which test the LPE explicitly with respect to banking. 
However, there has been some research on the relationship between bank size and growth. 
Alhadeff and Alhadeff (1964) compare the growth of the top 200 largest US banks in the US over 
the period 1930-1960, to the growth of the total banking industry assets. The authors use three 
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separate samples, namely 1930-1960,1940-1960, and 1950-1960, so the identity of the top 200 
banks at the start of each period is different. 
To compare the growth of the largest banks to the growth of banks across the entire market, the 
authors calculate the ratio of the growth of the large bank group to the average growth of all 
banks. For each of the three periods studied, they find that the large bank group grew more slowly 
than average. 
To examine the relationship between size and growth on a dis-aggregated basis, the sample of 
200 banks is split into ten sub-groups based on initial size. The mean growth rate for survivors in 
each decile is expressed as a percentage of the mean growth rate of all banks in the top 200. 
They find that in general smaller banks enjoyed higher growth than their larger counterparts. 
Rhoades and Yeats (1974) examine growth, concentration and merger activity in the US 
commercial banking industry over the period 1960-1971. Using a sample of 600 banks they 
distinguish between internally generated growth and external growth by merger. The latter is 
isolated by removing the deposits of acquired banks from the assets of the acquirer. It is 
assumed that the acquired bank would have grown by the average for the entire industry until the 
end of the sample period. Splitting the sample into six bands, they find that banks in the smallest 
and largest bands experienced the slowest growth. A regression of size in the terminal period on 
size in the initial period yields a slope coefficient of less than unity, implying that smaller banks 
grew faster than larger banks. Merger is found to be the most important source of growth for 
banks in the largest size group. When this growth is removed, the internal growth of the largest 
banks is found to be well below that of the smallest banks. However, internal growth is very high 
for medium sized banks. 
Yeats, Irons and Rhoades (1975) examine growth for a US sample of 48 new banks which 
entered over the period 1960 to 1963, and the subsequent growth of these banks over a ten year 
period. They argue that one should expect some similarities in the patterns of growth between 
these banks for three reasons. Firstly, banking services tend to be homogenous, so one would 
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expect banks to charge similar prices and grow at similar rates. Secondly, the extent to which 
banks can compete with each other is tightly regulated. Thirdly, banks naturally locate in markets 
which give them maximum access to a large pool of customers. Given that banks seek to capture 
similar types of business, they will tend to locate in similar markets. If banks are uniformly 
distributed geographically, then they will tend to capture similar shares of any existing or new 
business. 
Yeats et al model bank growth, using age, average changes in disposable income for the market 
which each bank serves, and the number of entrants as explanatory variables. They find a 
positive relationship between growth and bank age, and changes in disposable income. Entry is 
found to have a negative effect on bank growth. 
Yeats et al argue that the model can be used by managers and regulators to examine deviations 
of actual from expected growth rates. Regulators can use the model to intervene if a bank seems 
to be in trouble, while managers of banks can use it to judge when to raise capital. 
Alhadeff and Alhadeff (1976) examine the growth up to 1970 of 986 new banks that entered the 
US banking industry between 1948 and 1966. They explain bank size in 1970 using 
environmental factors common to all banks, internal factors specific to a bank and the number of 
years since entry as explanatory variables. They argue that in banking markets internal factors 
are likely to be less important because of tight regulation that constrains the activities of 
management. External factors therefore tend to determine the growth and performance of banks. 
Such factors may include restrictions on entry of new banks, branch expansion, and the size and 
structure of banks' assets and liabilities. Consequently, banks that are successful in identifying 
areas where regulation is conducive to growth will be successful. 
Variables capturing entry restrictions, restrictions on branch expansion, market growth, the size of 
local markets, and a time trend (to control for learning effects) are found to have a positive effect 
on bank growth. 
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The authors examine the robustness of the results to see whether new banks which have entered 
unit banking states had different growth experiences to those which entered branch banking 
states. They find that restrictions on branching and market growth do most to explain the positive 
growth rates enjoyed by new banks in branch banking states, while market growth did most to 
explain the growth of new banks in unit bank states. 
The size of branch banks at the end of the period was found to be around 10 per cent higher than 
that of unit banks, perhaps because the former can open branches. However, unit banks were 
four times more likely to survive than banks operating in branching states. 
Tschoegl (1983) investigates the relationship between size and growth for a sample of large 
international banks. He tests three hypotheses relating to the LPE, namely that the growth rates 
are independent of bank size, variability of growth rates in bank size is independent of initial size, 
and growth rates do not persist from one period to the next. Tscheogl argues that if these 
propositions hold concentration will increase over time. 'This result is due strictly to the workings 
of chance and requires no assumptions about the behaviour of firms or managers, economies of 
scale, or monopoly advantages. '29 
Tschoegl uses total assets as a measure of size. 30 The data consists of 100 banks in the years 
1971,1973,1975 and 1977. He estimates four equations, using book value of assets and market 
value of equity as size measures. He also allows for serial correlation in growth rates (by including 
lagged growth terms) and national differences in the size-growth relationship (using dummy 
variables). 3' Tschoegl finds that initial size is unrelated to final size, thus lending support to his 
first hypothesis, implying that concentration is likely to increase over time. 
29 Tschoegl (1983), p. 189. 30 Tscheogl augments this measure by using equity in some estimations. The equity measure is included to 
allow for some of the difficulties in using the asset measure of bank size. These problems mainly relate to 
differing accounting practices across countries. The author argues that some countries allow banks to keep 
hidden reserves that allow them to smooth performance from year to year. He argues that this can bias the 
estimated coefficients towards accepting the LPE. 
31 The three equations using assets as a measure of size were carried out by regressing size in 1977 on 
1975,1975 on 1973, and 1973 on 1971. The equity equation was carried out by regressing size in 1977 on 
size in 1973. 
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To examine whether the variability of growth is independent of the bank size, Tschoegl regresses 
the estimated (absolute) residuals on initial bank size. He finds that variability of growth declines 
with size in all equations, implying that smaller banks tend to exhibit more variable growth rates 
than large banks. This suggests that big banks are less risky than small banks. 
Tschoegl finds a weak positive, but insignificant relationship between growth rates in successive 
periods, implying that growth in one period does not act as a good predictor of growth in 
subsequent periods. Consequently, banks find it difficult to sustain above average growth over 
several time periods. This suggests that financial innovation or superior management talent is 
weak or absent. 
Tschoegl finds a positive relationship between size and transnationality, but also finds that growth 
and transnationality are unrelated. He argues that if banks become more transnational as they 
grow, then they are likely to be subject to more random shocks, which leads to the acceptance of 
LPE. The variability of growth in book assets is positively related to transnationality, but negatively 
related to equity. A positive relationship suggests banks engaging in foreign activities are likely to 
have more variable growth rates than banks specialising in domestic operations. In contrast, a 
negative relationship suggests that transnational banks are likely to be more diversified, and 
benefit by pooling risks across several markets. 
Tschoegl concludes that because banks growth rates tend to be less variable for larger and 
transnational banks, there should be scope for regulation which takes account of differences in 
the risk profile of large and small banks. 
Overall, the evidence as to whether the operation of the LPE shapes the structure of banking 
industries is somewhat limited. On balance, the available evidence suggests that size is unlikely 
to enhance a bank's growth opportunities through economies of scale or other efficiency 
advantages, but may aid in smoothing the variability of growth. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed the application of industrial organisation theory to the empirical 
analysis of competition in banking. In particular the role of market structure in determining the 
performance of banks, and the forces which in turn may determine banking market structure have 
also been explored. When analysing SCP relationships in banking, substantial evidence supports 
the view that concentration levels and barriers to entry influence performance. Among the 
determinants of market structure, the evidence on economies of scale is mixed. In contrast to 
manufacturing, there is some evidence that high growth leads to increasing concentration in 
banking. There is also evidence that technological advance and changes in customer attributes 
lead to increased concentration, as banks grow to meet new competitive challenges. Finally, 
some evidence suggests that stochastic forces play a part in shaping banking market structure, 
evidenced by the failure to reject the LPE in the Tschoegl (1983) study. No evidence for the LPE 
exists for European banking markets. Given the limited attention devoted to testing the LPE, the 
rest of this thesis aims to estimate and simulate stochastic models, which examine the 
relationship between size and growth, in order to test whether it is possible to reject the idea that 
growth is determined independently of size. The following chapter gives an overview of the 
empirical literature that tests the LPE for manufacturing industries. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SIZE AND GROWTH, AND THE LAW OF 
PROPORTIONATE EFFECT IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
5.1 Introduction 
Market concentration is the proportion of an industry's total assets, sales or employment that is 
controlled by its largest firms. Traditional industrial organisation literature suggests a number of 
factors can cause industries to be dominated by a few large firms. Such factors include entry and 
exit barriers, economies of scale or the adoption of entry deterring strategies to prevent the 
growth of rival firms. Typically, this literature suggests that large firms are likely to gain a 
competitive advantage through enhanced efficiency or market power, which enables them to grow 
at faster rates than their smaller rivals, and which tends to lead to a market structure in which a 
few large firms dominate. 
However, industries may evolve into concentrated structures even if size does not enhance a 
firm's growth prospects. Gibrat (1931) investigates the implications if each firm's growth in any 
year is determined randomly, and is therefore independent of its size and its growth in previous 
years. He shows that this non-relationship between growth and firm size has important 
consequences for changes in concentration and market structure over time. According to the Law 
of Proportionate Effect (LPE hereafter), the factors which influence a firm's growth, such as 
growth of demand, managerial talent, innovation, organisational structure and luck, are distributed 
across firms in a manner which is essentially random. This results in a firm size distribution that 
becomes increasingly skewed towards a small number of large firms. Previous research has 
found that this process accords well with the actual size distribution of firms observed in many 
real world industries. ' 
1 Quandt (1966), Silberman (1967) and Clarke (1979) test how closely the actual size distribution of firms 
in particular industries conform to a family of skewed distributions including the lognormal, Yule and Pareto 
distributions. 
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The following chapter describes the literature which follows from Gibrat's original contributions. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 illustrates by means of a simple example, how 
stochastic influences can cause the concentration of industry to increase over time. Section 5.3, 
discusses previous empirical studies which have sought to test the LPE. This section is split into 
two subsections to reflect the different methods used to test the LPE. Section 5.3.2 describes 
tests of the LPE between two time periods by means of log-linear regression analysis. Section 
5.3.3 describes tests for the LPE using cross sectional data collected at a single point in time. 
This research compares (through the use of goodness of fit tests) the actual size distribution of 
firm sizes with a family of theoretical skewed distributions that would be generated if the industry 
had evolved through the influence of random shocks. The LPE is judged to hold when the actual 
size distribution of firms corresponds closely to the theoretical distribution. Section 5.4 concludes. 
5.2 Absolute and Proportionate Growth of Firms And Market Concentration 
Several economists have noted the importance of random factors in determining the growth of 
firms. Sherman (1974) uses Schwed's (1965) ' great coin flipping contest ' to illustrate how 
inequalities can arise over time. 
' The referee gives a signal for the first time and 400,000 coins flash in the sun as they are 
tossed. The scorers make their tabulations, and discover that 200,000 people are winners and 
200,000 are losers. Then the second game is played. Of the original 200,000 winners, about half 
of them win again. The third game is played, and of the 100,000 who have won both games half 
of them are again successful. These 50,000, in the fourth game are reduced to 25,000, and in the 
fifth to 12,500. These 12,500 have now won five straight without loss and are no doubt beginning 
to fancy themselves as coin flippers. They feel they have an 'instinct' for it. However in the sixth 
game, 6250 are disappointed and amazed they have finally lost, and perhaps some of them start 
a Congressional investigation. But the victorious 6,250 play on and are successively reduced in 
number until less than a thousand are left. This little band have won nine straight without a loss, 
and by this time most of them have at least a local reputation for their ability. People come from 
some distance to consult them about their method of calling heads and tails, and they modestly 
give explanations of how they have achieved their success. Eventually there are about a dozen 
men who have won every single time for about fifteen games. These are regarded as the experts, 
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the greatest coin flippers in history, the men who never lose, and they have their biographies 
written. '2 
Sherman argues that it is important not to regard all large firms as successful and efficient; to do 
so is like treating coin flippers as skilled. In many cases, luck may have a significant effect on the 
growth of firms. 
Prais (1976) argues that random shocks can lead to a greater dispersion of firm sizes over time 
even if large firms are not growing any faster than small firms over time. He demonstrates this by 
a 'Special Theory' where all sizes of firm have the same chances of absolute growth in any time 
period. He later modifies this assumption to that of proportionate growth. 
The example involves a hypothetical industry that consists of 128 firms, each employing 100 
employees. Firms are governed by a growth process, where in any year 50 per cent remain the 
same size, 25 per cent increase in size by 10 workers and 25 percent decrease in size by 10 
workers. Table 5.1 shows this process over a three year period. For example, at the end of year 
one, there are 32 firms with 90 employees, 64 firms with 100 employees, and 32 firms with 110 
employees. Total industry employment is still 128,000 workers. However, total industry 
employment is distributed in differing proportions across the industry. 
The final column of Table 5.1 shows the concentration ratio for the 10 largest firms in each of the 
four years. Concentration has increased from an initial value of 7.81 per cent in year zero to 9.53 
per cent at the end of year three. Prais observes that 'The dispersion of the distribution thus 
grows inexorably as time proceeds as a result of spontaneous drift (the sizes of firms follow a 
random walk, as sheep which have no shepherd). s3 
Prais contends firms may have an equal chance of growing by the same proportionate amount. 
This type of growth process can cause concentration to grow more rapidly than under the 
2 Schwed (1955), p. 160-161 (quoted in Sherman, 1974, p. 9) 3 Prais (1976), p. 26. 
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assumption of absolute growth. Table 5.2 shows this process. The starting point is the same as in 
the previous example, but this time 50 per cent of firms in any period stay the same size, while 25 
per cent grow by 10 per cent and 25 per cent decline by 10 per cent. The process of proportionate 
growth leads to an increase in the mean employment in the industry. After year three 
concentration has increased from 7.81 per cent to 9.58 per cent (compared to 9.53 per cent in the 
previous example). 
If this process continues for long enough the size distribution of firms will approximate the 
lognormal distribution, which is very close to the actual size distribution of firms observed in many 
industries. ` 
Hannah and Kay (1977) use the following gambling analogy to describe the above process. 
'.... if a group of rich men and a group of poor men visit Monte Carlo, it is likely that some of the 
rich will become poor and some of the poor become rich: but it is also probable that some of the 
rich will get richer and some of the poor will get poorer, so that the extent of inequality within each 
group and over the two groups taken together is likely to increase. The process works to increase 
industrial concentration in much the same way. '5 
The LPE in its general form ignores many systematic factors that may affect firms' growth 
prospects and the size distribution of firms within an industry. These factors include the entry of 
new firms and exit of established firms, mergers and acquisitions, persistence of individual firm 
growth rates through time, the potential to exploit economies of scale and potential entry. These 
are now discussed. 
Entry and Exit 
The LPE in its simplest form takes no account of entry of new firms and exit of established firms. 
Most empirical studies report results on samples of firms that have survived over the entire period 
of the investigation, consequently, taking no account of the size-growth relationship for non- 
4 See Aitchison and Brown (1966) for an extended discussion of the lognormal distribution. 5 Hannah and Kay (1977), p. 103. 
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surviving firms. If chances of survival are inversely related to initial size and subsequent growth, 
estimation using a sample of surviving firms may introduce a selection bias (Mansfield, 1962). 
Mergers 
The LPE focuses on growth from internal sources, and has little to say about growth from 
acquisitions and mergers. Evidence suggests that the chances of take-over and merger are 
related to size (Dunne and Hughes, 1994). e 
Persistence of Growth 
The LPE assumes the growth rates of firms are independent in successive periods. However, in 
reality, the effects of managerial efficiencies are likely to carry forward across more than one time 
period. If there is a positive correlation in growth rates between successive periods, the observed 
relationship between size and growth is likely to be biased upwards (Chesher, 1979). 
Attainment of the Minimum Efficient Scale 
The LPE also assumes that firms face flat cost curves. However, according to microeconomic 
theory, most industries are characterised by U-Shaped cost curves, in which case firms must 
reach the industry minimum efficient scale (MES) to ensure survival (Stigler, 1958). ' The extent to 
which the LPE operates may depend on the size classes of firms that are examined. Small firms 
must pursue rapid growth to reach the MES, or die through bankruptcy or take-over. In contrast, 
large firms which have reached the minimum efficient scale are unlikely to grow as fast, since 
they could encounter the disadvantages associated with diseconomies of scale. Consequently, 
the LPE is more likely to hold for large firms which have already reached the minimum efficient 
scale (Simon and Bonnini, 1958). This implies that some threshold for firm size may exist below 
which the LPE does not hold (Davies and Lyons, 1982). 
6 Several authors most notably Kumar (1985) have attempted to examine the growth process of individual 
firms from internal and external courses. See section 5.3.1 for a discussion of such issues. 7Chapter 3 provides a discussion of these issues. 
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Heteroscedasticity in growth rates 
The LPE assumes that growth rates are homoscedastic for firms of all sizes. However, larger 
firms are likely to pursue a strategy of diversification, and so can spread risk over a large number 
of production activities. This ensures stability in growth over time (Singh and Whittington, 1968). 
Larger firms are also likely to be older than smaller firms, so may experience learning economies 
of scale which enable them to avoid making costly mistakes. Such benefits are unlikely to be 
available to smaller firms, which are also often younger, and through inexperience more likely to 
make mistakes (Jovanovic, 1982). 
It may also be the case that the prevailing type of competition influences the variability in growth 
rates of firms. For example, in industries that are characterised by a high degree of non-price 
competition, firms will be subject to more variable returns. This is because the outcomes of 
product and process innovations are uncertain, and so are likely to exert a random effect on 
individual firm growth rates (Weiss, 1963). 
Entry and Exit Barriers 
The LPE ignores barriers to entry and exit. Entry may be at its largest in smaller size groups as 
small firms are born (Simon and Bonnini, 1958). However, the model does not recognise the 
implication if large firms enter in order to diversify, causing concentration to increase (Davies, 
1989). The problem of unobservable entry (as in the contestable markets literature), where 
incumbent firm behaviour is constrained by actions of potential entrants, is also ignored (Baumol, 
1982). 
Section 5.3 Review of Previous Studies 
Empirical research that has tested the LPE has used comprehensive data sets, and various 
econometric techniques. The research is grouped into two categories. The first approach uses 
samples of firms to test LPE using log-linear regression, to examine the relationship between the 
size and growth of firms between two time periods. There is extensive evidence for manufacturing 
in the UK and US, and there is also some evidence for Germany, Austria and Italy. Results have 
been mixed with early studies finding no relationship between size and growth, or a positive 
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relationship between firm size and growth. More recent studies find that small firms grow faster 
with more variable growth rates. Testing procedures have become progressively more 
sophisticated, with many authors drawing links between evolutionary learning models (where 
younger less experienced firms enjoy less stable growth than their larger counterparts), and more 
traditional arguments based on economies of scale and strategic behaviour. These studies are 
reviewed in section 5.3.1. The second approach adopts a static approach, examining the 
frequency distribution of firm sizes. Using goodness of fit tests, it is possible to test how closely 
the observed, often skewed firm size distributions approximate to a set of skewed distributions 
(such as the lognormal, Pareto and Yule) which are the outcome of a random data generating 
process. There is evidence for the US, UK, Sweden and former socialist countries. This research 
is reviewed in section 5.3.2. 
5.3.1 Empirical Studies which use the Log Linear Formulation to test LPE 
This section outlines studies that have used the log-linear regression model to test the LPE. 
These studies vary in terms of data and geographical coverage, and method of investigation. The 
section, also describes the various data and methodological difficulties associated with testing for 
the LPE. 
In the main researchers in this area have tested a log-linear regression of the general form. 
Su =ß1 +ß2s1ca+u1c; E(u1º)=0 and var(u1, )=a . (1) 
sit is some measure of firm size (in natural log form). Interpretation of ß, depends on whether 
f32 =1 or X32 < 1.832 reflects the relationship between firm size in the current and the previous 
period, and a1 measures the dispersion of firm growth rates relative to mean size. If X32 = 11 
there is no relationship between size and growth, and so LPE holds. If iß2 < 1, small firms tend to 
grow faster than larger firms. If #ß2 > 1, the opposite applies. 
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Hart and Prais (1956) 
In a seminal paper, Hart and Prais (1956) analyse trends in concentration for the period 1885 to 
1956, using a sample of firms quoted on the UK Stock Exchange. The number of firms varies 
over time, ranging from 60 firms in 1885 to 2,103 firms in 1956. Firm size is measured as the 
stock exchange valuation of the firm. 
Transition matrices are used to examine the mobility of firms over time. The sample period is split 
into five sub-periods of approximately fifteen years each. They find that for firms that survived in 
each of these time periods, the dispersion of firm sizes increased, implying increasing 
concentration. 
Hart and Prais carry out a log-linear regression analysis of opening firm size on closing firm size 
for the periods 1885 to 1896,1896 to 1907,1907 to 1924,1924 to 1939,1939 to 1950. For 
periods up to 1939, X32 is approximately unity, but from 1939 onwards the value is below unity. 
The authors argue that industry concentration in the UK was increasing up to 1939 through the 
operation of LPE, but stabilised after this point as smaller firms grew faster than their larger 
counterparts. 
Hart (1962) 
Hart (1962) asserts that if LPE is valid, the following must hold. Firstly, large, medium and small 
firms have the same average proportionate growth. Secondly, dispersion of growth rates around 
this mean level is equal for all sizes of firms. Thirdly, the distribution of firm sizes follows a 
lognormal distribution. Finally, the relative dispersion of firm sizes increase over time. 
Using gross profits minus depreciation as a measure of firm size, and a data set consisting of UK 
firms drawn from four industries over various time periods, he finds no differences in the mean 
profit growth of small and large firms-8 
8 The sample consists of 40 brewing firms covering the period 1931 - 1932 to 1937 - 1938 (comprising 22 
small and 18 large) , 36 cotton spinning firms covering the period 1937 and 1938 (comprising 18 large and 18 small) 124 firms from the drinks industry, 1950 and 1954 (comprising 57 small and 67 large). Hart also 
uses a data set of 229 unquoted firms (comprising 113 large and 116 small). 
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' These results are consistent with that part of the law of proportionate effect which states that on 
average the proportionate growth of firms is the same irrespective of whether they are large or 
smalLi9 
However, Hart does find that the dispersion of growth around the common mean differs for large 
and small firms in the brewing industries, with large firms experiencing more variable growth. 
Hart plots the sizes of firms between 1950 and 1955 for a sample of 1981 firms, to test whether 
the distribution is lognormal. He finds that departures from lognormality are modest, and that the 
variance of the size distribution increases over the period. He carries out a regression of the 
variances in 1955 firm size, on the variance of firm size in 1950, (for a sample of 1981 quoted 
firms), and finds that the coefficient is close to unity, implying that size in the two time periods is 
unrelated. 
' We should expect the growth or decline of a firm to depend on the quality of its management, on 
the tastes of its customers, on the development of techniques, on government policy, and on 
many other forces. But if the argument of this paper is accepted, we should expect these 
influences to account for a relatively small part of proportionate growth of firms. There will be a 
long list of causes - the weather, the international political situation, the import policy of countries 
overseas and many more - some making for growth, some making for decline, but together 
apparently acting randomly on the sizes of firms. i10 
Hymer and Pashigian (19621 
Hymer and Pashigian (1962) examine the relationship between firm size and growth for a sample 
of 1,000 large US firms. The growth rate of an individual firm is measured in terms of changes in 
asset size over the period 1946 to 1955. The authors divide the 1,000 firms into ten industrial 
groupings. The sample is split into size quartiles, and the mean growth rates and standard 
deviations of these respective quartiles are calculated. They find that mean growth rates of firms 
are unrelated to size, but that dispersion of growth tends to be negatively related to firm size. This 
9 Hart (1962), p. 33. 
10 Ibid., p. 39. 
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contradicts earlier arguments of Simon and Bonnini (1958), who assume that all firms in an 
industry are subject to the same costs (see section 5.3.2). In contrast, Hymer and Pashigian's 
findings imply that costs tend to decline with firm size, either as a result of economies of scale or 
diversification advantages held by large firms. 
Mansfield (1962) 
Mansfield (1962) tests the LPE for the US tyre, petrol and steel industries over ten sub-periods. " 
He classifies firms by their initial size and computes a frequency distribution of growth rates within 
each size class. He then carries out a chi-squared test for each of the size classes to determine 
whether the observed frequencies of firm sizes were equal in all classes. 
The role of firm exit in driving the relationship between size and growth is analysed by evaluating 
three different versions of the LPE. Version one tests LPE for all firms in existence in a given 
time period, even if some firms did not survive to the end of the period. In seven out of ten cases 
tested, the LPE does not hold. This is because the chances of firm failure or exit do not operate 
equally for all size bands of firms. Version two tests the LPE for firms that survived for the entire 
period under investigation. He finds that the LPE holds. Version three examines the proposition 
that the LPE should hold for firms whose size is equal to or above the industry minimum efficient 
scale (MES). In this case, the LPE holds to the extent that firms have equal mean growth rates, 
but the dispersion of these growth rates is more variable for small firms. 
Following the work of Simon and Bonini (1958), Mansfield examines the size mobility of firms in 
his sample. He finds that the probability of an initially small firm growing to be larger than a larger 
11 Steel industry data covers the period 1916 to 1957, petrol industry data covers the period 1921 to 1957, 
and tyre industry data covers 1937 to 1952. Size is measured in tonnes for steel, employees for tyres, and 
barrels for petroleum. Steel is split into four sub-periods, petrol into four and tyres into two. 
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counterpart, is greater, the smaller the initial difference in market share. Overall, the results 
suggest that small firms are more likely to die than large firms, and those which do survive tend to 
have higher and more variable rates of growth. Overall, this was the first study to formally reject 
the LPE. 
Samuals (1965) presents results for a sample of 400 UK manufacturing firms covering the period 
1951 to 1960. Net assets (total assets minus current liabilities) are used to measure firm size. 
The sample is split into four size groups. Samuals finds a significant difference in the mean 
growth rates across the four groups. He constructs bivariate size distributions of firms yielding 
fifteen net asset size groupings over two periods, 1950/1951 and 1959/1960 (the upper limit of 
each size grouping being twice the lower limit), and finds a positive skew in firm sizes. The author 
tests the LPE by regressing the variance of firm growth in 1959/60 on variance of firm growth in 
1950/1951. The LPE fails (with an estimated coefficient equal to 1.07), implying that (over the 
period sampled) larger firms grew faster than small firms. He uses the standard deviation of the 
growth equation as a measure of the mobility of firms throughout the period and finds a value of 
1.38 implying some level of competition. He compares these findings with those of Hart and Prais 
(1956) of 0.99 and Hart (1962) of 1.24. Samuals' results tend to contradict the earlier findings of 
Hart (1962) that the LPE held between 1950 and 1955. Samuals' results could be reconciled with 
those of Hart (1962) for his post 1956 sample, if it was the case that from 1956 onwards, larger 
firms grew faster than small firms. 
Samuals study also examines the extent to which mergers play a important role in helping large 
firms to grow faster than smaller firms. He finds that mergers tended to increase the growth rates 
of medium, and large firms. However, even allowing for merger activity, larger firms still grew 
faster than their smaller counterparts. This may be caused by large firms re-valuing their assets 
on a more regular basis than small firms. 
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Steindl (19651 
Steindl (1965) tests the LPE for a sample of 1,269 Austrian firms. The sample is split into eight 
size bands based on initial size, and the mean and standard deviation of growth for each class for 
the period 1950-1957 is calculated. Mean growth rates and the standard deviation in growth rates 
differ between different sizes of firms. Growth tends to decline by firm size, with the largest and 
smallest size bands of firms recording average growth of -0.05 per cent and 0.17 per cent 
respectively. The standard deviation of growth rates also tends to decline by size, with the largest 
firms' standard deviation in growth equal to 0.02, compared with 0.33 for the smallest firms. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that smaller firms enjoyed much faster rates of growth over the 
sample period, but that this growth is more variable than that recorded for large firms. 
Singh and Whittington (19681 
Singh and Whittington (1968) examine the size and growth of firms across four UK industries 
covering the period 1948 to 1960.12 They sum up the essence of the LPE by stating that: 
' The chance of growth or shrinkage in the sizes of individual firms will depend on their profitability 
as well as on financial policy and other decisions of their respective management's. Profitability in 
turn will depend on a number of factors such as the quality of the firm's management, the range of 
its products, availability of particular inputs, general economic climate, political conditions and so 
on. During any particular period of time, some of these factors would make for an increase in the 
size of the firm, others for a decline, but their combined effect would yield a probability of the rates 
of growth (or decline) for firms of each given size. The law of proportionate effect assumes that 
this probability distribution is the same for all size classes of firms. '" 
They argue that there are four main economic implications of this, namely 1) no optimum size of 
firm; 2) current growth is not influenced by previous growth; 3) dispersion of firm sizes and 
concentration will increase over time; and 4) the process can help explain the observed firm size 
distribution. 
12 The period was also split into two sub-periods covering 1948 to 1954 and 1954 to 1960. The four 
industries are shipbuilding and non-electrical engineering, food, clothing and footwear, and tobacco. 13 Singh and Whittington (1968), p73. 
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Singh and Whittington test the LPE by regressing initial firm size on closing size, for two sub- 
periods in each industry, and for the period as a whole (entry and exit is ignored). They find 
values of iß2 greater than unity for all industries for the two sub-periods, and for the sample 
period as a whole. Furthermore, departures from LPE are more pronounced over time, lending 
support to the earlier findings of Samuals (1965). 
Utton (1972) 
Utton (1972) tests LPE for a sample of 1,527 UK manufacturing firms over the period 1954 to 
1965. He regresses the variance of firm sizes in 1965 against variance in firm sizes in 1954, for 
thirteen manufacturing industries, and for the manufacturing industry as a whole. He accepts the 
LPE for seven manufacturing industries. In addition, large firms grew faster than small firms in 
five industries, and for manufacturing as a whole. 
To examine the mobility of firms, Utton estimates the residual variance of the growth equation to 
be 0.73 which is smaller than the previous estimates proposed of Hart and Prais (1956), Hart 
(1962) and Samuals (1965). 
Utton tests whether faster growth of large firms is the result of internal or external growth. To 
isolate mergers Utton re-estimates the model for firms that were not involved in mergers over the 
period. He finds that for manufacturing, as a whole the LPE is accepted, and that it can be 
accepted where it was previously rejected in three of the five industries. These results imply 
merger activity caused large firms to grow faster than small firms. In two other industries, the LPE 
is rejected implying that internal growth, possibly through the operation of scale economies, 
allows larger firms to grow faster than smaller firms. Utton argues there is a role for the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission to intervene in the industries where external growth has led 
to increasing concentration. 
127 
Samuals and Chesher (1972) 
Samuals and Chesher (1972) test the LPE for a sample of 183 UK commercial and 
manufacturing firms covering the period 1960 to 1969. They carry out a regression of closing on 
opening size for the entire sample period and for selected sub-periods, and find that for the entire 
period that the estimated /32 < 1, implying that small firms grew faster than large firms. The 
model is re-estimated for eleven industrial groups. They find that small firms grew faster than 
large firms in five out of eleven industries, while large firms grew faster in the remaining cases. 
Samuals and Chesher examine the residuals of the growth equation to see if concentration 
increased over time. They estimate the residual variance to be 1.21, which means that for a 
number of companies of similar size in 1960 approximately 35 per cent would be twice the size by 
1969, and approximately 35 per cent would be half the size. This result is similar to that of Hart 
and Prais (1956) for the period 1938 to 1950, but lower than previous results obtained by 
Samuals (1965) for the period 1951 to 1960, and larger than estimates previously obtained by 
Utton (1972). 
Singh and Whittington (1975) 
Singh and Whittington (1975) update previous work, by testing the LPE for a sample of 2,000 
firms, which are divided into 21 industry groups. They argue that a priori, one would expect a 
negative relationship between size and growth based on traditional economies of scale 
arguments (i. e. smaller firms adjust their outputs upwards to reach the minimum efficient scale to 
ensure survival). 
The authors test three hypotheses derived from the LPE. Firstly, firms of different size classes 
have the same proportionate growth rates. Secondly, the dispersion of growth rates about a 
common mean is the same for all size classes. Thirdly, the rate of growth of the firm in one period 
should be independent of its growth rates in previous periods. 
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To test for differences in mean growth rates they group the sample into six size classes for the 
two sub-periods and the sample period as a whole. 14 Overall, they find a positive relationship 
between growth and size, which they confirm by a regression of growth on firm size. This 
suggests a rejection of proposition one. In addition, they find that the standard deviation of growth 
rates tends to decline as size increases. 
They augment these tests by carrying out a regression of closing on opening size, and find that in 
the majority of industries /2 > 1, implying that large firms grew faster than smaller firms. 
However, they argue that this coefficient could be upwardly biased if large firms re-value assets 
more often than small firms. Furthermore, the variance of growth is heteroscedastic (which they 
argue appears likely given that the dispersion of growth rates differs across size classes). 
Heteroscedasticity may affect the estimation of the relation between firm size and growth. - 
Values of X32 are highest in the industries with the slowest growth rates. They argue this provides 
support for standard oligopoly theory, (i. e. that large firms are likely to grow faster in industries 
where they are protected by entry barriers, and operate in an environment of implicit or explicit co- 
operation). 15 
Singh and Whittington test whether individual firms' growth rates are related over time. They 
regress growth in the period 1954 to 1960, on growth in the period 1948 to 1954, finding evidence 
of persistence of growth. 16 
'A large proportion of the positive relationship between size and growth is due to the positive 
serial correlation of growth rates. This does not affect our conclusion that the Law of 
Proportionate Effect is contradicted by the observed relationship between growth and opening 
14 The time period under investigation is 1948 to 1960 which is split into two sub-periods (1948 - 1954 and 
1954 - 1960. The sample was drawn from manufacturing, construction, distribution and miscellaneous 
services, food, non-electrical engineering, clothing and footwear, and tobacco industries. Firm size is 
measured as net assets (with no adjustments made for inflation). 15 This was tested by using the Spearman rank correlation coefficient to look at the correlation between the 
beta coefficients obtained for a given industry and mean industry growth rates. 16 This is augmented by a rank correlation analysis which finds that the growth rate coefficients are positive 
in 17 of the 21 industries sampled. 
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size, but it does draw attention to the probability that serial correlation of growth rates is the main 
cause for this result'" 
The Singh and Whittington study also addresses the process of firm entry and exit. They find that 
the volume of firm entry tend to decline with size. They conclude by arguing that more attention 
should be paid to the process of entry and exit, and draw attention to the work of Ijiri and Simon 
(1964,1967). 18 
Aaronvitch and Sawyer (1975) 
Aaronvitch and Sawyer (1975) present evidence for a sample of 233 large UK manufacturing 
firms covering the period 1958 to 1967. They test the LPE in three stages. In the first stage a 
regression of closing on opening size is carried out. The presence of heteroscedasticity is then 
tested. Finally, the regression is re-estimated adjusting the coefficients for the effects (if any) of 
heteroscedasticity. The results find no relationship between growth and size, and thus accept the 
LPE. 
Chesher(1979) 
Chesher (1979) draws on the arguments of Singh and Whittington (1975), to develop a 
methodology for testing the LPE incorporating persistence of growth rates within a firm's growth 
function. Normally, the LPE argues that if X32 =1 the law holds. This assumes that the error 
terms in the equations are independent over time. If this is not the case then there is serial 
correlation and the LPE is rejected. He contends that the LPE only operates if 62 =1 and the 
error term is white noise. 
17 Ibid., p. 22. 18 Ijiri and Simon (1964,1967) explicitly examine the effects of firm entry and exit on the size distribution of 
firms. This issue is explored further in chapter 8. 
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Davies and Lyons (19821 
Davies and Lyons (1982) attempt to combine the traditional and the stochastic explanations of 
concentration. In the former case the emphasis is on firm numbers, economies of scale and 
barriers to entry, and in the latter random factors. 
The authors specify a model in which firms either operate at the minimum efficient scale, or 
expand output in order to reach this level. Once firms reach the minimum efficient scale, the LPE 
becomes operative. This means that a threshold exists below which the LPE is rejected. 
Kumar (1985) 
Kumar (1985) provides empirical evidence on the relationship between size, growth and 
acquisitions, for the period 1960 to 1976 for a sample of 2000 UK quoted firms. The data is split 
into three sub-periods. 19 
Kumar attempts to disentangle the relationship between growth due to random factors and growth 
due to external determinants (such as acquisition and merger). He tests three aspects of the LPE, 
examining whether firms of different size classes have the same average proportionate growth, 
whether the dispersion of firm growth rates around a common mean size is the same for all size 
classes, and whether growth rates are correlated over time. 
Kumar uses five measures of firm size, namely net assets, physical assets, equity, employees 
and sales. Growth is calculated as size in period t+1 as a proportion of size in period t. Growth by 
acquisition is calculated as expenditure on acquisitions of new subsidiaries as a proportion of 
opening size. 
19 The sub-periods are 1960 -1965,1966 - 1971, and 1972 - 1976. The corresponding numbers of firms for 
each period was 1747,1021 and 824 respectively. 
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Following Chesher (1979), Kumar tests for persistence in growth rates between two periods, 
(1960 to 1971, and 1966 to 1976). He finds that 12 per cent of growth in one period is carried into 
the subsequent period. This is lower than the previous results of Singh and Whittington (1975) 
where 30 per cent of growth is carried forward from one period to the next. The decline in growth 
persistence was perhaps a consequence of the increased levels of competition. 
Kumar tests the LPE by regressing current size on initial size for each of the three sub-periods. 
He finds a significant negative relationship between size and growth for sub-period one and three, 
but cannot reject LPE for sub-period two. Kumar tests whether the results obtained for sub-period 
three are robust with respect to the size measure used. Using four other size measures, he finds 
a significant negative relationship between size and growth for physical assets and equity 
measures, but not for employees and sales. 
A similar analysis finds a positive relationship between size and growth by acquisition for the 
period 1960-1971, but a negative one for 1966-1976. The author also finds that merger and 
acquisition activity causes larger firms to have less variable growth rates than their smaller 
counterparts. 
Kumar concludes that firm growth is negatively related to size over the period as a whole, and 
that any observed persistence in growth rates is weaker than that found by Singh and Whittington 
(1975). In addition, there is a negative relationship between firm size and growth rates by 
acquisition, in earlier sub-periods, but not for the sample period as a whole. The dispersion of 
growth rates (associated with acquisition) tends to decline with firm size. 
Evans (1987) 
Evans (1987a) investigates the relationship between firm growth and age, and firm size and 
growth by industry. The methodological approach adopted controls for selection bias arising from 
attrition and heteroscedasticity. 
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Evans uses a sample of 42,339 small firms from 100 US manufacturing industries (drawn from 
the Small Business Administration Database), for the period 1976 to 1982. Firm size is measured 
by number of employees. Growth is measured as the annual logarithmic change in employment 
between 1976 and 1980. 
Evans carries out a regression analysis using three equations to explain the determinants of 
survival, growth and the variability of firm growth. This analysis is undertaken for both young and 
old firms. 20 
In general, Evans finds that the probability of failure decreases with firm age, as does growth and 
variability of growth. He also finds that LPE fails for small and large firms, although failure is not 
severe for larger firms. This implies that there may be some mean firm size, above which the LPE 
holds. 
Evans (1987b) extends previous work to examine the relationship between firm growth, size and 
age, for a sample of US manufacturing firms over the period 1976-1982. The sample consists of 
17,339 firms drawn from the Small Business Administration Database. Evans measures size as 
number of employees per firm (as assets data are unavailable). Various indicators of corporate 
structure are also collected for 1976,1978,1980 and 1982. Growth rates are measured as the 
annual logarithmic change in employment between 1976 and 1982. Evans finds an inverse 
relationship between firm size and firm growth and age. This supports the findings of Jovanovic 
(1982). Overall, the LPE is rejected. 21 
Hall (19871 
Hall (1987) uses a sample of US manufacturing firms over the period 1972 to 1983. The data 
comprises two samples of firms. The first consists of 1,349 firms for 1972 to 1979, while the 
second includes 1,098 firms for 1976 to 1983. 
20 Evans defines young firms as those which are six years old or less, while old firms are those which are 
seven years or older. 
21 Section 5.2 discusses Jovanovic's arguments, while chapter 7 presents new evidence on the effect of 
firm age on the growth of banks and manufacturing firms. 
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Hall examines the extent to which measurement error may affect the relationship between size 
and growth. She tests the LPE over 1972 to 1979,1973 to 1979 and 1976 to 1983,1977 to 1983, 
with and without industry dummy variables. She finds that in most cases the relationship between 
firm size and growth is negative and 'that uncorrelated errors of measurement in employment 
cannot be responsible for more than 10% of the observed relationship between firm size and 
growth. '22 
Hall examines the time series behaviour of employment growth using a first order autoregressive 
moving average model, orARMA (1,1). She finds a significant negative relationship between firm 
size and growth. The variance of growth rates across firms changes significantly from year to 
year. 
Hall tests the extent to which the observed results are robust in the presence of exit. She finds the 
probability of survival is related to firm size, but that growth is uncorrelated with survival. 
Neither measurement error, nor sample attrition can account for the negative relationship 
between firm size and growth. The LPE is rejected as small firms grew faster than large firms. 
uunne. rcoaerts ana 5amuaison t1ym 
Dunne, Roberts and Samualson (1989) examine post entry employment growth and failure for 
over 200,000 manufacturing plants for the US covering the period 1967 to 1977. The authors 
examine patterns in employment growth and failure for plants, which were established in 1967, 
1972 and 1977. 
Dunne et al assign firms to size classes based on age, size, industry grouping and ownership 
structure. 23 For all plants, they find that mean growth rates decline with plant size. Mean growth 
22 Hall (1987), p. 588. 
23 Dunne et al group the sample of firms on the following basis. Age is composed of three categories of 
plants from 1 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years and 11 to 15 years. Current size class consists of five categories, 
namely 5 to 19 employees, 20 to 49 employees, 50 to 99 employees, 100 to 249 employees, and greater 
than 250 employees. Manufacturing groups are defined by their standard industrial classification based on 
22 manufacturing industries. Ownership category is split into two groups reflecting whether the plant is a 
single entity or whether it is part of a multi-plant operation. 
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tends to decline with age for multi-plant firms, but not for single plant firms. Differences in the 
variability of growth rates are small across size classes as plants become more established (i. e. 
get older). They also find failure rates decline with age and size. 
Although small plants tend to grow faster than large plants, they also tend to fail more frequently. 
They argue that 'Policies designed to encourage the establishment of new plants may simply 
elevate the level of small plant failure if the policy-induced entrants are candidates who are less 
likely to succeed than their older competitors. ' 24 
Contini and Revelli (1989) 
Contini and Revelli (1989) test the LPE for a sample of 467 Italian firms covering the period 1973 
to 1986. They test for persistence in growth rates. They regress growth for the period 1983 to 
1986 on growth in 1977 to 1980 and 1980 to 1983, and find a negative relationship. This implies 
that firms with above average growth in one period tend to experience below average growth in 
the next period. 
The authors test the LPE for groups of large and small firms for the sub-periods 1973-1977 and 
1977-1981. The LPE holds in many of the industries sampled for large firms, but is rejected for all 
industry groupings of small firms. They find /2<1, implying that the LPE does not hold. 
Acs and Audretsch (1990) 
Acs and Audretsch (1990) present evidence at the industry level for US manufacturing for the 
period 1976 to 1980. They use number of employees as their measure of firm size. 
The authors examine the role of expansion and contraction of surviving firms, and the contraction 
of industry growth caused by firm exits. The authors exclude firms which entered during the 
sample period. Average growth for a given size class is decomposed as follows: 
24 Dunne et al (1989), p. 697. 
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S1980i = f(S1976i + EXP; + CONTR; - DEATH) 
where: S1980i is mean firm size, in 1980. S1976i is mean firm size in 1976. EXP; denotes the 
expansion of firms which survived the entire period. CONTR; is the contraction of surviving 
firms. DEATH; is the contraction in size caused by firms which exited. Growth is measured as 
the difference between size between 1980 and 1976, while explicitly taking account of exit. 
They calculate the mean growth rate between 1976 and 1980 for four size classes in each of the 
408, four digit industries sampled, and test for differences in growth rates between each of the 
four size classes for each industry. The LPE is accepted for 245 out of the 408 cases. These 
results contrast to those of Evans (1987a) who finds no support for LPE in 89 per cent of 
industries sampled. The main reason for the discrepancy is perhaps, that Evans excludes firms 
that exited the industry from his tests. 
According to Acs and Audretsch, 
'.... when we incorporate the impact of exits in our mean growth rate, the higher growth rate of 
small firms is apparently offset by their greater propensity to exit... Thus, incorporating the impact 
of exits tends to produce more support for the assumptions underlying Gibrat's law than would 
otherwise be found. ' 25 
Reid (1992) 
Reid (1992) describes the LPE as a mixed deterministic / stochastic model of firm growth. He 
tests the LPE for a sample of 73 small firms for the period 1985 to 1988. Using assets as a 
measure of firm size, Reid finds that there is a significant negative relationship between firm size 
and growth, implying that the smallest firms in the sample grew at the fastest rates. 
25 Acs and Audretsch (1990), p. 134. 
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Reid considers the problem of sample selection bias due to the deaths of small firms. Using a 
binary choice model in which the dependent variable is survival or non-survival, and the 
independent variable is size, Reid finds no relationship between survival and firm size. This 
suggests that the results do not suffer from sample selection bias. 
Reid extends the analysis by including quadratic size and age variables (which capture any non- 
linear relationships in the data) to test for life cycle or learning effects on firm growth. He finds a 
negative relationship between growth and size, and growth and age, and a positive relationship 
between the interaction term between size and age. This implies that larger firms are likely to be 
older. Overall, Reid rejects the LPE, but finds substantial support for age as an important 
determinant of the growth prospects of small firms. 
Wagner (1992) 
Wagner (1992) estimates size-growth relationships using a sample of 7,000 small German firms, 
for the period 1978 to 1989. Firm size is measured by number of employees, while growth is the 
percentage change in firm size from one year to the next. Wagner only considers surviving firms. 
However, to minimise the survival bias he considers a sequence of overlapping three yearly 
periods beginning with 1978 to 1980 and ending in 1987 to 1989. 
Wagner regresses closing size on size in the previous two periods. He divides the sample into 
four industry sub-groups, to include manufacture of capital goods; manufacture of consumer 
goods; and the manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco products. He tests the LPE for ten 
three-year periods for three different size groups of firms. He finds the LPE to be valid for only 
half of the three yearly time periods. Overall, he finds that ft2 is close to one in nearly all cases, 
but that there is persistence of growth in many cases. 
Dunne and Hughes (1994) 
Dunne and Hughes (1994) test for differences in the mean and variance of growth rates across 
firm size classes using a sample of UK firms. 
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Dunne and Hughes add to the evidence on size-growth relationships using a large sample of 
comprising 2,149 firms. Firstly, for a sample of firms which had survived from 1975 to 1980, they 
trace the survival and growth prospects over the period 1980 to 1985. Secondly, they test for 
threshold effects by running an analysis within broad size classes as well as for the sample as a 
whole. 26 Thirdly, they investigate the effect of company age on patterns of growth and survival. 
Finally, they test for problems associated with serial correlation in growth rates, heteroscedasticity 
and sample attrition. 
The size measure adopted for the study is net assets. Of the 2,149 firms which were live in 1980, 
1,709 firms survived to 1985, while 440 exited. The smallest and largest classes had the smallest 
and largest survival rates. 
Dunne and Hughes seek to investigate two aspects of the survival process, namely 
1) Is the exit of a firm dependent on size? 
2) Is exit dependent on slow growth? 
They find that the smallest companies have the highest liquidation rates, but are more susceptible 
to exit by take-over than their larger counterparts. Slow growth increases the chances of exit for 
the sample as a whole, but this does not hold for the largest size class. This contrasts with earlier 
results of Dunne, Roberts and Samualson (1989) and Mansfield (1962), who find an inverse 
relationship between exit rates and size. 
In addition, Dunne and Hughes examine the size and growth of surviving firms. They find that the 
mean and variance of growth both decline with firm size. The authors acknowledge that the 
results may be a consequence of aggregation bias brought about by grouping all industries in one 
sample. If some industries are characterised by large numbers of small but rapidly expanding 
26 This type of estimation draws on the insights of Simon and Bonnini (1958) and Davies and Lyons (1982) 
who contend that LPE may only hold for firms operating at, or above the minimum efficient scale. 
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firms, an analysis pooled across industries may produce an apparent negative relationship 
between size and growth even though within each industry a positive or no relationship may exist. 
Using a log-linear model, the authors test the LPE for two sub-periods (1975 to 1980 and 1980 to 
1985). These tests are carried out for different size classes and industry groupings. The LPE is 
accepted for the majority of classes for the period 1980 to 1985 (with the exception of the 
smallest categories of firms, and for the sample as a whole). They argue that this provides 
evidence of a size threshold below which the LPE does not hold. The LPE is rejected for all size 
classes for the period 1975 to 1980. They extend the analysis to examine the size-growth 
relationship within individual industries. For the period 1980 to 1985, small firms grew fastest in 
sixteen of the nineteen industries sampled. However, this relationship is only significant in four 
cases. For 1970 to 1975 small firms grew fastest in sixteen industries, and significantly so in 
eight. 
The authors tackle several of the econometric problems encountered in earlier studies, including, 
serial correlation in growth rates; heteroscedasticity arising from inequality in growth rate 
variances across size classes; and sample attrition bias. 
They argue that if there is serial correlation in growth rates, more weight is given to firms with 
higher growth rates that cause the estimated coefficient between growth and size to be biased 
upwards. To test this, they regress growth over the period 1970-1985 on growth in 1975-1980 for 
935 surviving firms. In contrast to earlier findings of Kumar (1985) and Singh and Whittington 
(1975), they find little persistence in growth rates. This is attributed to increased take-over activity 
and globalisation, which made it difficult for firms to achieve persistently high growth rates. 
Dunne and Hughes find that the variance of firm growth rates declines with size. They suggest 
that the source of heteroscedasticity is likely to lie in the stability of growth rates of large 
diversified firms which can spread risk across many product areas, making them less susceptible 
to large fluctuations in growth (Prais, 1976). On the other hand Jovanovic (1982), argues that 
small size classes contain a disproportionate number of younger firms, with inexperienced 
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managerial teams which tend to make more mistakes. Therefore, greater instability of growth 
rates does not come from small size per se, but from age related effects. 
Dunne and Hughes re-estimate their model including and excluding age variables. They find a 
negative relationship between firm size and age for the sample as a whole, and for 15 out of the 
19 industries (significantly so in 3 cases). Therefore, although small firms grew faster than larger 
ones, there also seem to be life-cycle effects at work. Younger companies seem to be more 
dynamic in terms of experiencing faster growth, but their growth is also more variable. They argue 
that these observed size-age relationships are consistent with the model of Jovanovic (1982). 
Size effects appear more important for smaller firms, which implies some sort of threshold effect 
for the LPE (Simon and Bonnini, 1958). 
The authors also examine whether any bias arises as a result of higher exit rates across smaller 
firms. To analyse this they re-estimate the model for all firms using a binary variable to denote 
surviving and non-surviving firms. Size and age variables, and size-age interaction terms are 
included. The results are consistent with previous estimates, implying that there is little or no 
evidence of attrition bias. 
Overall, the results show that small firms grew faster than large firms, and have more variable 
growth rates. Small and large firms are less likely to be taken over than medium-sized firms. 
However, there is evidence of a threshold effect, and the LPE can be said to hold for firms above 
a certain size. 
Hart and Oulton (19961 
Hart and Oulton (1996) add to the evidence on size-growth relationships for a sample of 87,109 
independent firms for the period 1989-1993 (collected from the ONESOURCE database). They 
examine whether the observed size-growth relationship holds by individual size class. Splitting the 
sample into nine sub-classes based on initial size. They find that iß2 <1 for all size bands of 
27 
27 The number of employees in the opening period is used as the ranking measure. The size bands range 
from firms employing less than 4 employees to firms employing more than 1024 employees. 
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firms, but that the value of ft2 tends to decline monotonically from largest to smallest size 
category of firm. 
The authors conclude that the very smallest firms grew proportionately faster in terms of 
employment than their larger counterparts. However, the authors acknowledge that the results 
are for surviving enterprises only. 28 
From the evidence presented above, the LPE clearly has some merit as an explanation of firm 
growth and market concentration. Appendix 3 provides a summary of the studies reviewed above. 
The extent to which the LPE holds depends on attrition, age, size class, mergers and the 
persistence of growth rates through time. Although, there is some variation, there is a strong 
pattern of acceptance of the LPE up to the middle of the 1970s. Recent studies support the view 
that small firms grow faster, and experience more variable growth rates than large firms. This 
tends to be in line with long term trends in industrial concentration (Hart and Clarke, 1980). 
However, such evidence is presented for surviving firms only. The LPE appears to hold for larger 
sized firms. Evidence presented relating to sample attrition finds that exit is negatively related to 
size, but not growth. Other evidence suggests that even if the LPE does not hold, this is not 
because of a relationship between size and growth per se, but rather a relationship between 
growth through time. Mergers can also play an important role in determining growth patterns. 
Most recent studies of the LPE incorporate firm age as an explanatory variable. All evidence, 
without exception, supports the view that younger firms have more variable growth rates, 
attributed to the fact that inexperienced management is more likely to make mistakes. Overall, 
the balance of evidence suggests that small firms tend to grow faster and have more variable 
growth rates than large firms, and that growth prospects in one period tend to influence growth in 
future periods. 
28 The authors maintain that the smallest firms in the economy are more likely to go bankrupt than larger 
counterparts. Therefore the growth rates observed for the smallest surviving firms in the sample are likely 
to be inflated. 
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5.3.2 Goodness of Fit Tests of Firm Size Distributions 
This section reviews briefly the empirical literature that has tested the LPE by examining how 
closely the observed distribution of firm sizes fits one of several theoretical probability 
distributions, including the lognormal, the Pareto and the Yule distribution 
Hart and Prais (1,9561 
Hart and Prais examine the extent to which the sample firm size distribution approximates to the 
lognormal distribution. 29 They calculate the natural logarithm of firm size in the years 1885,1896, 
1907,1924,1939 and 1950, and carry out goodness of fit tests for skewness and kurtosis of the 
distribution of firm sizes. They find no departures from lognormality for the period up to 1907. 
However, from 1907 onwards departures from lognormality become significant. 
Simon and Bonnini (1958) 
Simon and Bonnini (1958) argue that LPE applies to firms that are operating above the minimum 
efficient scale required for long term survival. Firms operating below this size either grow faster to 
reach the minimum efficient scale or perish. As a result most firms will be operating at optimum 
size levels, and will have exhausted economies of scale. 
' Size has no effect upon the expected percentage growth of a firm.... That is to say, we assume 
that a firm randomly selected from those with a billion dollars in assets has the same probability of 
growing, say, by 20%, as a firm selected from those with a million dollars in assets. v30 
They assume that any subsequent growth is likely to be randomly distributed across size class. 
' Whether sales, assets, number of employees, value added, or profits are used as a size 
measure, the observed distributions always belong to the class of highly skewed distributions that 
include the lognormal and the Yule. This is true of the data on individual industries and for all 
industries taken together. It holds for sizes of plants as well as firms. ' 31 
29 The sample used is described in section 5.3.1. 30 Simon and Bonnini (1958), p. 608-609. 31 Simon and Bonnini (1958), p. 611, footnote omitted. 
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Simon and Bonnini assume there is a constant entry rate into the lowest size class of firms. If this 
assumption holds, firm sizes will approximate the Yule distribution. 
Simon and Bonnini test these arguments by fitting straight lines to the logarithms of cumulative 
distributions using UK and US data. 32 They allow for entry of new firms over time into the lower 
end of the size distribution. The authors find that the distributions of firm sizes tend to 
approximate closely to the Yule and Pareto distributions. 33 
Quandt (1966) 
Quandt (1966) uses data on 30 US industries to test how well the observed size distributions fit 
variants of the Pareto distribution, and the lognormal distribution. In 66 per cent of the cases 
analysed, Quandt can accept the null hypothesis that the empirical distribution of firm sizes fits 
the theoretical distributions . 
34 However, he is unable to discriminate between the various 
theoretical distributions as to which one best fitted the data. 
Silberman (1967) 
Silberman (1967) presents evidence for a sample of 90, four-digit industries in 1947 and 1958 for 
plant and firm level data. A goodness of fit test is used to test for consistency with the lognormal 
distribution. He compares actual and expected concentration measures based on the lognormal 
hypothesis. The results are mixed. For firms, the null can be accepted in half of the industries 
studied, but for plant size only 17 out of 79 industries pass the test. 
32 The data for UK firms is the same as used by Hart and Prais (1956), while the US data covers the top 
500 firms 1954 to 1956. 
33 The Pareto distribution approximates the upper tail of the Yule distribution. 34 Quandt argues that there are four main ways to carry out goodness of fit tests on firm sizes. These are: 
1) The method of moments or quartiles; 2) maximum likelihood estimation; 3) fitting a straight line to the 
cumulative distribution of firm sizes; and 4) by qualitative methods such as the Lorenz curve. 
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Engwell (1973) 
Engwell (1973) finds support for the lognormal hypothesis when applied to Swedish car and shoe 
manufacturing establishments for the period 1952-1966. Using a similar approach to the one 
adopted by Silberman, Engwell accepts that the lognormal distribution gives a good description of 
firm size distributions in these two industries. Engwell also carries out the same tests at 
establishment level for Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia, and accepts the LPE. 
He surmises that the LPE can be accepted in industries that have undergone little change in 
patterns of demand and firm numbers. Engwell suggests that when systematic factors are 
absent, random influences are likely to pre-dominate. 
Clarke (19791 
Clarke (1979) tests the usefulness of the lognormal distribution in characterising firm size 
distributions. The data set consists of 147 UK (three-digit) manufacturing industries in 1968. He 
tests each industry's plant and firm size distribution for normality by carrying out tests for 
skewness and kurtosis. He finds that 80 per cent of the industries fail tests for skewness and 
kurtosis. He finds the lognormal distribution fits only 9 of the 133 firm size distributions sampled. 
When applying the tests at the plant level, he finds that the hypothesis can be accepted in 25 per 
cent of cases. Clarke also finds large number of firms appearing in the upper end of the size 
distribution, which suggests that systematic factors may favour the growth of large firms. 
Kwoka (19831 
Kwoka (1983) tests the goodness of fit of the Pareto distribution for 308 US manufacturing 
industries. Using data on the market shares of the top ten firms in each industry, Kwoka attempts 
to fit this data to the Pareto distribution. Although the Pareto distribution is rejected as an 
adequate explanation of the distribution of firm sizes, Kwoka does find some regularity in the 
distributions. 
' While stochastic growth processes may be at work in these data, many other factors play 
decisive roles in determining firm size distributions. Those factors - like serially correlated growth 
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rates, mergers and acquisition, and other firm behaviour - deserve close examination in light of 
the particular empirical findings in this paper. i3s 
Overall, research in this area is static in its approach and ignores influences on the size 
distributions of firms such as correlation of growth rates from period to period, the impact of 
managerial ability, and returns linked to process and product innovation. 
This chapter has examined previous empirical research that has explored the relationship 
between firm size and growth, and its consequences for industry structure. The results suggest 
that the LPE plays a substantial part in shaping firm size distributions, and may outweigh 
systematic explanations for firm growth. Future research is likely to search for ways to combine 
traditional explanations for firm growth with the LPE described above. This might be achieved by 
more comprehensive data sets or through the use of simulation techniques. 
Drawing on this literature, the remainder of this thesis attempts to assess the extent to which size- 
growth relationships are instrumental in determining the size distribution for samples of European 
banks and manufacturing firms. 
35 Kwoka (1982), p. 395. 
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CHAPTER 6 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
6.1 Introduction 
The chapter outlines the methodological approach used to investigate size-growth relationships 
across countries and firm types. Two models are presented. The first tests for the size-growth 
relation across countries and firm types, but makes no allowance for persistence of growth rates 
in successive periods. The second not only tests for the size-growth relation, but also for the 
persistence of growth rates over time. 
The data set used to test the LPE consists of a banking sample drawn from eight EU countries, 
and a manufacturing sample drawn from five EU countries. The sample of banks represents the 
largest data set ever used to test the LPE in banking markets. As there is no previous evidence in 
the literature on whether the LPE holds in European banking markets, this study aims to fill this 
gap. 
The manufacturing sample is included for several reasons. Firstly, there is a large body of 
literature (see chapter 5) which examines the relationship between the size and growth of 
manufacturing firms. However, all of these studies have examined the relationship for single 
countries. The following adds to the literature by studying the size-growth relationship at a 
European level. Secondly, the analysis of a manufacturing sample will enable comparisons to be 
drawn between the estimated size-growth relationships for the manufacturing and banking 
industries. 
The main motivation for testing separately the LPE for the two samples is that on a priori grounds 
one would expect to find some differences in the size-growth relationship between banking and 
manufacturing, arising from differences between the competitive conditions in each case. Banks 
tend to be subject to a tighter regulatory framework than manufacturing firms, and so are often 
insulated from many of the competitive pressures faced by the latter (Tirole, 1994a). In contrast to 
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manufacturing firms, the failure of one bank can lead to the failure of others (described in the 
literature as the domino effect). As a consequence regulation is geared to minimise the likelihood 
of bank failure. For instance regulatory authorities may 'bail out' failing banks in order to ensure 
the stability of the banking industry (Rose, 1987). Other differences between banking and 
manufacturing firms lie in the nature of the respective production technologies used to produce 
banking services and manufactured goods, and in the structural characteristics of the respective 
industries. Manufacturing generally involves large-scale (often standardised) production 
techniques aimed at exploiting technical economies of scale to yield storable outputs (Stanbeck, 
1979). In contrast, banking (in common with many services) tends to be intangible and in many 
cases involves simultaneity in consumption and production which often requires a location close 
to the customer base (Akehurst, 1987 and Britton, Clark and Bell, 1992). Recent evidence for 
banking suggests that economies of scale are available to banks at low levels of output 
(Molyneux et at, 1996). Banks use the same inputs (deposits, labour and capital), and produce 
the same outputs (loans, assets and off balance sheet business) which are priced in response to 
prevailing market conditions. ' This is not always the case for many less regulated manufacturing 
industries, where small firms can enter niche markets and sell differentiated products, often at low 
prices to capture market share from their larger counterparts. As a consequence, the extent to 
which competitive pressures affect the growth and the size distribution of firms differs between 
banking and manufacturing. Therefore size-growth relationships are tested separately across the 
two industries. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 begins by describing the empirical 
model, which will be used to test for the relationship between firm size and growth, allowing for 
variations in these relationships across industries and countries. Section 6.3 describes the data 
sources and sample selection for the sample of EU banks. This section also examines the size 
I Some controversy surrounds the appropriate measurement of bank inputs and outputs. Two main 
approaches underlie the measurement of inputs and outputs. In the production approach, banks are treated 
as firms which utilise capital and labour to produce various deposits or loan accounts. In the intermediation 
approach banks are seen as intermediaries rather than producers. In this case the appropriate input 
measures are deposits, labour and capital, while output is measured by the values of loans granted and 
investments made. 
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distribution of the banks over the period 1990 to 1994. Section 6.4 repeats this exercise for the 
sample of manufacturing firms. Section 6.5 provides a summary. 
6.2 An Estimable Model of Firm Growth 
In this section the model to be used in the estimation of size-growth relationships across 
European banking and manufacturing is described. The aim of this model is to capture any 
relationship between size and growth and between growth in successive periods. The data set, 
which includes details of firm size over the period 1990 to 1994 inclusive, allows us to estimate 
two formulations, expressed as follows: 
(a) a model which tests for a relationship between growth over the period 1990-1994, and size in 
1990; and 
(b) a model which tests for relationships between growth over the period 1992-1994, and size in 
1992 and growth over the period 1990-1992. 
Formulation (a) benefits by measuring growth over a longer period (1990-1994), but does so at 
the cost of excluding the possibility of testing for persistence in growth rates. By using growth over 
a shorter period (1992-1994) as a dependent variable, formulation (b) allows testing for size 
effects and persistence in growth rates. It seems plausible to assume that firms' growth rates are 
likely to be related through time, perhaps through the effects of managerial decisions which may 
have consequences for a firm's growth for long periods of time (Kumar, 1985). On the other hand, 
the longer the period of observation, the less important we might expect persistence effects to be. 
In other words, 'managerial' benefits are likely to be short lived, and less evident if comparisons 
are made over longer observation periods. Therefore, both formulations (a) and (b) are justified to 
some extent. Previous studies which have used formulation (a) include Hart and Prais (1956), 
Samuals (1965) and Dunne and Hughes (1994). Studies which have used formulation (b) include 
Chesher (1979), Kumar (1985) and Wagner (1992). 
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Let sit denote the size measure for an individual firm at some time period t, expressed in natural 
logarithm form. The presentation of the model that follows refers to formulation (b). The structure 
and p3 ). of formulation (a) is the same, but without the persistence of growth terms ()63,83 
FFF 
ASit =Qi +i/ß2 -')Sit-1 +ß30sºt-i +ýS1 diit +ý5 diit +ZS3d3it 
f-2 f-2 f-2 (1` 
CCC 
+2C 
CCCCC 
P e; {it +LP2e2it + P3e3it +uic 
c-2 c-2 c-2 
t where E(u; t)=0andvar. (u; t)= Q 
The main parameters of interest in equation (1) are ß,, #82 , iß3 and o 
(see below), while 8j 
and p! (f = 2... F; c=2 ... C; j = 1... 3) are intercept and slope shift parameters. 
The intercept and 
slope dummies are defined as follows: 
For firms, d;; 1 =1 if firm i is of type f and 0 if otherwise; for f=2... F where F is the number of 
categories of firms, d2it =di;, s; t_I, and 
d3it =dý. t s;, _l. el,., =1 
if firm i belongs to country c and 0 if 
otherwise for c=2... C where C is the number of countries; e2it = eilt s; t. 1, and e3it = e;;, 
Ls1. j . For 
banks f=1 denotes commercial banks, f=2 denotes co-operative banks and f=3 denotes savings 
banks. c=1 denotes Belgium, c=2 denotes Denmark, c=3 denotes France, c=4 denotes Germany, 
c=5 denotes Italy, c=6 denotes Netherlands, c=7 denotes Spain and c=8 denotes the United 
Kingdom. 
For manufacturing firms f=1 denotes Alcohol, f=2 denotes Building Materials, f=3 denotes 
Chemicals, f=4 denotes Diversified Industrials, f=5 denotes Electronics, f=6 denotes Engineering, 
f=7 denotes Food, f=8 denotes Household, f=9 denotes Pharmaceuticals, f=10 denotes Paper 
and f=11 denotes Textiles. c=1 denotes France, c=2 denotes Germany, c=3 denotes Italy, c=4 
denotes Spain and c=5 denotes the UK. 
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The dummy variables allow for shifts in the intercept and slope coefficients by firm type and 
country, and so allows specific estimates of /3, , 
X32 and X33 to be obtained. For example, for the 
sample of banks, iß2+82 provides an estimate of the size-growth relationship for commercial 
banks, while ß2 + p2 does the same for banks located in Denmark. In a similar fashion /31 + 811 
provide specific intercept and persistence of growth estimates ßl + p, and ß3 + 83 9 
ß3 +p2 
for commercial and Danish banks. 
If A'41, smaller firms tend to grow faster on average than their larger counterparts. sit is 
stationary, possibly in relation to a deterministic trend which, in a cross-sectional estimation of 
equation (1), is indistinguishable from the intercept parameter. This suggests that over time the 
size of all firms will tend to converge toward some long run average value (Marshall, 1890, and 
Mueller, 1972), in which case there is no tendency for concentration to increase over time. If 
ß2 =1, then firm size has no effect on growth, and the LPE holds. In this case sit is non- 
stationary, and over time there is a tendency for concentration to increase as some firms come to 
fortuitously dominate the market, having enjoyed several periods of above average growth. 
Finally, if X32 >1, large firms grow proportionately faster than smaller firms, possibly through 
efficiency advantages arising from scale and scope economies, x-efficiency, or through the 
exercise of market power (Singh and Whittington, 1975). In this case the time path of s1 tends to 
be explosive. This seems unrealistic (a priori this case can be ruled out, at least over the long 
term). Therefore, the appropriate test of the LPE is Ho: ß2 =1 against H1: ß2 4 1. 
If /32 =1, the value of X6, is important in determining whether the average size of firms is 
increasing or contracting. 6, >0 implies that on average, firms are tending to grow, while ßi <0 
implies that on average, firms are tending to contract. 631 therefore denotes the mean growth rate 
across firms. If ß2 < 1, the interpretation of /3, is different. In this case, ß1 is relevant in 
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determining the long run mean of s;, (as described above). The mean value towards which sit is 
mean reverting is 
-A 
(ß2 -1) 
The value of X33 determines the extent to which growth in any period is related to growth in the 
preceding period. 63 =0 implies that there is no relationship between growth in successive 
periods, X33 >0 implies that above or below average growth in the previous period has a tendency 
to be repeated in the current period. ß3 <0 implies that above (below) average growth tends to 
lead to below (above) average growth in the next period. 
Finally, a, t measures the dispersion of growth rates relative to their mean values (conditional on 
sit_1 and Os; t. 1). If Q. = Q, u;, is homoscedastic, and dispersion is the same 
for all banks of all 
sizes, at all times. On the other hand, heteroscedasticity of the form a,, =f (s;,. 1) may imply 
dispersion which is either directly or inversely related to size (Mansfield, 1962). 
Firm type and country variations in fl, 1 
X32 and 63 are tested systematically for the validity of all 
relevant permutations of exclusion restrictions on the dummies dj; t and ejcit . 
Figure 6.1 
illustrates the procedure used to eliminate any unnecessary variables from equation (1) to 
achieve a final specification for formulation (b), which allows for persistence of growth. Thus in 
the upper left-hand corner of Figure 6.1, equation (1) is tested for the exclusion of various - 
permutations of the firm type dummies. Acceptance of Ho: {St }=0, Ho: {8Z }=0 or Ho: {83 }=0 
leads to the intermediate nodes (1a), (1b) or (1c) respectively, from which the acceptance of 
further restrictions (Ho: {82 nS3 }=0 and so on) leads to equation (2). In the lower left-hand 
sector, equation (2) is then tested for country effects in the same manner. In the upper and lower 
151 
Figure 6 1: Tests for significance of bank type and country effects 
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Figure 6.2: Tests for significance of firm type and country effects 
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right hand sectors, the same sets of tests are performed in the reverse order (i. e. country effects 
first, then firm type effects). The most parsimonious specification possible is equation (4). Z 
6.3 EU Banking Sample 
The EU banking data was collected from the BANKSCOPE database, compiled by International 
Bank Credit Analysis Limited (IBCA). The database comprises accounts data on more than 8000 
banks. The sample selection criteria were as follows. Any bank which operated in a country which 
was a member of the European Union in 1990, and was classified by the database as a 
commercial, savings or co-operative bank, and for which data for each of the years 1990 to 1994 
inclusive was accessible was selected, with the following exceptions. Banks from Portugal, 
Ireland and Greece were excluded from the sample because there was insufficient data on banks 
from these countries. ' Banks with operations in one country, which are centrally located in 
another country, posed particular problems in the data selection process. Firstly, many EU banks 
have subsidiaries located in other countries (e. g. Barclays Bank Espana). To include these 
subsidiaries would in effect lead to double counting within the sample. Secondly, subsidiaries of 
foreign banks from other countries are located in many countries. The extent to which these types 
of institutions grow is perhaps more affected by the corporate objectives of parent institutions than 
the competitive environment of the country in which the subsidiary is located. Therefore, these 
two types of banks were excluded from the sample. This problem was particularly acute in the 
case of Luxembourg, for which, once foreign subsidiaries were removed from the sample, only 
four banks remained. As a consequence Luxembourg banks were excluded altogether. The final 
2 In Figure 6.2, a similar process is carried out for formulation (a), which excludes the possibility of 
persistence of growth. In this case, equation (5) is tested for the exclusion of various permutations of the 
firm type dummies. Acceptance of Ho: (46, }=0 or Ho: {82 }=0 leads to the intermediate nodes (5a) or 
(5b), from which the acceptance of further restrictions (Ho: {82 }=0 and so on) leads to equation (6). In the 
lower left-hand sector, equation (6) is then tested for country effects in the same manner. In the upper and 
lower right hand sectors, the same sets of tests are performed for country effects, then firm type effects. 
The most parsimonious specification possible in Figure 6.2 is equation (8). 3 Given that part of the analysis in the following chapter attempts to test for individual country effects in 
driving the size-growth relationship, it was decided to exclude these three countries for the small numbers 
of banks that would be yielded for estimation purposes. 
154 
sample consisted of indigenous banks drawn from eight EU countries: Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the UK. 
Three measures of size are used in the empirical analysis, namely total assets, total equity and 
off balance sheet business. Following Tschoegl (1983), total assets and total equity were chosen 
since both of these measures represent widely accepted measures of bank size. Tschoegl argues 
that the equity measure circumvents some of the difficulties with the assets measure, which arise 
from differences in accounting practices across countries. In some countries, banks are permitted 
to keep hidden reserves, allowing them to smooth performance, but biasing the estimated 
coefficients towards an acceptance of the LPE. Off balance sheet business, although not a 
measure of overall bank size, is included because this type of business has become increasingly 
important for EU banks during the 1990s (EU, 1997a). In this case, the main aim of using such a 
measure is to assess whether off balance sheet business exhibits patterns of growth similar to 
those for total assets and equity. 
The data for the study was collected in nominal terms in domestic currencies and converted into 
ECU's using an ECU exchange rate. The effects of inflation over the five-year sample period were 
removed by using an ECU GDP deflator. 4 This allows us to focus on real rather than nominal 
growth. 
Tables 6.1-6.3, show the numbers of sample banks classified by country and bank type. Table 
6.1, shows that the sample selection process yielded 617 banks for which total assets data was 
available for the entire sample period. Of these the largest numbers of banks came from the UK, 
Italy, Spain, Germany and France, with 108,120,117,109 and 107 banks respectively. Overall, 
the total sample of 617 banks consists of 414 commercial, 157 savings and 46 co-operative 
This deflator was calculated from figures taken from the IMF (1995), World Economic Outlook. 
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Table 6.1: Sample of Banks in Assets Estimations 
Sector Commercial Co-operative Savings Total 
Country 
Belgium 18 - - 18 
Denmark 23 - - 23 
France 107 - - 107 
Germany 58 16 35 109 
Italy 47 30 43 120 
Netherlands 15 - - 15 
Spain 68 - 49 117 
UK 78 - 30 108 
Total 414 46 157 617 
Table 6.2: Sample of Banks in Equity Estimations 
Sector Commercial Co-operative Savings Total 
Country 
Belgium 18 - - 18 
Denmark 23 - - 23 
France 98 - - 107 
Germany 58 16 35 109 
Italy 47 30 43 120 
Netherlands 15 - - 15 
Spain 67 - 49 116 
UK 78 - 30 108 
Total 404 46 157 607 
Table 6.3: Sample of Banks in Off Balance Sheet Estimations 
Sector Commercial Co-operative Savings Total 
Country 
Denmark 22 - - 22 
France 94 - - 94 
Germany 55 12 32 99 
Italy 18 15 30 63 
Netherlands 15 - - 15 
Spain 58 - 45 103 
UK 55 - - 55 
Total 317 27 107 451 
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banks. 5 In Tables 6.2 and 6.3, the equity and off balance sheet business size measures, yield 
smaller numbers of banks because there were some gaps in the data. When using the equity 
measure, ten banks with negative equity data were removed from the sample (since it is not 
possible to apply the logarithmic transformation to a negative size measure), leaving a total 
sample based on this measure of 607 banks. When collecting data on off balance sheet 
business, fewer banks reported such business either at the beginning or throughout the sample 
period. In particular the data coverage was poor for Belgian banks at the beginning of the sample 
period, and consequently this country was dropped from the OBS estimations. The final sample 
size for the off balance sheet measure is 451 banks. 
6.3.1 The size of banks 
Tables 6.4 to 6.6 show that the mean and standard deviation of bank size increased for each 
measure of size during the sample period. The median size of bank increased for equity and off 
balance sheet business, but not total assets. The growth in equity is indicative of the recent 
emphasis on capital growth as a strategy in the banking industry (Arthur Andersen, 1993). The 
increased average size of off balance sheet business can be explained by banks diversifying into 
new areas of business, as the process of de-regulation within the EU gathered momentum 
(Canals, 1993,1997). 
The bank size distribution, (using each measure of size) is summarised by the skewness 
coefficient, and reflects a positive skew (see Figure 6.3). 6 This indicates an industry where a few 
large banks may dominate, and perhaps confirms the predictions of the LPE that if growth is 
independent of size, a positively skewed distribution of firm size will emerge over time (Prais, 
1976). Tables 6.4 to 6.6 also show size distribution descriptive statistics after applying the 
logarithmic transformation. It is notable that the skewness of the firm size distribution falls toward 
5A priori one might expect differences in the size-growth relationship across bank types, which may arise 
as a consequence of differing business objectives. Commercial banks are more likely to aim to maximise 
shareholder value, while co-operative and savings banks may follow other types of objective. 6 See Lewis and Pescetto (1996), chapter 1 for an extended discussion of size distributions of commercial 
banks within the EU. 
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Table 6.4: Total Asset Size of EU banks 1990 to 1994 (ECU million) 
n= 617 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Mean 8426.53 8689.77 8729.28 9168.45 9123.83 
Standard Deviation 24922.94 25241.46 26545.69 28347.58 27701.46 
1`t Quartile 431.3 458.07 410.59 410.74 390.59 
Median 1205.1 1253.88 1173.16 1174.45 1160.47 
3fd Quartile 3951.1 4033.1 3919.27 4216.79 4338.48 
Kurtosis 35.35 33.30 38.57 37.94 34.41 
Skewness 5.30 5.13 5.51 5.50 5.25 
Log: Mean 7.29 7.32 7.26 7.25 7.25 
Standard Deviation 1.76 1.75 1.79 1.82 1.83 
Kurtosis 3.19 3.12 3.17 3.21 3.13 
Skewness 0.45 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.43 
Table 6.5: Total Equity Size of EU banks 1990 to 1994 (ECU million) 
n= 607 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Mean 378.50 413.48 399.71 407.13 421.18 
Standard Deviation 985.76 1035.09 1014.14 1061.74 1078.96 
1`` Quartile 28.35 30.68 30.26 30.37 29.06 
Median 72.3 76.7 78.93 76.98 79.56 
3rd Quartile 220.65 236.89 225.68 231.88 231.45 
Kurtosis 35.17 26.74 28.55 26.85 24.00 
Skewness 5.12 4.52 4.67 4.80 4.57 
Log: Mean 4.48 4.54 4.52 4.53 4.54 
Standard Deviation 1.61 1.63 1.61 1.62 1.62 
Kurtosis 3.06 2.99 3.03 3.09 3.04 
Skewness 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.52 
Table 6.6: Total Off Balance Sheet Asset Size of EU banks 1990 to 1994 (ECU million) 
n= 451 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Mean 1351.92 1451.22 1747.80 2061.64 1997.28 
Standard Deviation 5801.32 6573.10 7783.57 8672.53 8246.07 
1" Quartile 22.87 24.74 28.27 26.51 27.01 
Median 65.21 77.01 88.42 76.70 88.37 
3rd Quartile 282.84 294.88 363.77 358.56 406.89 
Kurtosis 67.54 80.08 54.76 47.61 44.62 
Skewness 7.37 8.05 6.91 6.35 6.18 
Log: Mean 4.48 4.58 4.70 4.70 4.76 
Standard Deviation 2.15 2.11 2.14 2.20 2.19 
Kurtosis 3.57 3.50 3.46 3.50 3.43 
Skewness 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.57 
Note: All figures are expressed in real terms (1990 as base). 
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zero when the logarithmic transformation is applied, suggesting that the lognormal distribution 
may provide a reasonable description of the data (Clarke, 1979). 
Figure 6.3: The Size Distribution of EU Banks 1990 
E 
C 
Size in ECU's (Millions) 
The size characteristics of the sample by bank ownership type and country are described in 
Tables 6.7 to 6.12. By country, the mean size of bank increased in most countries with the 
exception of Denmark and Italy. However, the median asset size fell in France, Italy, Spain and 
the UK. Median equity size increased in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. 
The median OBS size increased in all cases except Denmark and Italy. 
The mean asset size increased for all bank types except co-operative banks, while the median 
size increases only for savings banks. The mean equity size increases for all bank types, while 
the median bank size increased for savings and co-operative banks, but not for commercial 
banks. Finally for OBS business, the mean bank size increased for commercial banks, but not for 
savings and co-operative banks, but the median size increased for all banks. 
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6.3.2 The Growth Of Banks 
Tables 6.13 - 6.15 show the mean and standard deviations of the logarithmic growth rates over 
the period 1990-94 by bank type and country for each size measure separately. For the entire 
sample on average, size measured by equity and off balance sheet business grew slightly, and 
size measured by total assets declined slightly. There was positive growth in all size measures for 
all countries except France, Italy and Spain, which each experienced negative growth in two of 
the three size measures used. These banking markets were the among the most regulated in the 
EU during the 1980s, and thus may have suffered more as de-regulation, increased competition 
and a deterioration in their respective domestic macroeconomic conditions impinged on their 
growth prospects (EU, 1997a). 7 
On average, savings and co-operative banks experienced positive real growth over the period on 
all measures, while commercial banks, experienced slightly negative growth measured by assets. 
The negative asset growth of commercial banks may be indicative of a greater focus of 
commercial banks on equity growth, along with increasing importance of off balance sheet 
business (Metals, 1997). 
The evolution of the banking industry over the period 1990 to 1994 can be described by 
comparing the size distribution at the start and end of the period. Tables 6.16 - 6.18 show the size 
distributions of banking firms in 1990 and 1994, in the form of transition matrices which also 
illustrate the mobility of the sample between different size bands. The sample is divided into five 
size bands based on size in 1990. 
For assets, Table 6.16 shows that more banks fell in the ECU < 500 million size class in 1994 
than in 1990. Fewer banks appeared in the ECU 200-400 million and ECU 400 - 800 million class, 
while greater numbers of banks fell into > ECU 800 million size class in 1994 than in 1990. 
Overall, the distribution of firm sizes has become more dispersed over the sample period. For 
equity, Table 6.17 tends to show a pattern of overall growth in the average size of firm with fewer 
7'See chapter 2 for an extended discussion of these arguments. 
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Size class <500 500-1000 1000-2000 2000-4000 >4000 1990 total 
(millions ECU's) 
1990 Prices 
<500 157 15 1 0 0 173 
500-1000 26 56 17 0 0 97 
1000-2000 1 26 69 15 0 111 
2000-4000 2 0 14 46 19 81 
>4000 0 0 1 7 145 153 
1994 totals 186 97 102 68 164 617 
size class <30 30-60 60-120 120-240 >240 1990 total 
(millions ECU's) 
1990 Prices 
< 30 136 23 1 0 0 160 
30-60 13 71 38 1 0 123 
60-120 5 14 55 25 1 100 
120-240 1 3 2 63 14 83 
>240 0 0 1 6 134 141 
1994 total 155 111 97 95 149 607 
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Size class <50 50-100 100-200 200-400 >400 1990 total 
(millions ECU's) 
1990 Prices 
<50 153 29 7 4 2 195 
50-100 17 24 19 6 2 68 
100-200 6 3 16 20 9 54 
200-400 2 4 7 14 12 39 
> 400 2 0 1 3 89 95 
1994 total 180 60 50 47 114 451 
too --.. 
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banks falling into the three lower size bands, and greater numbers falling into the two highest size 
bands in 1994 than in 1990. This pattern is repeated for off balance sheet business in Table 6.18. 
6.4 EU Manufacturing Sample 
The data for the empirical investigation of manufacturing firms was collected from the 
DATASTREAM accounts database. The sample period is 1990-1994. The sample comprises 
manufacturing firms from five EU countries, namely UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain. 8 The 
firms were classified into eleven broadly defined manufacturing industries: alcoholic beverages, 
building materials, chemicals, diversified industrials, electronics, engineering, food, household 
products, pharmaceuticals, paper and packaging and textiles. 
The size measure is net assets, defined as fixed assets plus current assets minus current 
liabilities. This measure was chosen partly because it was available for more firms than other 
possible measures (such as turnover and employment), and partly to allow comparisons with 
other studies which have adopted this measure. In any case, evidence suggests that most 
commonly used measures of size tend to be highly correlated (Hart and Oulton, 1996). The 
sample selection procedure yielded 757 firms, for which five years of complete data was available 
covering the period 1990-1994. Table 6.19 classifies the sample firms by industrial group and 
country. 
6.4.1 The Size of Manufacturing Firms 
Table 6.20 provides summary statistics relating to firm sizes. The mean firm size, along with the 
standard deviation and median size increased over the sample period. The size distribution of 
firms also exhibits a positive skew indicating a few large firms and numerous smaller firms 
characterise all manufacturing industries (see Figure 6.4). The distribution is more skewed than 
that observed for banks, suggesting a greater dispersion of firm size in manufacturing. However, 
as before, the firm size distribution exhibits near normality when a logarithmic transformation is 
carried out. 
8 It was initially hoped to collect data on the same countries from which the sample of banks were drawn. 
However, the coverage of the DATASTREAM database did not permit such a selection. 
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Sector France Germany Italy Spain UK Total 
Alcoholic beverages 7 32 0 3 9 51 
Building materials 11 31 5 4 25 76 
Chemicals 10 19 3 2 19 53 
Diversified Industrials 14 30 3 2 18 67 
Electricals and office 19 35 3 1 27 85 
equipment 
Engineering 21 95 8 7 75 206 
Food producers 13 12 1 2 20 48 
Household goods 4 12 0 0 11 27 
Pharmaceuticals 7 11 0 0 17 35 
Paper and Packaging 5 14 3 1 22 45 
Textiles and apparel 5 38 3 0 18 64 
Total 116 329 29 22 261 757 
n= 757 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Mean 906.33 932.02 927.30 967.04 967.61 
Standard Deviation 2692.82 2775.28 2791.78 3006.42 2972.63 
1b` Quartile 40.6 42.7 41.65 45.67 47.41 
Median 122.48 129.46 127.62 141.38 142.88 
3ro Quartile 495.81 523.63 496.87 482.66 493.68 
Kurtosis 51.54 52.87 54.63 63.44 58.08 
Skewness 6.21 6.29 6.42 6.99 6.75 
Log: Mean 5.03 5.08 5.07 5.12 5.14 
Standard Deviation 1.81 1.81 1.81 1.80 1.77 
Kurtosis 2.80 2.79 2.83 2.96 2.88 
Skewness 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.44 
Note: 
Figures expressed in real terms (1990 as base). 
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Figure 6.4: The Size Distribution of EU Manufacturing Firms 
I 
1 
E 
C 
Size In ECU's (millions) 
By country, the mean asset size increased for French, German and UK manufacturing firms over 
the sample period, but not for Italian and Spanish firms (see Table 6.21), while the median firm 
size increased in France and Germany only. By manufacturing industry, the mean size increased 
in all industries except chemicals. However, median firm size fell in seven of the eleven industries 
sampled (see Table 6.22). 
6.4.2 The Growth Of Manufacturing Firms 
This section adopts the same method as section 6.3.2, to examine the growth of manufacturing 
firms. Table 6.23, shows average net asset growth between 1990 to 1994. Taking the sample as 
a whole, mean growth over the period 1990 to 1994 was positive. By country, for the UK, German 
and French samples, growth was positive, while for Italy and Spain mean growth was negative. 
On average, German firms experienced the fastest growth over the period. 
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By manufacturing industry, all industries experienced positive mean growth. Firms operating in 
the pharmaceuticals industry enjoyed the fastest mean growth, and chemical firms on average 
experienced the slowest growth. Within countries, some industries experienced negative growth, 
including building materials in the UK; engineering in Italy, France and Spain; paper in France and 
Spain; and chemicals, diversified industrials and electronics in Italy and Spain. 
Table 6.24 shows the size distribution of firms by size class in 1990 and 1994. The sample was 
split into five size bands based on initial size. These size bands ranged from firms with net assets 
of less than ECU 60 million to firms with net assets greater than ECU 480 million. Over the 
period 1990 to 1994, the numbers of firms in both the smallest and largest size classes 
decreased, while the numbers operating in the three middle size bands increased. Such a pattern 
of mobility through the size classes suggests that sizes were converging toward some average 
level. This is perhaps consistent with the notion that firms must aim to produce at a critical scale 
in order to survive (Stigler, 1968), and that there are diseconomies of scale at the top end of the 
size distribution. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has described the sources and characteristics of data to be used in the present 
study of the size and growth of EU banks along with a comparative sample of manufacturing firms 
during the period 1990 to 1994. 
Between 1990 and 1994, the average bank size has increased when measured using total 
assets, equity and off balance sheet business. Average bank growth, however, is negative for 
total assets over the period 1990 to 1994 and positive for equity and off balance sheet business. 
There also appears to be some mobility of banks through the size classes over this period, with 
the firm size distribution becoming more dispersed. 
By country, banks in Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom enjoyed positive mean 
growth in assets, equity and off balance sheet business, while banks located in France, Italy and 
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size class <60 60-120 120-240 240-480 >480 opening 
millions (ECU's) total 
1990 Prices 
<60 204 42 9 0 1 256 
60-120 22 68 19 8 0 117 
120-240 3 18 54 24 1 100 
240-480 0 0 16 56 17 89 
>480 0 1 0 20 174 195 
closing totals 229 129 98 108 193 757 
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Spain tended to fair less well. Co-operative and savings banks tended on the whole to enjoy 
higher growth than commercial banks. However, these differences appear to be relatively small. 
From the discussion of the manufacturing sample, the average manufacturing firm increased in 
size over the sample period. Mean growth was generally positive over the period. However, the 
UK, and German firms experienced higher growth, while many French, Spanish and Italian firms 
experienced negative growth. There appears to be some mobility in the sample, with firms initially 
in the lower size classes moving into higher size classes, while some firms in higher size bands 
moved down the size distribution. This perhaps suggests a convergence in firm sizes toward 
some average level. 
The descriptive statistics presented above help identify differences in the growth characteristics of 
the sample. For example, it may be significant that sample banks and manufacturing firms based 
in the UK and Germany tended to enjoy higher growth than their counterparts in France, Italy and 
Spain. This may suggest that the fortunes of banks might be closely linked to the success or 
failure of manufacturing firms, or that macroeconomic conditions differ across countries. 
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CHAPTER 7 
TESTING THE LAW OF PROPORTIONATE EFFECT FOR EU BANKING AND 
MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
7.1 Introduction 
Drawing on the methodology described in chapter 6, this chapter tests the Law of Proportionate 
Effect (LPE) for samples consisting of EU banking and manufacturing firms. Several contributions 
are made to existing knowledge. Firstly, no study to date has explicitly examined the relationship 
between size and growth of firms for the EU banking industry, and this study fills this void. 
Secondly, the results analyse the similarities or differences in the size-growth relationship 
between manufacturing and banking firms. Thirdly, the evidence on the size-growth relationship 
for EU manufacturing firms augments previous manufacturing evidence, which to my knowledge 
is based on data restricted to single countries. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 tests the LPE for a sample of banks 
drawn from eight EU countries. Section 7.3 does the same for a sample of manufacturing firms 
drawn from five EU countries. Section 7.4 examines differences between the results for banking 
and manufacturing. In section 7.5 the influence of age on bank and manufacturing firm growth is 
analysed. Conclusions are drawn in section 7.6. 
7.2 Testing the LPE for EU Banks 
This section presents tests of the LPE for the sample of EU banks. The model of bank growth is 
estimated in two ways, with and without persistence in growth rates. Section 7.2.1 presents the 
results for the model of firm growth with persistence of growth, while section 7.2.2 discusses the 
results for the model without persistence of growth. Given the empirical importance of persistence 
of growth, the majority of the commentary is based on the results presented in section 7.2.1. 
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The method for testing the LPE was discussed in detail in the previous chapter. In general, it 
involves starting with a general model of the form 
FFF 
Osit =/. '1 +662 -1)Sit-1 
+/l3ASita +2 diit +2ý sidzic +2 'd3it 
f-2 f-2 f-2 (1) 
CCC 
ccccc +LPl eli1 +2 P2e2it + P3e3i, +uiº 
c-2 c-2 c-2 
Equation (1) allows for the presence of a full set of bank type and country effects on all three 
coefficients, i. e. A, ß2 and X33. In order to arrive (where possible) at a more parsimonious 
specification, Wald tests for exclusion restrictions on the bank type and country effect dummies 
are carried out along the lines described in Figure 6.1. The final model is the one used to test the 
LPE. 
The results of the tests for the joint significance of different permutations of bank type and country 
dummies, presented in the form of probability values (i. e. minimum significance levels at which 
the exclusion restriction specified in the null hypothesis can be accepted) for the Wald tests are 
shown in Table 7.1 for each of the three size measures. Small probability-values (i. e. of less than 
0.05) in Table 7.1 indicate rejection of the exclusion restriction for the set of dummies concerned. 
The results for each of the three size measures are now discussed. 
The tests for bank type effects in equation (1) suggest that the null hypotheses of { SI f }=0, ('52f }=0 
and {5}=O can be accepted, along with {82f n 83 }=0, {81f n S3 }=0, {(5, f n S2 }=0 and 
{ä }=O. Given that all bank type effects are insignificant, equation (2) can be accepted. When 
examining country effects, it is possible to eliminate either p', p2 , or p3 individually 
from 
equations (1) and (2), but not all three together. Further tests on the intermediate nodes between 
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Null Eq'n values Null E 'n -values 
Assets Equity CBS Assets Equity CBS 
Bank Type Effects Count Effects 
s[ =0 1 0.789 0.357 0.002 pi .0 1 0.307 0.266 0.026 
sr no 1 0.923 0.764 0.048 p2 C .0 1 0.183 0.740 0.000 
51 =p 3 1 
0.858 0.833 0.971 pC .0 3 1 0.535 0.365 0.398 
=0 2nS la 0.475 0.004 0.492 pC n p3 =0 Id 0.000 0.000 0.000 3 
sf n S3 =0 lb 0.429 0.002 0.051 pý p3 Mp 1e 0.000 0.000 0.000 
sifaf=0 lc 0.449 0.002 0.003 PC n Pz no 1f 0.000 0.000 0.000 
sf =p 1 0.679 0.007 0.014 C no P! 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Country Effects Bank Te Effects 
pi =0 2 0.375 0.233 0.205 a1 =p 3 0.918 0.185 0.001 
p2 =p 2 0.204 0.628 0.000 5r =0 3 0.862 
0.500 0.001 
p3 =p 2 0.553 0.246 0.228 45 .p 
3 0.377 0.129 0.019 
pZ n Pj =0 2a 0.000 0.000 0.000 6f s3 =0 3a 0.547 0.001 0.005 
PC n p3 =0 2b 0.000 0.000 0.000 ar n 63 =p 3b 0.568 0.001 0.005 
PC n p2 =0 2c 0.000 0.000 0.000 6n fi =0 3c 0.865 0.002 0.000 
Pi =0 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 51 =0 3 0.780 0.002 
0.000 
Bank Type and Country Effects 
Sf ri pý =0 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Heteroscedastici 
Qi2 = Q2 1 0.667 0.745 0.495 
Note: The heteroscedasticity tests report p-values from tests carried out by obtaining n R2 from an auxiliary regression 
of the residuals on the squares of Sii_1. The test statistic Is distributed Z2 (1) under the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity. 
FFF 
As 
it =#81 
+(62 -1)Sit-1 +/. '30Sit-1 
+ýSI dýit + Z, 62 
2 It 
f-2 f-2 f-2 (1` 
CCC 
cccc ;e+ Pl e1rt P2e2rt +ýjp3it +uit 
c-2 c-2 c-2 
CCC 
Asrt -/mot +ýß2 -1)Srt-1 +ßsisrt-t +2P1 +2Pie2rt ý"ý, P3e3rt +urt ý2) 
c-2 c-2 c-2 
FFF 
As 
it -YI 
+ (P2 -1)Sit. l 
+, 83esit-1 +2SI "lit + 
La2d2it +1: 3d3it 
+uit ý3) 
f-2 f-2 f-2 
esit =A+ (A -1)Sit-1 +ß3isit-1 +uit (4) 
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equation (2) and equation (4) accepted {pi }=0 in equation (2c) and {p3 }=0 in equation (2a), but 
rejected any attempts to exclude p2. Therefore, the final model specification for the assets 
equation is as follows: 
C 
Asit =Qý +(Q2 -1 )sit-I +Q3Asit-1 +2p eiic + uit 
c-2 
The estimation results are shown in Table 7.2. For the purposes of presentation, the sums of ß2 
and its shift parameter p2 together with associated standard errors are shown for each country. 
Therefore, these reported values are interpreted as bank type specific estimates of the slope 
AA 
coefficients on s; t_I . The coefficients 
/11 and 63 are common to all banks in the sample. 
The tests reject the LPE for French, Italian and Spanish banks, for which X32 + p2 is significantly 
less than one, implying that smaller banks grew faster than larger banks, with the estimated 
coefficients significantly smaller than one at the 5% level for Italy, and at the 10% level for France 
and Spain. This implies that for these countries, there was some tendency for bank sizes to revert 
towards a long run equilibrium value. Individual growth rates for 1990-1992 appear to have 
persisted significantly into 1992-1994 (ß3 >0) in a pattern which did not differ significantly 
between countries; i. e. banks which grew faster (slower) than average in 1990-1992 tended to 
repeat this performance again in 1992-1994. There is no evidence of heteroscedasticity in growth 
rates across the sample. 
The finding that the LPE does not hold for Italian and Spanish banks may be a reflection of the 
substantial restructuring which took place in these banking markets in the response to the EU's 
Single Market programme (which came into force in 1992). Italian and Spanish banks may have 
had to make more sweeping regulatory changes than was the case in other EU countries, in order 
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Tahte 7.2: Estimation Results 1992-1994 
Assets 
Q 0.0275 t (0.0588) 
Bel Den Fra Ger Ita Net Spa UK 
1 008 1.0071 0.9878* 1.0119 0.9819 x 1.0131 0.9861' 1.0049 Q2 +P2 . (0.0132) (0.0144) (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0130) (0.0089) (0.0083) 
ß 0.1248* 3 (0.0459) 
n= 617 Q =0.34 R2 =0.08 
_ 2 
=0.07 R 
Het =0.31 
Equity 
0.0566+ Ql (0.0337) 
Comm Coop Savings 
P2 +S f 
1.0017 1.0286 
0 9 
1.0238 
2 (0.0159) . 01 ( 6) (0.0169) 
Bel Den Fra Ger Ita Net Spa UK 
%3 + i 
1.0017 0.9960 0.9756* 1.0095 0.9662* 1.0166 0.9588* 1.0093 
0083 2 P (0.0159) (0.0169) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0085) (0.0147) (0.0088) ) (0. 
R -0.0095 
3 (0.0405) 
n=607 Q=0.27 R2=o. 15 2-0.13 
Het=0.17 
Off Balance Sheet Business 
Comm Coop Savings 
Q + si 
0.0997 1.234 X 0.7714' 
l (0.3731) (0.539) (0.4510) 
Comm Coop Savings 
Q +S2 
0.9760 0.7971' 0.8774 
2 (0.0884) (0.1178) (0.1043) 
Den Fra Ger Ita Net Spa UK 
R + pl 
0.0997 0.2581 -0.5451 X -0.3839 0.5510' -0.0365 0.4826 
x 
l (0.3731) (0.1894) (0.2301) (0.2813) (0.3156) (0.1957) (0.1942) 
Den Fra Ger Ita Net Spa UK 
ß + 2 
0.9760 0.9518' 1.1809* 0.9051 X 0.9437 0.9905 1.0159 
2 l P (0.0884) (0.0318) (0.0449) (0.0486) (0.0575) (0.0464) (0.0345) 
R -0.1353" 
3 (0.0409) 
n= 451 Q =0.67 R2 =0.36 R2 =0.33 
Het =0.29 
"= significant at 11% level = significant at 5% level significant at 10% level 
Notes: Tests for significance of ß2 are one tail (i. e. Ho: 62 =1 against H,: 82 < 1). 
Tests for significance for ft, and X33 are two tail. 
Standard errors of estimated coefficients are shown beneath in parentheses. 
The heteroscedasticity tests (Het) are n R2 from an auxiliary regression of the residuals on the squares of sit.. The 
test statistic is distributed Z2 (1) under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. 
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to comply with the 1992 legislation (EU, 1997a). ' The EU study also notes that the largest banks 
had to adjust their operations more significantly than the smaller banks because of the threat of 
potential competition from foreign banks. 2 These adjustments may perhaps have acted as a drag 
on the growth of large banks relative to their smaller counterparts. For France, the rejection of the 
LPE may be explained by the adjustments by larger banks to the sluggish performance of the 
national economy in the early 1990s (Morgan Stanley, 1995), which again may have inhibited the 
growth of the banks concerned. 
Equity 
The tests for the significance of the various groups of dummies in equation (1) for the equity 
estimations reported in Table 7.1, did not provide a clear indication of the most appropriate model 
specification. For country effects, the restrictions (p, }=0, (p'2 }=0 and { p3 }=0 can be accepted 
individually in equations (1), but are rejected in pairs in equations (1d), (1e) and (1f) and 
collectively (p7 = 0). For bank type effects, the restrictions { Si }=0, (, 6,1)=O and (453f }=0 can be 
accepted, when tested individually in equation (1). However, these types of effects are rejected in 
pairs in equations (1a), (1b) and (1c), and collectively in equation (1). Further testing which 
experimented with various permutations of bank type and country effects accepted a 
specification, which included bank type and country slope dummies, but excluded all other 
dummies, as follows: 
±8dt C 
AS it = ß1 + (Q2 -1)sit-i + ß3Osic-i ++ý P2 2+ ui, 
f-2 c-2 
The estimation results are shown in Table 7.2. Two complete sets of bank type and country slope 
coefficients are included, 62 + p2 and X32 + 82 respectively, along with values for /3, and Q3 
which are common to all banks. 
1 Chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion of the regulatory changes across EU member states. 2 Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) and chapter 3 of this thesis provide a detailed discussion of the effects 
of potential competition on incumbent firms. 
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The results indicate rejection of the LPE in three cases, with values of ß2 +p2 significantly below 
one recorded for France, Italy and Spain. The pattern of results is therefore very similar to those 
obtained for assets. However, for the equity measure, there is no evidence of serial correlation in 
growth rates. While the impact of the EU's Single Market Programme perhaps accounts for the 
faster growth of smaller banks than their larger counterparts in Italy and Spain, (as with the assets 
results), the French results for equity may reflect the substantial downturn in the domestic 
economy, which was especially marked between 1992 and 1995. Many large French banks were 
forced to make substantial provisions for bad and doubtful debts over this period, causing profits 
and growth to suffer (Morgan Stanley, 1995,1996), with one of France's largest banks, Credit 
Lyonnais, being bailed out by the government. This example reflects the general poor 
performance of many of France's largest banks during this period. However, across the other five 
countries in the sample the LPE holds. Once again, no evidence of heteroscedasticity in growth 
rates is found over the sample of banks. 
Off Balance Sheet Business (OBS) 
For off balance sheet business, the results of the tests for bank type effects in equation (1), which 
are reported in Table 7.1, are slightly ambiguous. Several of the restrictions are close to the 
border between acceptance and rejection, depending on whether the significance level chosen is 
5% or 10%. At the 5% level, the tests suggest that bank type intercept and slope dummies, and 
country intercept and slope dummies should be included. The tests allow the acceptance of the 
null hypotheses of {p3}=0 and {83 }=0. Therefore, the final model specification for off balance 
sheet business is as follows: 
FFCC 
Os; 
t =A+ 
02 -1)s1.1 +ß3i sic-i + ZSi dI + 2Sidiit +ýp1 elit +ýP2 2 +U 
r-i r-z c-z c-z 
In Table 7.2, separate values of + Si , 
'ý + AC, 
P2 + SZ and ß2 + p2 are shown for each 
bank type and each country. 
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The results for off balance sheet business generally show greater variation between different 
types of banks and between different countries in patterns of growth, than is the case for assets 
and equity. /32+52 is less than one for all bank types, and significantly so for co-operative 
banks. /32+ p2 is less than one for all countries except UK and Germany, and is significantly so 
for France and Italy. In these cases there is some evidence of an inverse relationship between 
size and growth. However, the highly significant value of ß2+1 greater than one for Germany 
suggests that larger German banks expanded their OBS portfolios faster than smaller banks over 
the sample period. The pattern for Germany therefore appears to be markedly different to that for 
other countries. This is perhaps because smaller banks in the savings and co-operative segments 
of the German banking market still earn most of their revenue from net interest income, and as 
such are not heavily involved in off balance sheet business. In contrast, large German banks now 
earn a higher proportion of their total revenues from off balance sheet activities than was the case 
at the beginning of the 1990s (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 1998a). 
Finally, there is evidence of negative persistence between growth rates in 1992-1994 and 1990- 
1992, which does not differ significantly between countries and bank types. This suggests that 
banks which expanded their off balance sheet business rapidly in 1990-1992 experienced slower 
than average growth in 1992-1994, and conversely, those which grew more slowly during the 
former period tended to catch up during the latter. This finding is confirmed by EU (1997a), which 
notes that the fee and non-interest incomes of large European banks grew substantially between 
1990 and 1993, but thereafter the ratio of non-interest incomes to total income decreased. 3 No 
evidence of heteroscedasticity in bank growth rates is detected. The off-balance sheet 
estimations yield little evidence in support of the LPE. 
Overall, for the conventional asset and equity measures of bank size, the evidence tends to 
favour acceptance of the LPE, with the exceptions of Italy, Spain and France, where smaller 
banks grew faster than their larger counterparts. Evidence is found for some persistence of 
3 See Table 2.13, chapter 2. 
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growth in total assets, and off balance sheet business, but not for equity. Finally, no evidence is 
found of heteroscedasticity in growth rates for any of the size measures. 
7.2.2 A Model of Bank Growth Excluding Persistence of Growth 
This section discusses the results from estimating the model specification, which does not allow 
for the possibility of persistence of growth. The testing procedure starts from the following 
specification 
FFcc 
As;, =AA +(ß2 -1)s, c4+2., Si disc + 
J]Sidiic +ýp eiic +LPieiic +ui, (5) 
f-2 f-2 c-2 c-2 
The same process as above is followed in testing for bank type and country effects on ß, and 
Q2 
, by testing the validity of exclusion restrictions on 
d!; 
1 and eý; t . Recalling Figure 6.2, the aim 
of these tests is to arrive at a more parsimonious estimable model, from which unnecessary 
dummy variables are omitted. The results of these tests are shown in Table 7.3. The results for 
each size measure are now discussed. 
Assets 
The tests on bank type effects in equation (5) allowed the restrictions (81f }=0, {82 }=0 and 
{ SS }=0 to be accepted, so equation (6) with no bank type effects is accepted. Testing the country 
effects in equation (6), it is possible to eliminate either pf, or Pz individually, but {p} =0 is 
rejected. Further testing which experimented with the intermediate specifications between 
equation (6) and (8) accepted a model that included country slope shifts, but excluded all other 
dummies, as follows: 
c 
Asit =iii +(/2 -1)s1 1 +2. 'Piei1c +uid 
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Null E 'n values Null E ; 'n -values 
Assets Equity CBS Assets Equity OBS 
Bank Te Effects Count Effects 
5 =0 5 0.736 0.080 0.044 Pi =0 5 0.128 0.383 0.013 
a2 =0 5 0.644 0.803 0.327 PC =0 5 0.302 0.477 0.001 
52 =0 5a 0.038 0.000 0.157 PC .0 5c 0.000 0.000 0.000 
8, =0 5b 0.044 0.000 0.022 PC =0 5d 0.000 0.000 0.000 
,5 =0 
5 0.129 0.000 0.040 pý =0 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Count Effects Bank Ty pe Effects 
Pi =0 6 0.218 0.250 0.067 aý =0 7 0.730 0.040 0.083 
P2 =0 6 0.436 0.526 0.001 Sr .0 7 0.570 0.668 0.082 
P2 =0 6a 0.000 0.000 0.000 82 .0 7a 0.256 0.000 0.875 
Pi =0 6b 0.000 0.000 0.000 S1 =0 7b 0.328 0.000 0.895 
=0 6 0.000 0.000 0.000 5f =0 7 0.501 0.000 0.265 
Bank Type and Country Effects 
Sý r ,, =0 5 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
Heteroscedastici 
Q Q2 5 0.100 0.296 0.143 
Note: The heteroscedasticity tests report p-values from tests carried out by obtaining 'nR2 from an 
auxiliary regression of the residuals on the squares of Sit. . The test statistic is distributed x2 (1) under the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. 
FFCC 
Asit = +(I2 -1)s1.. 1 +ZSi dijc + dz +ýp eiic +ýPieei, +uic (5) f-2 f-2 c-2 c-2 
CC 
Asiº -ß, +(ß2 -1)sa 1 +LPielit ý"ý, P2 2 +u,, (6) 
c-2 c-2 
FF 
Asia = +(ý2 "1)sit-i +1: S1 dij, +L Sid2 +ui1 (7) 
f-2 f-2 
A sit =A+ (ß2 -')Sit_1 + u; t 
(8) 
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The estimation results are shown in Table 7.4. The LPE is accepted for all countries except 
Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain. In Belgium and Germany, larger banks grew proportionately 
faster than smaller banks, while for Italy and Spain the opposite was true. 
Equity 
For equity, tests on equation (5) revealed that the exclusion restrictions on the bank type (Si }=0 
and { 82 }=0 and country dummies { pi }=0 and { p2 } =0 could be accepted. However, it was 
not possible to accept the exclusion of all bank type effects (8j = 0), nor all country effects 
(pjc=0). Further tests on various combinations of bank type and country effects allowed the 
acceptance of a model, which included the bank type and country slope dummies, and excluded 
all intercept dummies. Therefore, the final model is 
FC 
Asiº = Q, + (P2 -1)S j, -, 
+ý S2 2i +ý Pi e zig +ut f-2 c-2 
The estimation results are shown in Table 7.4. For bank types X82 is found to be greater than one 
and significant for savings banks. The LPE is rejected for Denmark, France, Italy, Spain, and the 
UK, where smaller banks grew faster than larger banks. 
Finally, for the OBS measure, (8f }=0 is accepted in equation (5), but {, 6, f }=0, { pi }=0 and 
{pz }= 0 are all rejected. The final model is 
FCC 
As;, =A +(Q2 -1)S1,4 + 2,2 Si d1jt + P1 ei<< + P2e2 +uiº 
f-2 c-2 c-2 
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Assets 
-0.0473 Q1 (0.0833) 
Bel Den Fra Ger Ita Net Spa UK 
1.0377 1.0159 0.9921 1.0285 0.9817' 1.0248 0.9352* 1.0031 Q2+A (0.0188) (0.0204) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0185) (0.0128) (0.0118) 
ri=617 Q=0.48 R2=0.07 2=0.06 Het=3.08 
Equity 
Q 0.1769* 466 1 ) (0.0 
Comm Coop Savings 
; si Q 
0.9891 1.0207 
0 0278 
1.0479 x 
2 2 (0.0224) . ) ( (0.0 40) 
Bel Den Fra Ger Ita Net Spa UK 
0.9891 0.9343* 0.9752 x 0.9867 0.9641* 1.007 0.9244* 0.9560' Q2 +P2 (0.0224) (0.0229) (0.0131) (0.0128) (0.0119) (0.021) (0.0123) (0.0112) 
n=607 &=0.38 R2=0.15 R2-0.13 Het 0.85 
Off Balance Sh eet Business 
Comm Coop Savings 
Ql + 
0.1378 
525 0 
0.5027 
5667 0 
0.4601 
0 5401 ( ) . ) ( . ( . ) 
Den Fra Ger Ita Net Spa UK 
0.1378 1.0948* -0.2471 0.7281 
X 0.9505 X 0.4646 X 0.9154* 
Qt + Pi (0.5255) (0.2396) (0.3129) (0.2826) (0.4199) (0.2385) (0.2633) 
Den Fra Ger Ita Net Spa UK 
9704 0 0.8298* 1.1259 X 0.7603* 0.9066 0.8693 x 0.9632 %j2 + Pi . (0.1254) (0.041) (0.0613) (0.0501) (0.0802) (0.0597) (0.0483) 
n=451 
j 
Q=093 R2=0.19 R2 =0.16 
Het=1.36 
1 
*= si nifica nt at I% level = si nificant at 5% level -x '= significant at 10% level 
Notes: Tests for significance of 832 are one tail (i. e. Ho: /12 =1 against HI: Q2 < 1). 
Tests for significance for ß, is two tail. 
Standard errors of estimated coefficients are shown beneath in parentheses. 
The heteroscedasticity tests (Het) are n R2 from an auxiliary regression of the residuals on the squares of 
sit. 1. The test statistic is distributed X2 (1) under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. 
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The estimation results are shown in Table 7.4. Values of ß2 + p2 are less than one for all 
countries except Germany, and significantly so for France, Italy and Spain, implying that smaller 
banks grew faster than larger banks in these countries in terms of their off balance sheet 
business. %2+ p2 is greater than one and significant for Germany, implying that larger banks 
grew proportionately faster than smaller banks. 
Taking all the results together for banking, the following conclusions can be drawn. Using the 
conventional assets and equity size measures, in the majority of countries sampled, the 
distribution of growth rates across banks appears to be independent of bank size. When using the 
preferred estimates (i. e. model(s) which allow for persistence in growth rates), the only countries 
for which there is evidence that small banks grew faster than their larger counterparts are France, 
Italy and Spain. For France, this phenomenon may reflect the adjustment by larger banks to the 
difficulties experienced by the national economy in the early 1990s. In the case of Italy and Spain, 
the EU's Single Market programme may have impinged on the growth of large banks in these two 
countries. Using the assets measure of bank size, there was significant evidence of persistence 
in growth performance across all countries. In other words there was a tendency for banks which 
experienced above average growth performance in 1990-1992 to do so again in 1992-1994. 
However, no evidence of persistence in growth rates was found when using total equity as a size 
measure. 
Tests of the LPE based on the size of banks' reported off balance sheet business were also 
carried out. The LPE is rejected in a number of cases, specifically for co-operative banks and for 
French and Italian banks, with the off balance sheet business of smaller banks tending to grow 
faster than their larger counterparts in these cases. For off balance sheet business, there was 
strong evidence of negative serial correlation in growth rates between the periods 1990-1992 and 
1992-1994. This suggests that a catching up process may have been operating, whereby banks 
with large off balance sheet positions in 1992 typically experienced difficulties in expanding further 
during the next two years, while those which started from a lower base in 1992 subsequently 
tended to grow faster. 
192 
Comparing these results with those of previous banking studies, Alhadeff and Alhadeff (1964) 
investigate the growth rates of the largest 200 US banks between 1930 and 1960, and found that 
smaller banks tended to enjoy higher growth, thus rejecting the LPE. Rhoades and Yeats (1974) 
for a sample of large US banks find that overall smaller banks grew faster than larger banks, 
leading to declining levels of concentration. Tschoegl (1983) finds that the LPE holds for a sample 
of 100 large international banks. He also finds that variability in growth declined with size, implying 
that smaller banks exhibited more variable growth rates than large banks, which he suggests, is 
an indication that large banks are less risky than smaller banks. He also finds a weak positive, but 
insignificant relationship between growth rates in successive periods, implying that growth in one 
period does not act as a good predictor of growth in subsequent periods. Consequently, banks 
found it difficult to sustain above average growth over long periods. 
In terms of mean growth rates in total assets and equity, the results reported above suggest that 
in some countries such as France, Italy and Spain smaller banks tended to grow faster than 
larger banks. This finding is similar to the results of Alhadeff and Alhadeff (1964), and Rhoades 
and Yeats (1974) who find smaller banks grew faster than larger banks in their sample. 
However, the present analysis also finds that the LPE holds across other countries such as 
Denmark, Netherlands, Germany and the UK, thus sharing similarities to the findings of Tschoegl, 
who finds that larger and smaller banks grew at the same rates over the period examined. 
In contrast to Tschoegl (1983) and Alhadeff and Alhadeff (1964), this study finds no evidence of 
heteroscedasticity in growth rates. However, some evidence of persistence in growth of total 
assets and off balance sheet business is detected, suggesting that some banks can maintain 
above average performance from one period to the next. This may be due to advantages arising 
from financial, managerial or technological innovation. 
7.3 Testing The LPE for Manufacturing Firms 
This section presents the results of tests of the LPE for the sample of 757 manufacturing firms 
drawn from five EU countries including France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. Firm growth is 
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again modelled in two ways, namely with and without persistence of growth. The results for the 
model allowing for serial correlation in growth rates are discussed in section 7.3.1, while the 
results for the model with no serial correlation are discussed in section 7.3.2. 
As before, the most general form of model is: 
FFF 
Os;, =ß1 +(ß2 '1)Sa4 +Q3ASiº-1 +1: Si dit + S2 2 +ýÖ 3d l f-2 f-2 f-2 (1) 
CCC 
cc 'e + Pl etýt + P2 e2; cc +Z Ps s; t + u, c c-2 c-2 c-2 
The dummies variables dý; t , 
dZ; 
t and 
d3it allow for variations in ß1, Q2 and Q3 respectively 
between manufacturing firms of different types (f = 1... 11 for alcohol, building materials, 
chemicals, diversified industrials, electricals, engineering, food, household, pharmaceuticals, 
paper and textiles), while the dummies e,; t e2it and e3i1 allow for variations in ßý , 
/32 and ß3 
respectively between countries (c = 1... 5 for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United 
Kingdom). The test procedures for eliminating unnecessary sets of intercept and slope dummies 
follow those set out in Figure 6.1. The results of the Wald tests are shown in Table 7.5. 
Estimation of equation (1) revealed the presence of heteroscedasticity in firm growth rates. 
Therefore, the quoted p-values are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). The results in 
Table 7.5 suggest that none of the firm type or country dummies can be omitted from equation 
(1). Therefore, Table 7.6 reports the results of estimating equation (1) with a full set of intercept 
and slope dummies included. 
Values of f2 +p2 which are significantly smaller than one are recorded for the UK, Spain and 
Germany, implying that the LPE is rejected in these cases. However, the LPE holds for France 
and Italy. A recent EC study notes that there has been a decline in concentration in many national 
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Firm Te Effects Country Effects 
Null Equ'n P-values Null Equ'n P-values 
sf =0 1 0.011 Ole =p 
1 0.002 
of =0 2 
1 0.001 P2 =p 1 0.018 
sf =p 3 
1 0.000 P3 =0 1 0.000 
jfr, Sf =0 27 1a 
0.002 P= rý PO =0 1d 0.000 
of ro=0 Ib 0.018 pý P3 -0 1e 
0.000 
sfr of _0 
1C 0.001" PI rpi =0 if 0.000 12 
Sr .0 
i 
1 0.000 Pj, 0 1 0.000 
Count Effects Firm Type Effects 
Pi =0 2 
0.001 s1 =0 3 0.108 
Pi =0 2 
0.005 s= =0 3 0.012 
P3 =p 2 
0.000 0 =p 3 0.021 
P2 ^ Ps =0 2a 
0.000 g2 r S3 00 3a 0.012 
Pi ^ Pi =0 2b 
0.000 
1nS; =0 
3b 0.107 
P, r P= =0 2c 
0.000 sr n S= =0 3c 0.005 
Pi =0 2 0.000 of =0 3 
0.001 
Firm Type and Cou ntry Effects 
aý P! =p 1 0.000 
Heteroscedastici 
Q2 _ Q2 1 
0.007 
Note: The heteroscedasticity tests report p-values from tests carried out by obtaining n R2 from an 
auxiliary regression of the residuals on the squares of Sit_1. The test statistic is distributed 
2 (1) under the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. 
FFF 
Os; l =Qi +(%j2 -1 
)Sic-, +QsAsº, 
-, 
+LSi disc + 2's2 2 +ýS3d3it 
f-2 f-2 f-2 (1) 
CCC 
ccccc + u1c + PleI i, + P2e2i, + Pse3i, 
c-2 c-2 c-2 
CCC 
Osil =5 +iß2 -1)Sit-I +/33iSit-1 +2 1 eilt 
+ýjp2 2 
+2 ýP3e3it +uit 
c-2 c-2 c-2 
FFF 
OSi, =QA +(Q2 -1)Sit-t +Q3ASit-t +2 dic + 152 2 ý'ýS3d3ýc +uit (3) 
f-2 f-2 f-2 
OSie -=A+ (ß2 -1)Srt-t + 83ASial +u; c 
(4) 
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economies as a result of intensifying levels of competition (EC, 1997). Among the values of 
ý3 C, there is evidence of negative persistence of growth for Italy and positive persistence of 
growth for Spain. 
f32+52 is less than one for all eleven industries, and significantly so for alcohol, building 
materials, electricals, engineering, food, household, paper and textiles. This implies a rejection of 
the LPE in these industries, where smaller firms grew faster than their larger counterparts. In the 
case of alcohol, the industry tends not to be technologically advanced, making it difficult for large 
firms to obtain any advantages associated with technical economies of scale (EU, 1997b). For 
building materials, household and engineering industries, small firms have tended to perform 
better by operating in more specialised areas of production, and have been flexible enough to 
cope with wide fluctuations in demand (EU, 1997c). In food and textiles, rapidly changing 
consumer tastes have given smaller firms opportunities to produce highly differentiated products 
to satisfy demand in increasingly specialised consumer markets (EU, 1997d). In food, there has 
also been an increase in the bargaining power of major distribution chains, a proliferation in retail 
formats and a slowing down in the growth of many product areas. As a consequence this had led 
to many producers having to cut prices, which has resulted in falling levels of profitability and 
growth. In the paper and packaging industry, the market is generally fragmented, and increased 
environmental regulation may have affected the growth prospects of many firms (EU, 1997b). 
Finally, in electricals, the growth of demand for hi-tech specialist computer and electronic 
products have led to many small firms enjoying high growth over the period, relative to larger, 
more established firms (EC, 1997). 
The LPE is found to hold for pharmaceuticals industry. This industry has undergone substantial 
change, emanating from intensified competition from non-EU countries, downward pressures on 
prices and profits (as governments have attempted to keep down spending on health), and the 
loss of many patent protections which previously gave some types of firms in this industry a 
competitive advantage (EC, 1997). 
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Significantly positive persistence of growth is found for chemicals, implying that above average 
growth in one two year period tends to carry forward into the next two year period. This in part 
may be due to management strategies aimed at increasing productivity and profits. The industry 
has also seen a rationalisation in research and development activity with the formation of strategic 
alliances between many firms. These strategies have in part been a response to increased 
competitive pressures from emerging markets in Asia (EU, 1997e). 
Significantly negative persistence of growth is found for alcohol. This may in part reflect the low- 
tech nature of the industry which makes it difficult for firms to obtain advantages from product and 
process innovations (EC, 1997). 
Finally, there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in growth rates, with smaller firms found to have 
experienced more variable growth rates than larger firms. This may result from the fact that 
smaller firms tend to be less diversified, and so are more likely to be affected if the demand for 
any particular product increases or decreases. Heteroscedasticity in growth rates has also been 
found in recent country specific studies of manufacturing (Dunne and Hughes, 1994). 
Overall, by country, the LPE is rejected for Germany, Spain and the UK, in which smaller firms 
grew faster than larger firms. By industry the LPE is rejected for over half of the industries 
sampled. 
7.3.2 A Model of Manufacturing Firm Growth Excluding Persistence of Growth 
A similar process is repeated for models with no persistence of growth. The initial model is: 
FFCC 
Asi, =A +(ß2 '1)sic-i L5 disc + ýSzdi +ýPi eiiºý +Pier, +uic (5) 
f-2 f-2 c-2 c-2 
The results of tests for the exclusion of the sets of country and industry intercept and slope 
dummies are shown in Table 7.7. The p-values quoted are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The 
tests carried out in equation (5) accept the restriction {ST}=O, but nothing else. Further 
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Firm Type Effects Count Effects 
Null Equ'n P-values Null Equ'n P-values 
aI =0 5 0.573 pi =0 5 0.026 
Sr -_0 z 
5 0.049 p=0 5 0.002 
,5=0 
5a 0.003 p2 C =0 5c 0.003 
s1 =0 5b 0.044 Pi -0 5d 0.083 
of =0 5 0.000 pi .0 5 0.000 
Count Te Effects Firm Te Effects 
pi =0 6 0.043 5 =0 7 0.616 
A _0 
6 0.004 s2 a0 7 0.181 
A=0 6a 0.005 ss no 7a 0.003 
4=0 6b 0.084 1 =0 7b 0.049 
P'. =0 6 0.000 S! =0 7 0.004 
Firm Te and Country Effects 
sr t pý =0 5 0.000 
Heteroscedasticity 
a2 = Q2 t -1 
5 0.000 
Notes: The heteroscedasticity tests report p-values from tests carried out by obtaining n R2 from an 
auxiliary regression of the residuals on the squares of Sit_,. The test statistic is distributed 
2 (1) under the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Quoted P-values are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
As;, =ß1 +iß2 -1)sn-i +ý51 di1 + Z5 d2 -ý 
Pi eii, +2P2 2 +uic (5) f-2 f=2 c-2 c-2 
CC 
Os;, -%31 +(P2 -1)Sit. l +p eüt +ZPieiýt +uit (6) 
0-2 c-2 
FF 
ASit =A +(A -1)Sit-1 +2; 81f diit + 1: Sidiic +uit (7) 
f-2 f-2 
OSit -*61 +( 2 -1)Sit. 1 + uit 
(8) 
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experimentation suggested that { pl }=0 could be accepted. It was therefore possible to reach a 
final specification that included industry and country specific slope shifts, but excluded all 
intercept dummies, as follows: 
FC 
is;, =QA +(ß2 -1)sn4 + 
Z82d2; 
t + 
2L; P2'e2"; º + ui, f-2 c-2 
The estimation results are shown in Table 7.8. 
ß2 +p2 is significantly smaller than one in all of the five countries, implying consistent rejection 
of the LPE. ß2+82 is less than one in all eleven industries, and significantly so in all cases 
except pharmaceuticals, again implying a rejection of the LPE. Evidence is found of 
heteroscedasticity in growth rates, with greater variability for small firms than their larger 
counterparts. 
Overall, the manufacturing results suggest that in many industries and countries, smaller firms 
grew faster than their larger counterparts and experienced greater variability in their growth rates. 
The results also suggest that the extent to which the LPE holds for EU manufacturing firms is 
dependent on the individual country or industry under consideration. By country, the LPE is 
rejected for three of the five countries in the model which allows for persistence of growth. The 
finding that smaller firms grew faster than their larger counterparts in the UK is consistent with the 
results of Dunne and Hughes (1994), and Hart and Oulton (1996). The present study also finds 
no significant relationship between growth rates over successive time periods, which is also 
consistent with Dunne and Hughes (1994). 
Using Italian data for the period 1980-1986, Contini and Revelli (1989) found that small firms grew 
faster than larger firms. However, when the sample was disaggregated by size, the LPE was 
accepted for the largest firms in the sample. For Germany, the present results are similar to those 
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of Wagner (1992), who also found no relationship between size and growth. However, in contrast 
to Wagner, no evidence of persistence in growth rates is found in the present study. 
Finally, the results also suggest that smaller firms have more variable growth rates than large 
firms. This is in line with much other empirical evidence for manufacturing, including Mansfield , 
(1962), Hall (1987), Evans (1987a, b) and Dunne and Hughes (1994). 
This section compares the results of the estimations for the banking and manufacturing samples. 
Overall, the LPE holds for most countries in EU banking markets when the preferred models are 
estimated. However, this is not the case for manufacturing. Table 7.9 compares the results for 
both industries. 
Country Banking (Equity and Assets 
measure) 
Manufacturing (Assets 
Measure) 
Belgium Accept N/A 
Denmark Accept N/A 
France Reject (Smaller banks grew Accept 
proportionately faster than 
larger banks) 
Germany Accept Reject (Smaller firms grew 
proportionately faster than 
larger firms) 
Italy Reject (Smaller banks grew Accept 
proportionately faster than 
larger banks) 
Netherlands Accept N/A 
Spain Reject (Smaller banks grew Reject (Smaller firms grew 
proportionately faster than proportionately faster than 
larger banks) larger firms) 
United Kingdom Accept Reject (Smaller firms grew 
proportionately faster than 
larger firms 
Note: N/A denotes not available. 
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Country effects appear to pre-dominate in banking where most rejections of the LPE occur. In 
manufacturing the pattern is less clear. However, the LPE is rejected for eight industries In the 
model which allows for persistence of growth (see Table 7.6). There is evidence of persistence of 
growth above or below average from one period to the next In both banking and manufacturing. 
However, the size of the persistence coefficient varies across countries and industries for 
manufacturing, but not for banking. Persistence of growth In manufacturing Is generally positive 
and significant. Small firms have more variable growth rates than large firms In manufacturing, as 
was also found by Dunne and Hughes (1994). However, there Is no evidence of 
heteroscedasticity for European banking, in contrast to the findings of Tschoegl (1983) for his 
study on the growth characteristics of international banks. 
Overall, the differences between the banking and manufacturing results perhaps arise from 
fundamental differences between the competitive conditions in these Industries. For example, 
given that banks often sell homogenous products, raise funds In a similar manner and set rates 
on deposits and loans determined by the market, they are likely to grow at similar rates. Barriers 
to entry are higher in banking than manufacturing as a consequence of structural and conduct 
regulation (Tirole, 1994a). This means that small banks must satisfy regulatory requirements 
before trading can commence, and perhaps have less flexibility In offering products and services 
at different prices to their larger competitors. This is likely to lead to small and large banks 
growing at the same proportionate rates. In contrast, small firms can enter most manufacturing 
industries without the hindrance of government regulations, and produce differentiated products 
at competitive prices to capture market share. This often results in small manufacturing firms 
growing faster than their larger counterparts. 
7.5 Effects of Age on the Size and Growth of Banking and Manufacturing Firms 
The LPE assumes that growth is independent of size. However, the results thus far suggest that 
smaller firms have faster growth rates than larger firms in several countries for both banking and 
manufacturing. Furthermore, small firms have more variable growth rates than their larger 
counterparts in manufacturing. The reason why smaller firms grow faster than larger firms is 
perhaps that smaller firms are only likely to survive if they can achieve efficient scale rapidly 
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(Simon and Bonnini, 1958). Available empirical evidence suggests that European manufacturing 
firms which produce output at levels less than the minimum efficient scale incur substantial cost 
disadvantages relative to large firms (Emerson et al, 1988). Therefore, if smaller firms are 
observed to enjoy above average growth, this could be indicative of a form of survivorship bias, in 
the sense that only the fastest growing small firms survive and therefore become included in the 
sample. However, the reason why small firms have more variable growth rates than large firms 
for manufacturing remains less clear. Some evidence suggests that larger firms are more 
diversified than smaller firms and so are less vulnerable to large fluctuations in growth (Singh and 
Whittington, 1975). Other authors suggest that smaller firms also tend to be younger than their 
larger counterparts, tend to employ less experienced managers, and have had less time to 
acquire learning economies of scale. As a consequence these firms make more mistakes, and so 
have greater variability in their growth prospects (Jovanovic, 1982). These arguments have been 
supported empirically by Evans (1987a, b) and Reid (1992). 
Mueller (1972) argues that firms go through a life cycle of growth and profitability which can be 
split into four main phases: the emergent, growth, maturity and declining phases. In the emergent 
phase, firms are often small entities reliant on single products, and under the control of owner- 
managers. At this stage the firm often charges low prices to gain market share, and re-invests 
profits to facilitate expansion. At this stage it is critical that the firm makes enough revenue to 
meet immediate liabilities, otherwise it may decline and die. Marshall (1890) likens young firms to 
young trees in the forest '... as they struggle upwards through the benumbing age of their old 
rivals. Many succumb on the way, and only a few survive. ' 4 
In the growth phase of the life cycle, firms raise finance on the capital markets to aid further 
expansion. This expansion gives the firm access to scale economies, which leads to increased 
efficiency. Furthermore, the firm may often diversify into new product areas in order to reduce the 
risks associated with any single product or service. During the maturity phase growth and profits 
° Marshall (1890), p. 317. 
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level off as markets reach saturation point, and the firm encounters diseconomies associated with 
problems of managerial coordination (Penrose, 1959). In the declining phase, the firm's sales and 
profits fall, leading to a loss of confidence on the part of investors, falling share prices and 
eventually bankruptcy. 
The life cycle model leads to a testable proposition, that age (as well as size) may be a relevant 
explanatory variable in any model of growth. In this section, tests for any relationship between 
both size and age and growth are carried out. A slightly less formal procedure than the one 
adopted in the previous section is used to determine the specification of the model. Following 
earlier work by Evans (1987a, b) and Reid (1992), the estimated model is: 
OSit =Qt +(Q2 -1)S1t-t +QsOsiat +ß4ai, -t 
+ß5s? 
-t 
+ ß6sit-talc-t 
Efcc + ýý d>it +P epic + uit 
b-2 c-2 
where E(u; t)=0andvar(u; t)= Q2 
a. 4 is firm i's age in 1990 in years, expressed in natural logarithmic form, and s;,. laII. I is an 
interaction term which is included to test whether the relationship between age and growth varies 
with firm size. The remaining variables are defined as before (see above). The model tests for 
any linear and non-linear relationship between size in 1990 and growth over the period 1990- 
1994, while allowing for differences across countries and industries through the inclusion of sets 
of industry and country specific intercept dummies. Slope dummies for the coefficients on the size 
and age variables, are not included. The data on bank ages was collected from the Bankers' 
Almanac, while manufacturing firm ages was collected from the MacMillan UK Stock Exchange 
Yearbook and Dun and Bradstreet's Europa Publication. Due to missing information on firm ages, 
63 banks and 7 manufacturing firms were dropped from the sample. This left a sample of 554 
banks and 750 manufacturing firms for which data on firm age was available. The results for 
banking and manufacturing are now discussed in turn. 
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The results of estimating equation (9) for banks are reported in Table 7.10. The estimation results 
suggest that the relationship between growth and size is non-linear, with both coefficients on s;, _, 
and S24 found to be significant. The signs of the estimated coefficients indicate that the 
relationship between size and growth is negative for smaller banks and positive for larger banks. 
Using the appropriate terms in the estimated model, bank growth can be differentiated with 
respect to initial size, in order to determine the value of initial size beyond which the relationship 
between size and growth becomes positive; i. e. the turning point in the size-growth relationship. 
As;, =-0.0380-0.1358s;, _1 
+0.007s? 
_, 
+0.0041a;, s;,.,.............. 
a0s 
_-0.1358 + 0.014 s;,., + 0.0041 a 1., =0 asit-1 
0.1358 - 0.0041 a;, _, ==9.7 - 0.293 a;, _, , where sit., 
is the value of s;,., at which Os;, s t_1 0.014 
achieves a turning point. 
z "=0.014 
> 0, implying the point at which 
S'ý 
=0 minimises growth. 
.cl .cl 
Therefore, for a bank with age = 20 years (ai1_, = 2.9957), si, _1 = 
8.82, or actual size = 6783.6. 
For a bank with age = 50 (a;, _1 = 
3.9120), sit., = 8.55, or actual size = 5186.3. 
For a 20 year old firm, the relationship between size and growth is positive for banks bigger than 
ECU 6783.6 million. For a 50 year old firm, the relationship is positive for firms bigger than ECU 
5186.3 million. 
Although the size-age interaction term is included in the above discussion, statistically it is not 
significantly different from zero, and in general the empirical results suggest that there is no 
relationship between bank age and growth. This contrasts with Yeats et al (1975), who find a 
positive relationship between bank growth and age. Overall, our findings suggest that the 
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arguments of Mueller (1972) and Jovanovic (1982) do not apply to the growth processes of 
European banks. Possibly, banks may face flat long run average cost curves, and so can operate 
at various levels of production without incurring substantially higher or lower average costs. 
Therefore, small banks do not have to grow rapidly to reach the minimum efficient scale of 
production, to ensure survival. 
Manufacturing 
The results of estimating equation (9) for manufacturing are reported in Table 7.11. The results 
suggest that the relationship between size and growth is again non-linear. As before, the signs of 
the estimated coefficients indicate that the relationship between size and growth is negative for 
smaller banks and positive for larger banks. There is also a significant relationship between age 
and growth, so younger firms tend to grow faster than older firms. The results may also suggest 
that younger firms grow faster than their older counterparts as are at an earlier stage of their firm 
life-cycle (Mueller, 1972). The interaction term between size and age, s;,. iait., is found to be 
positive and significant. Again, the turning point in the size-growth relationship can be determined, 
using the same method as before. 
Os; t =-0.0899-0.2463s;, _1 
+0.0138s_, +0.0155a; ts;,., +......... 
ads `_-0.2463 + 0.0276 sit., + 0.0155 a; 1-1 =0 osit-I 
0.2463 - 0.0155 a;, _, s; ý_ý _=8.924 - 0.562 a; t_l, where s;, _, 
is the value of sit., at which As;, 0.0276 
achieves a turning point. 
2 2Asi, 
= 0.0276 > 0, implying the point at which 
S'` 
=0 minimises growth. as2 
it-I it -1 
Therefore, for a firm with age = 20 years (ai, _, = 
2.9957), si,, 1 = 7.2404, or actual size = 1394.6. 
For a firm with age = 50 (a; t_1 = 3.9120), si, _, = 
6.7255, or actual size = 833.4. 
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For a 20 year old firm, the relationship between size and growth is positive for firms bigger than 
ECU1394.6 million. For a 50 year old firm, the relationship is positive for firms bigger than ECU 
833.4 million. 
There is evidence of heteroscedasticity in growth rates, with more variable growth for small firms 
than large firms. A regression of the squared residuals on a2.1 finds no relationship between 
growth variability and age, implying that younger firms do not have more variable growth rates 
than their older counterparts. The dummies are generally significant by country and generally 
insignificant by industry. 
The results suggest that a manufacturing firm's age does influence its growth prospects. This 
lends some support to the view that either young firms are at an early stage of their life-cycle and 
must grow to become established, or that younger or smaller firms may actively pursue growth in 
an attempt to reach the minimum efficient scale. Finally, no evidence Is found to suggest that 
younger firms have more variable growth rates than their older counterparts. 
7.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the nature and strength of size-growth relationships for the EU 
banking and manufacturing industries from 1990 to 1994. In both cases, tests have been carried 
out to assess whether the LPE holds. 
For banks, the finding that the LPE generally holds (using the assets and equity size measures) In 
the majority of cases suggests that a pattern of increased concentration in European banking 
markets could develop over time. There may be a tendency for concentration to increase, even in 
the absence of factors such as the superior efficiency of large banks, merger activity or the 
implementation of entry deterring strategies by incumbent banks. Such a pattern suggests that 
bank growth is determined in a random fashion, independent of bank size. 
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In contrast, the results for manufacturing firms generally suggest that growth is inversely related 
to firm size, thus contradicting the LPE. This means that there is no long-term tendency for 
concentration to increase. This is perhaps a consequence of managerial or demand constraints 
which are often encountered by firms seeking to grow past a certain critical size (Penrose, 1959 
and Marris, 1964). Furthermore, smaller firms have more variable growth than their larger 
counterparts. This is perhaps due to the diversification of large scale operations which allow large 
firms to spread risks over a number of product areas, and so smooth their growth rates over time 
(Singh and Whittington, 1968). 
Finally, the relationship between age and growth has been examined for both banking and 
manufacturing. The overall finding is that age appears to be an important determinant of growth in 
manufacturing, where younger firms tend to enjoy faster rates of growth than older firms. 
However, this is not the case for banks. 
There are several limitations to the empirical analysis. In particular, the results are based on 
samples of manufacturing and banking firms that have survived over the entire period of the 
investigation. Consequently, the estimations take no account of the relationship between a firm's 
growth and its chances of survival. Assuming that the chances of survival are related to slow 
growth, death rates are likely to be higher across smaller firms as they are at the upper end of the 
size distribution. Large firms are likely to decline for long periods as they fall through the size 
distribution and eventually die (Mansfield, 1962). In other words there is an inverse relationship 
between firm size and the probability of survival. If small surviving firms have faster growth rates 
2 than non-surviving firms, there exists the possibility of bias in favour of finding '2 < 1, as the 
small firms sampled are unrepresentative of a population of small firms in general. However, the 
present data set does not allow the exploration of the possibility of such a bias to any great 
extent. 5 The effects of acquisition and merger on size-growth relationship has also been ignored, 
primarily because identifying these events and quantifying their effects was problematic given the 
5 However, the extent to which slow growth may lead to the failure of banks is somewhat 
questionable. 
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data sets available. The possibility of any bias in the results from ignoring entry, exit and merger 
may, however provide a fruitful area for future research. 
Overall, the results give valuable insights into the size-growth relationships for European banks 
and manufacturing firms over the period 1990-1994. An interesting, if somewhat speculative 
extension of this work is to use the estimated parameters derived from the empirical investigation 
to build stochastic simulation model(s) to predict the future evolution of the EU banking Industry. 
This is developed in chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE EVOLUTION OF MARKET STRUCTURE: A SIMULATIONS EXERCISE 
8.1 Introduction 
In its strictest form the LPE applies to a cohort of surviving firms whose membership remains 
constant over time. The empirical model(s) estimated previously (in this thesis and elsewhere in 
the industrial organisation literature) make no allowance for factors other than shocks which are 
independent of firm size, and therefore 'random', and which determine the evolution of the size 
distribution of firms over time. However, in practice it is certain that there are other factors which 
are also instrumental in shaping market structures. Such factors include the entry of new firms, 
the exit of existing firms and mergers between existing firms. In this chapter the method of 
stochastic simulation is used to investigate the impact of such factors. Stochastic simulation is a 
flexible approach that uses randomly generated numbers to test hypotheses relating to an 
underlying theoretical model. 
This chapter discusses the methodology and results of a simulation exercise, which examines the 
implications for market structure of various scenarios regarding bank growth, as well as entry, exit 
and merger over fifty time periods. This model is then extended to Introduce assumptions about 
entry, exit and merger activity. The rest of the chapter Is structured as follows. Section 8.2 
discusses previous work in the industrial organisation literature that has used stochastic 
simulation to model firm growth. Section 8.3 describes the construction of a simulation model for 
a constant population of banks, and considers the implications for the size distributions of banks 
of various assumptions regarding growth. Section 8.4 repeats this exercise, but in addition allows 
the population of banks to vary through entry, exit and merger. Section 8.5 uses official sources 
and other evidence to calibrate simulation models of industry structure for the banking markets of 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Section 8.6 provides a summary. 
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8.2 Previous Research 
Ijiri and Simon (1964), Engwell (1973), Scherer (1980) and McGloughan (1995) have examined 
the extent to which simple theoretical models of firm growth can generate firm size distributions 
similar to those which are observed empirically. 
Ijiri and Simon (1964) carry out Monte Carlo simulations to assess whether stochastic models of 
firm growth lead to skewed distributions of firm sizes. They develop a model In which the growth 
of a firm is influenced partly by random factors, and partly by previous growth, the Influence of 
which declines as time proceeds. The authors allow for entry Into the lowest size class of firms 
only. To generate a distribution of firm sizes, they begin with an industry consisting of 247 firms of 
approximately equal size, which comprise 1000 asset units (approximately 4 units for each firm). 
They simulate the model over 1000 time periods, and find that 75 per cent of growth is attributed 
to existing firms and 25 per cent to entrants. Ijiri and Simon find a relationship between firm size 
and age, where older firms tend to become (and remain) larger than younger firms. The larger 
firms' advantages are augmented when there is positive serial correlation in growth rates, and 
when the rate of entry is low. They show that their simulations generate a lognormal distribution of 
firm sizes. 
' We can now confidently predict that many other processes, incorporating comparably weak 
forms of the law of proportionate effects, will lead to a highly similar distribution. Thus our analysis 
greatly increases the plausibility of a stochastic explanation of firm sizes. ' 
Engwell (1973) uses a simulation approach to examine the size distribution of firms in Sweden, 
based on data for the car and shoe industries. He develops a model which postulates that the 
size distribution of firms is determined by: the growth rates of individual firms; the entry of new 
firms; and the exit of existing firms. 2 Using theoretical assumptions regarding growth rates, and 
empirical facts on previous entry and exit to and from the two industries sampled, Engwell finds 
1 Ijiri and Simon (1964), p. 89. 
2 Entry and exit in the Engwell model follows a two step process. In the first step, a random draw is made 
from a suitable probability distribution to establish whether a new firm enters or an established firm exits 
from the market. In the second step, a random draw is made from a second probability distribution to 
establish the size of the entering or exiting firm. 
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that the size distributions of firms generated by the simulation model fit reasonably well with the 
actual distribution of firm sizes in both cases. 
Scherer (1980) tests the LPE by constructing a hypothetical industry made up of 50 equal sized 
firms. Each firm's growth rate in each year is drawn from an Identical normal probability 
distribution whose parameters (mean and variance) are calibrated using a sample of 369 firms 
drawn from the 500 largest US firms over the period 1954-1960. Scherer runs the growth process 
16 times over a 140 year time period and calculates the average concentration ratio. He finds that 
CR4 increases from 8 per cent in year I to approximately 58 per cent in year 140. 
McGloughan (1995) extends the assumptions underlying a stochastic model of growth to produce 
a model that incorporates growth, entry and exit processes. He sets up five types of model to 
mimic the findings of previous studies. These are models in which (i) the LPE holds; (ii) small 
firms grow faster than large firms; (iii) large firms grow faster than small firms; (iv) there is serial 
correlation in growth rates; and (v) there is heteroscedasticity with the growth of small firms more 
variable than that of large firms. To allow for entry, McGloughan assumes that entrants are 
smaller than incumbent firms, and that the probability of exit is the same for all firm sizes. 
McGloughan develops fourteen different industry types, based on different assumptions about 
entry, exit, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. He finds that In industries in which larger 
firms grow faster than small firms, a high rate of entry has no effect on concentration, while for 
industries in which smaller firms grow faster, a high rate of entry leads to de-concentration. 
Overall, McGloughan argues that differences in the mean growth rates of firms play a more 
important role in determining industry concentration than entry, exit or heteroscedasticity In 
growth rates. However, he acknowledges that the results are subject to some limitations. 
' Stochastic simulation lacks the generality of asymptotic theory and the results generated are 
much less robust than those from analytical techniques, in that they tend to be sensitive to the 
way in which the underlying parameters are calibrated. P3 
3 McGloughan (1995), p. 431. 
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8.3 A Stochastic Model of Bank Growth for a Fixed Population of Banks 
This section outlines the assumptions underlying the simulation model of bank growth. The 
simulation exercise seeks to examine the sensitivity of industry structure to changes in 
assumptions regarding bank growth. The key indicators which are used to reflect outcomes in 
terms of industry structure are: the evolution of market concentration; changes in the distribution 
of bank sizes; and the persistence of dominance, measured by the extent to which one bank 
retains the largest market share through time. 
The assumptions which determine the evolution of market concentration for a fixed population of 
banks concern the following: (i) The relationship between a bank's current size and its growth 
rate; (ii) the relationship (if any) between a bank's growth rates in successive periods (serial 
correlation in growth rates); and (iii) the relationship (if any) between a bank's current size and the 
variance or standard deviation of the probability distribution from which its growth rate is drawn 
(heteroscedasticity in growth rates). 
For the purposes of the simulation exercise, the mean growth rate across banks is assumed to be 
zero; i. e. there is no deterministic trend in the evolution of bank size through time. The possibility 
of a deterministic trend is ignored because its inclusion would not affect the results concerning 
the relative distribution of bank sizes, the evolution of concentration or the persistence of 
dominance. 
Defining sit as the natural logarithm of the size of bank i at time t as before, the most general 
form which the model specifying the evolution of bank size over time could take is: 
As it =, Q, +(ß2 -1)s; ß_1 +ß3As; t_, +ß4t+u;, where E (ui, ) =0 and var (ut, ) = c; 
2 (1) 
A deterministic trend component would be incorporated by assuming that /34 #0 if X32 < 1; or 
A# 0 and X34 =0 if ß2 = 1. In order to exclude the deterministic trend, it is assumed that 
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A= p4 = 0. A= 0 ensures that mean logarithmic size is zero whenever /32 < 1. By setting initial 
logarithmic size, sfa, to zero in all simulations, a zero mean logarithmic size is also ensured for 
the case ß2 = 1. The simulation model adopted is therefore: 
As, _ (ß2 -1)s; t_l + 
83Asit_1 + u; t where: E (u; 1) =0 and var (u; 1) =a it (2) 
The relationship between current size and growth is controlled by the parameter 1= ; serial 
correlation in growth rates by the parameter /13 ; and heteroscedasticity in growth rates by the 
parameter cit. It is assumed that u; t are drawn from a normal distribution. 
The simulations will examine the implications for the evolution of the size distribution of banks of 
seven alternative sets of assumptions concerning these parameters. These are as follows: 
0 Industry 1: All banks grow at the same proportionate rate, and there Is no serial correlation or 
heteroscedasticity. In other words the LPE holds. This implies that ß2 = 1, ß3 = 0, and ail = 
Q. 
0 Industry 2: Small banks tend to grow faster than large banks, and there Is no serial correlation 
or heteroscedasticity, in which case ß2 < 1, Q3 = 0, and o=a. 
0 Industry 3: Large banks tend to grow faster than small banks, and there Is no serial 
correlation or heteroscedasticity, in which case j62 > 1,83 = 0, and Qit = a. 
" Industry 4: Large banks have more variable growth rates than small banks (i. e. there is 
heteroscedasticity, but no serial correlation), in which case ß2 = 1, ß3 = 0, and ail = f(s;, _1), 
where f' > 0. 
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" Industry 5: Small banks have more variable growth rates than large banks (i. e. there Is 
heteroscedasticity, but no serial correlation), in which case ßz = 1, X33 = 0, and v;, =g(si, _3 
), 
where g'<0. 
" Industry 6: Banks that enjoyed above average (below average) growth In the previous period 
tend to do so again in the current period (i. e. there is positive serial correlation, but no 
heteroscedasticity), in which case /32 = 1, iß3 > 0, and o=a. 
0 Industry 7: Banks that enjoyed above average (below average) growth in the previous period 
tend to have below average (above average) growth In the current period (i. e. there is 
negative serial correlation, but no heteroscedasticity), in which case ß2 = 1, ß3 < 0, and 
°"it = CF. 
The simulation results are reported using three sets of measures reflecting the evolution of the 
size distribution of banks: 
(i) mean and standard deviation of bank size; (ii) one, two and five bank concentration ratios and 
the numbers equivalent of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; 4 and (iii) the persistence of 
dominance, measured by the average number of time periods as market leader achieved by the 
bank with most periods as market leader. 
Table 8.1 reports the average results across 20 simulations of the evolution over 50 time periods 
of the sizes of a group of 20 banks for Industries 1 to 7. The banks begin equal in size at time 0. 
Their subsequent evolution is driven by equation (2). 
4 Chapter 3 provides a discussion of the relative merits of each of these measures for the analysis of 
market concentration. 
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able 8.1* Evolution of Market Structure: No I: -ntrV EXIt or Merge 
Type Mean St. Dev CR1 CR2 CR5 Num Eq 
Industry 1: ß2 =1, Q3 = 0, ag = 0.1 
t=10 1.03 0.33 8.7 16.1 35.4 18.2 
t=20 1.10 0.49 10.5 19.1 40.0 16.7 
t= 50 1.26 0.91 15.1 25.7 49.0 13.2 
Top 26.7 
Industry 2: 132 = 0.95,133 = 0, aft = 0.1 
t=10 1.05 0.27 8.2 15.1 33.4 18.9 
t=20 1.09 0.34 8.6 16.0 35.3 18.2 
t=50 1.05 0.33 8.8 16.2 35.4 18.2 
Top 18.4 
Industry 3: ß2 = 1.02, ß3 = 01 aft = 0.1 
t=10 1.08 0.37 9.0 16.8 36.4 17.9 
t=20 1.19 0.64 11.6 21.1 43.0 15.6 
t=50 2.10 2.83 27.2 40.0 64.8 7.3 
Top 30.5 
Industry 4: fl 2 =1, ß3 = 0. aft = 0.1+0.02 Sit-1 
t=10 1.07 0.35 9.0 16.5 34.2 18.2 
t=20 1.15 0.59 11.7 20.8 42.0 15.9 
t=50 1.38 1.20 18.2 29.1 51.7 11.5 
Top 25.2 
Industry 5: ßi2 =1, X33 = 0, aft = 0.1-0.02 SR. 1 
t=10 1.05 0.34 8.6 16.0 35.6 18.2 
t=20 1.09 0.48 10.1 18.8 39.3 16.7 
t=50 1.28 0.86 13.2 23.2 47.5 13.9 
Top 26.5 
Industry 6: f2 =1, ß=0.1, QIt = 0.1 
t=10 1.07 0.39 9.5 17.3 36.9 17.9 
t=20 1.12 0.56 11.3 20.0 41.6 16.1 
t=50 1.30 1.03 16.3 27.0 50.8 12.5 
Top 26.3 
Industry 7: 132 = 1, ß3 =-0.1. aft =-0.1 
t=10 1.04 0.31 8.4 15.7 34.8 18.5 
t=20 1.08 0.45 10.1 18.3 39.1 16.9 
t=50 1.23 0.83 14.2 24.8 47.6 13.7 
Notes: 
In each panel, the results are generated from 20 replications of the development over 10,20 and 50 time periods of 
a market comprising of 20 banks, each of which starts from an Initial size of I unit, and whose subsequent evolution 
is driven by the model: Asir = (ß2 -1)s; t. l + ß3i s; t -t 
+ u; i . Uit -N (0, Qit2) aft " 0.1 
Mean and st. dev denote the mean and standard deviation of actual bank size. 
CR. 1, CR. 2 AND CR. 5 are concentration ratios measuring the market share of the top 1,2, and 5 banks 
respectively. 
Num. equiv is the numbers equivalent version of the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index. 
Top denotes the number of periods in which one bank retains the largest market share through time. 
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Industry 1 is the case in which the LPE holds in its strictest form, and therefore represents a 
benchmark against which to compare the other panels (each of which represents some form of 
departure from the LPE). sit (for each bank i) follows a random walk, with a homoscedastic 
disturbance term. As before, lower case symbols are used to denote the natural logarithm of bank 
N 
size, so sit = size of bank i at time t, and sý _ sit IN = arithmetic mean of s;, ; and upper case 
N 
symbols are used to denote actual bank size, so Sit =e", and St ESit/N = arithmetic mean 
of Sit . While 
st (not shown in Table 8.1) remains zero over all time periods, Table 8.1 shows that 
S, tends to increase over time starting at 1.0 at t=0 and reaching 1.03 by t= 10,1.10 by t= 20 
and 1.26 by t= 50, because the dispersion of sit around st also tends to increase (Prais, 1976). 
The reasons for this phenomenon can be illustrated as follows. 
Suppose there are two banks, each with s; o = 0, so S; o =I for I =1,2; and so = 0, 
go = I. 
Suppose in period 1, u11= s,, = 0.2 and u2, = s21 = -0.2, so S,, = 1.2214 and S21 = 0.8187. 
Then s, = 0, but Si = 1.0201; i. e. average size has increased, due to the dispersion of s, i and 
s21 around the logarithmic mean of si = 0. Banks with sit >0 (Sit >1) contribute more to S, than 
banks with sit <0 (Sit < 1), due to the effects of the application of the exponential function to sit 
to obtain Sit .A similar phenomenon also explains the progressive Increases in the concentration 
ratios CR1, CR2 and CR5 reported in Table 8.1, which for Industry 1 start from 5.0,10.0 and 25.0 
respectively at t=0, and reach 15.1,25.7 and 49.0 respectively by t= 50. Likewise the H-H 
numbers equivalent falls from 20.0 at t=0 to 13.2 at t= 50. Finally, for Industry 1 the average 
number of time periods (out of 50) over which the firm with the longest duration as the largest firm 
held this position was 26.7. 
Industry 2 represents the case where smaller banks grow faster than larger banks, so the LPE 
does not hold. In this case /32 is set to 0.95. From an initial position in which all banks are of 
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equal size, random fluctuations from year to year in logarithmic size around its mean size cause 
the average bank size and the concentration ratios to increase slightly above their Initial values. 
However, once the equilibrium level of dispersion around the logarithmic mean is achieved, the 
proportionately faster growth of small banks slows and eventually halts the rate at which average 
bank size and concentration increase. As a consequence, there is no further tendency for 
average bank size or concentration to increase, as evidenced by the similarities in structure at 
t=10,20 and 50. 
Industry 3 represents the case where large banks grow faster than small banks. In this case P_ 
is set to 1.02. For values of ß2 greater than 1.02, the growth of the larger banks become 
sufficiently explosive to make the model unstable and unrealistic over 50 time periods. In Industry 
3, the pattern of growth in sit leads to a wide divergence in bank sizes, which increases 
exponentially over the 50 time periods. As a consequence average bank size and the dispersion 
of sizes increase much faster than under the LPE, leading to substantially higher rates of 
concentration at t= 50 (CR1=27.2%, CR2=40.0% and CR5 = 64.8% In Industry 3 compared with 
15.1%, 25.7% and 49% respectively in Industry 1). The differential growth advantages enjoyed by 
large banks results in the top bank enjoying market leadership for 30.8 periods on average. 
Although such a pattern is possible in theory, it is unlikely to be observed In practice for a 
sustained period of time. However, some of the early empirical evidence on the LPE suggests 
that this type of growth process may be observed over finite time periods (e. g. from 1950 to 1960 
for Samuals, 1965 and from 1948 to 1960 for Singh and Whittington, 1975). 
Industry 4 illustrates the effects of heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term when Qi, is 
positively related to sit4 . If Qit increases with sit_1, a 
bank which is fortunate to draw its growth 
rate (randomly) from the top end of the appropriate probability distribution in one period will 
become bigger, and will therefore draw its growth rate for the next period from a probability 
distribution with a larger variance. If it is fortunate again and draws from the top end of the 
distribution, it will have grown faster over the two time periods than a bank which experienced two 
'good' draws in successive periods from distributions whose variances do not increase with bank 
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size. In Industry 4, the pattern of growth in s;, leads to larger average values of bank size, than 
was the case under the LPE, leading to increasing levels of concentration over the 50 periods. 
The tendency towards increased concentration over time is therefore accentuated. At t= 50, 
CRI=18.2%, CR2=29.1% and CR5=51.7% for Industry 4, compared with 15.1%, 25.7%, 49% 
respectively in Industry 1. 
In contrast, Industry 5 illustrates the effects of heteroscedasticity In the disturbance term when 
crn is negatively related to st_l. In this case the long-term tendency towards increased 
concentration implied by the LPE, is offset to some extent by the effects of the heteroscedasticity. 
A bank that achieves growth rates from the top end of the distribution In two successive periods 
will tend to grow at a slower rate than it would under the LPE. This is because In the second 
period, the growth rate will be drawn from the top end of a distribution with a smaller variance, as 
a result of an increase in size achieved in the first period. Heteroscedasticity that follows this 
pattern does not bring convergence in bank size (the tendency toward increased concentration 
still continues in the long term), but it does slow the rate at which divergence takes place. At t=50, 
CRI=13.2%, CR2=23.2% and CR5=47.5% in Industry 5, compared with 15.1%, 25.7% and 49% 
respectively under Industry 1. Mansfield (1962), Singh and Whittington (1975), Evans (1987a, b), 
Hall (1987), Dunne and Hughes (1994), and Hart and Oulton (1996) have all found evidence of 
heteroscedasticity of the type modelled in Industry 5. The latter is likely to be more typical than In 
Industry 4, because large banks often enjoy advantages associated with diversified operations 
which make them less susceptible to periods of extremely high or low growth, than small banks 
whose business may be located in one or two areas of banking activity. However, no evidence of 
heteroscedasticity was found in the current investigation of European banks (chapter 7). 
Industry 6 illustrates the effects of positive serial correlation in rates of growth. Positive serial 
correlation (/33 = 0.1), by tending to prolong the advantages of banks which are initially fortuitous 
in drawing a positive growth rate (i. e. for which success leads to further success), speeds up the 
rate at which there is upward drift in average bank sizes, and increases in market concentration 
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(Chesher, 1979). At t= 50, CR1=16.3%, CR2=27.0% and CR5 =52.8% in Industry 6, compared 
with 15.1%, 25.7% and 49% respectively in Industry 1. 
Finally, Industry 7 illustrates the effects of negative serial correlation in rates of growth. Negative 
serial correlation (/33 = -0.1), by ensuring that the periods of positive and negative growth tend to 
be distributed more evenly across banks and tend to offset one another over time, has the effect 
of reducing the speed at which market concentration increases, although without halting it 
completely. At t= 50, CRI=14.2%, CR2=24.8% and CR5 = 47.6% In Industry 7 compared with 
15.1%, 25.7% and 49% respectively in Industry 1. 
For manufacturing industries Singh and Whittington (1975), Kumar (1985) and Dunne and 
Hughes (1994) have all found evidence of persistence of growth as modelled in Industry 6. With 
the exception of the present study (which found a positive relationship between growth rates in 
previous periods using a total assets measure of bank size), no evidence of growth persistence In 
banking markets has been presented. 
Figure 8.1 presents a diagrammatic summary and comparison of the results for Industries 1 to 7, 
in a different form to the results presented in Table 8.1. For each industry, M1= e" ; L1 = e--v' 
and U, = el+" where v, = 
Fl: (s. -i, - s, )2 /(N -1) . 
M1 therefore represents the actual size 
of a bank whose logarithmic size is the mean for the population of 20, and L, and U, represent 
the actual sizes of banks whose logarithmic size is one standard deviation below and above the 
mean logarithmic size respectively. As before, S1 is the mean actual size, which is generally 
higher than M, because of the effects of the application of the exponential function as discussed 
previously. In each case, around two thirds of the population of banks are typically located within 
the range of values identified between U, and L, , while 
M, typically approximates the median 
bank size. The diagrams illustrate clearly the extent to which relatively small changes in 
assumptions about the parameter values (from one Industry to another) can have major 
implications for the evolution of market structure over time. 
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Tables 8.2 to 8.4 present the simulation results in the form of a sensitivity analysis showing the 
effects of variation in each of the parameters x 12 ,ß and Q; t respectively, while holding all the 
parameters and assumptions constant. Table 8.5 shows the sensitivity of industry evolution to 
changes in the functional relationship between o and sit_, in the case where ait Is 
heteroscedastic. 
Table 8.2 shows the implications for the evolution of market structure of various values of 62. 
The row for X32 = 0.95 reproduces the results for Industry 2. /12 =1 is Industry 1 and 12 =1.02 is 
Industry 3. For X12 < 1. the random component of bank growth ensures there Is a distribution of 
values of su around 0 (S1 around 1), which opens out during the first few time periods, before 
settling down and eventually reaching a level of dispersion which does not increase further. The 
closer to 1 is the value of J2, the larger the variance of the equilibrium distribution, and the 
longer it takes for the distribution to reach its equilibrium. When X32 =1 concentration goes on 
increasing indefinitely, and there is no equilibrium distribution of bank sizes. If X32 > 1, there Is 
explosive growth in sit leading to large increases in average bank size and market concentration. 
Table 8.3 shows the implications of variation in the strength of serial correlation for various values 
of 63 on either side of zero. The rows for /33 = 0.1 and iß3 = -0.1 reproduce the results for 
Industries 6 and 7 in Table 8.1, while the row for /33 =0 represents Industry 1. Table 8.3 shows 
that the tendencies revealed in Table 8.1 are simply accentuated if there is a stronger pattern of 
positive or negative serial correlation; i. e. the former tends to strengthen the drift towards higher 
concentration, while the latter tends to offset (but not to halt) the same tendency. 
Table 8.4 shows the implications of variation in the parameter a1 , assuming homoscedasticity. 
The row for Qa = 0.1 reproduces the results for Industry 1. Increases in o impact primarily on 
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Table 8.2e Sensitivity Analysis for Variation in x(32 
462 
Mean St. Dev CR1 CR2 CR5 Num Equiv Top 
(1) t=10 
0.5 1.01 0.12 6.3 11.9 28.7 19.6 
0.75 1.01 0.15 6.5 12.6 29.6 19.6 
0.90 1.03 0.22 7.5 14.0 31.8 19.2 
0.95 1.05 0.27 8.2 15.1 33.4 18.9 
0.97 1.03 0.27 8.2 15.1 33.3 18.9 
0.99 1.05 0.30 8.2 15.4 34.5 18.5 
1 1.03 0.33 8.7 16.1 35.4 18.2 
1.02 1.08 0.37 9.0 16.8 36.4 17.9 
(i) t=20 
0.5 1.01 0.11 6.1 11.9 28.4 19.6 
0.75 1.01 0.14 6.4 12.4 29.5 19.6 
0.90 1.01 0.24 7.9 14.6 32.8 18.9 
0.95 1.09 0.34 8.6 16.0 35.3 18.2 
0.97 1.05 0.34 8.7 16.2 35.5 18.2 
0.99 1.12 0.48 10.4 18.7 39.3 16.9 
1 1.10 0.49 10.5 19.1 40.0 16.7 
1.02 1.19 0.64 11.6 21.1 43.0 15.6 
(iii)t=50 
0.5 1.00 0.12 6.2 12.1 28.8 19.6 6.7 
0.75 1.01 0.14 6.5 12.5 29.5 19.6 8.8 
0.90 1.01 0.23 7.4 14.2 32.3 18.9 14.1 
0.95 1.05 0.33 8.8 16.2 35.4 18.2 18.4 
0.97 1.10 0.43 9.8 18.0 37.6 17.2 18.9 
0.99 1.21 0.67 11.5 21.3 43.7 15.4 22.8 
1 1.26 0.91 15.1 25.7 49.0 13.2 26.6 
1.02 2.10 2.83 27.2 40.0 64.8 7.3 30.2 
Notes: 
In each panel, the results are generated from 20 replications of the development over 10,20 and 50 time periods of 
a market comprising of 20 banks, each of which starts from an initial size of I unit, and whose subsequent evolution 
is driven by the model: As; t _ 
(ß2 -1)sii. t +u1t ; ß2 as shown Uit -N (0, Q1t2) alt = 0.1. 
Mean and st. dev denote the mean and standard deviation of actual bank size. 
CR. 1, CR. 2 AND CR. 5 are concentration ratios measuring the market share of the top 1,2, and 5 banks 
respectively. 
Num. equiv is the numbers equivalent version of the Herfindahl - Hirschman index. 
Top denotes the number of periods in which one bank retains the largest market share through time. 
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Table 8.3- Sensitivity Analysis For Variation in ßg 
#j3 Mean StDev CR1 CR2 CR5 Num Equiv Top 
()t=10 
0.4 1.13 0.52 10.6 19.8 40.6 16.4 
0.2 1.08 0.44 10.2 18.3 38.6 17.2 
0.1 1.07 0.39 9.5 17.3 36.9 17.9 
0 1.03 0.33 8.7 16.1 35.4 18.2 
-0.1 1.04 0.31 8.4 15.7 34.8 18.5 
-0.2 1.03 0.28 8.2 15.4 33.8 18.5 
-0.4 1.02 0.22 7.4 14.0 32.0 19.2 
.. t=20 
0.4 1.30 0.92 14.2 25.3 49.4 13.5 
0.2 1.16 0.66 12.1 22.0 44.8 15.2 
0.1 1.12 0.56 11.3 20.0 41.6 16.1 
0 1.10 0.49 10.5 19.1 40.0 16.6 
-0.1 1.08 0.45 10.1 18.3 39.1 16.9 
-0.2 1.09 0.44 10.1 18.6 39.6 17.2 
-0.4 1.04 0.31 8.3 15.8 34.5 18.5 
(iii) t=50 
0.4 1.93 2.30 23.2 38.0 63.7 8.6 25.8 
0.2 1.51 1.58 20.9 32.9 57.8 9.90 27.6 
0.1 1.30 1.03 16.3 27.0 50.8 12.5 26.3 
0 1.27 0.91 15.1 25.7 49.0 13.2 26.7 
-0.1 1.23 0.83 14.2 24.8 47.6 13.7 23.6 
-0.2 1.20 0.78 14 24.8 46.3 14.1 24.7 
-0.4 1.12 0.55 11.2 20.4 41.5 16.1 20.8 
In each panel, the results are generated from 20 replications of the development over 10,20 and 50 time periods of 
a market comprising of 20 banks, each of which starts from an initial size of 1 unit, and whose subsequent evolution 
is driven by the model: Asu =ß3dsit -t +un 
ß3 as shown Ult -N (0, ait2 ). arlt s 0.1. 
Mean and st. dev denote the mean and standard deviation of actual bank size. 
CR1, CR. 2 AND CR. 5 are concentration ratios measuring the market share of the top 1,2, and 5 banks 
respectively. 
Num. equiv is the numbers equivalent version of the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index. 
Top denotes the number of periods in which one bank retains the largest market share through time. 
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Table 8-4: Sensitivity Analysis for variation to alt 
(Tit Mean St. Dev CR1 CR2 CR5 Num Equiv Top 
(i) t=10 
0.025 1.00 0.08 5.8 11.4 27.5 20 
0.05 1.00 0.16 6.7 12.8 30 19.6 
0.10 1.03 0.33 8.7 16.1 35.4 18.2 
0.15 1.08 0.52 11.1 19.9 41.1 16.4 
0.20 1.17 0.76 13.9 24.0 46.8 14.3 
0.25 1.28 1.07 17.1 28.5 52.5 12.0 
(ii) t=20 
0.025 1.00 0.11 6.1 11.9 28.5 19.6 
0.05 1.02 0.23 7.4 14.1 32.2 19.2 
0.10 1.10 0.49 10.5 19.1 40.0 16.7 
0.15 1.24 0.85 14.3 24.9 48.0 13.7 
0.20 1.46 1.38 18.7 31.2 55.9 10.8 
0.25 1.80 2.18 23.4 37.7 63.2 8.3 
(iii) t=50 
0.025 1.01 0.18 6.8 13.1 30.6 19.2 26.7 
0.05 1.06 0.37 9.1 16.8 36.5 17.9 26.7 
0.10 1.26 0.91 15.1 25.7 49.0 13.2 26.7 
0.15 1.67 1.90 22.5 35.8 60.8 8.9 26.7 
0.20 2.48 3.89 30.6 45.9 70.9 6.0 26.7 
0.25 4.01 8.01 38.4 55.0 78.8 4.3 26.7 
Notes: 
In each panel, the results are generated from 20 replications of the development over 10,20 and 50 time periods of 
a market comprising of 20 banks, each of which starts from an initial size of I unit, and whose subsequent evolution 
is driven by the model: ASS = Sit-1 + Uit; Uit -N (0, °it2) crit as shown. 
Mean and st. dev denote the mean and standard deviation of actual bank size. 
CR. 1, CR. 2 AND CR. 5 are concentration ratios measuring the market share of the top 1,2, and 5 banks 
respectively. 
Num. equiv is the numbers equivalent version of the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index. 
Top denotes the number of periods in which one bank retains the largest market share through time. 
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Table 8 . 5, Sensitivily 
Analysis for the functional relationship between aft aad, Sit., 
alt Mean St. Dev CR1 CR2 
CR5 Num Equiv Top 
(i) t=10 
0.1+0.03s; t4 
1.05 0.36 9.1 16.9 35.9 17.9 
0.1+0.02 s 1t_1 
1.07 0.35 9.0 16.5 34.2 18.2 
0.1 1.03 0.33 8.7 16.1 35.4 18.2 
0.1-0.02s1t_1 1.05 0.34 8.6 16.0 35.6 18.2 
0.1-0.03s1t_1 1.06 0.34 7.9 16.0 34.6 18.2 
(ii) t=20 
0.1+0.03s1i_1 1.09 0.52 11.6 20.2 40.7 16.1 
0.1 +0.02 s 11. E 
1.15 0.59 11.7 20.8 42.0 15.9 
0.1 1.10 0.49 10.5 19.1 40.0 16.7 
0.1-0.02 s 1i. i 
1.09 0.48 10.1 18.8 39.3 16.7 
0.1-0.03 s 11_1 
1.13 0.47 9.5 17.5 37.6 17.2 
(iii) t=50 
0.1+0.03 sit. 1 
1.38 1.19 17.2 29.0 50.8 11.8 24.3 
0.1 +0.02 s it. I 
1.38 1.20 18.2 29.1 51.7 11.5 25.2 
0.1 1.26 0.91 15.1 25.7 49.0 13.2 26.7 
0.1-0.02s11_1 1.28 0.86 13.2 23.2 47.5 13.9 26.5 
0.1-0.03 s; t_1 
1.24 0.80 12.6 23.1 46.2 14.3 25.9 
Notes: 
In each panel, the results are generated from 20 replications of the development over 10,20 and 50 time periods of 
a market comprising of 20 banks, each of which starts from an initial size of 1 unit, and whose subsequent evolution 
is driven by the model: ASit = Sit_t + U; t ; Uit -N (0, Qit2 ) Oit as shown. 
Mean and st. dev denote the mean and standard deviation of actual bank size. 
CR. 1, CR. 2 AND CR. 5 are concentration ratios measuring the market share of the top 1,2, and 5 banks 
respectively. 
Num. equiv is the numbers equivalent version of the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index. 
Top denotes the number of periods in which one bank retains the largest market share through time. 
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the dispersion of the firm size distribution, but also indirectly on mean firm size and concentration, 
because the wider the size distribution, the greater will be the accentuation of the effects of the 
exponential function in determining the latter. It is interesting to note, however, that the average 
number of periods over which the largest bank remains the top position is Invariant to changes In 
an . 
Finally, Table 8.5 shows the implications of variation in the extent of heteroscedasticity, reflected 
in changes in the parameters which express the functional relationship between o, and si,. 1. 
The rows for Qi = 0.1 + 0.02 si, _t and Q;, = 
0.1 - 0.02 si,., reproduce the results for Industries 4 
and 5, while Q;, = 0.1 represents Industry 1. A positive functional relationship between Qt, and 
sit_1 leads to greater increases in the mean and standard deviation of bank size, along with 
industry concentration than is the case in Industry 1. A negative functional relationship tends to 
slow the rate at which concentration increases over time. The results reported in Table 8.5 
contain quite a lot of noise, which makes the relationship between the extent of heteroscedasticity 
and the firm size distribution appear to be erratic. It is to be expected however that the noise 
would disappear if more than 20 replications were carried out. Computationally, this was judged to 
be impractical due to the heavy computing time requirements of the simulations with 
heteroscedasticity. 
Overall, the LPE leads to increases in the average and standard deviation of bank size, and 
increased concentration (Industry 1). These tendencies develop more quickly when large firms 
grow proportionately faster or experience more variable growth rates than their smaller 
counterparts, and when there is positive persistence of growth (Industries 3,4, and 6). The same 
tendencies develop more slowly when small firms have more variable growth rates than their 
larger counterparts, and when there is negative persistence of growth (Industries 5 and 7). There 
is no sustained tendency towards increased average and standard deviation of firm size or 
increased concentration if smaller firms grow faster than larger firms (Industry 2). 
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Time 
This section extends the previous models by developing a simulation model in which the 
population of banks is allowed to vary. In turn, processes allowing for entry, exit and merger are 
introduced. Each such process is superimposed onto each of the seven industry types to 
investigate how the tendencies towards increased concentration identified in Table 8.1 are altered 
according to different entry, exit and merger assumptions. 
En 
Traditional microeconomic literature views entry as an important component in the process of 
market price adjustment towards equilibrium. More dynamic views (e. g. the Schumpeterian and 
Austrian schools) see entry as an innovative process reflecting the Interaction of decisions made 
by consumers, entrepreneurs and resource owners. Central to this role Is the entrepreneur, who 
plays a crucial role by noticing unexploited opportunities. Entrepreneurs discover new pieces of 
information, which by their actions, they can transmit to other decision-makers, who can adjust 
their plans in order to improve on past performance. Kirzner (1973) argues that entry is 
instrumental in driving industry evolution. 
'The overambitous plans of one period will be replaced by more realistic ones; market 
opportunities overlooked in one period will be exploited in the next. In other words, even without 
changes in the basic data of the market (i. e. in consumer tastes, technological possibilities, and 
resource availabilities), the decisions made in one period of time generate systematic alterations 
in the corresponding decisions for the succeeding period. Taken over time, this series of 
systematic changes in the interconnected network of market conditions constitutes the market 
process. 's 
Empirical evidence on the determinants of entry for manufacturing industries now forms a 
substantial literature .6 Most research suggests that entry 
is higher in profitable industries or in 
industries enjoying high average growth rates (Geroski, 1991; Baldwin and Gorecki, 1987). In 
5 Kirzner (1973), p. 10. 
6 See Siegfried and Evans (1994) for an excellent survey on empirical studies of entry, and chapter 3 of this 
thesis. 
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contrast,, entry is slower for industries where incumbents hold absolute cost advantages over 
potential entrants, or where capital requirements for entrants are substantial (Orr, 1974a). The 
evidence with regard to scale economies. excess capacity and restrictive pricing practices (i. e. 
limit and predatory pricing acting as entry barriers) is both limited and inconclusive (Baldwin and 
Gorecki. 1987; Geroski, 1991). 
In banking, the evidence on the determinants of entry is also rather limited. Orr (1974b) using 
Canadian data covering the period 1963-1967, estimates a model to explain the entry process in 
manufacturing, and then applies the estimated coefficients to predict the likely rate of entry into 
banking. Entry is determined by profit levels, market growth, market size, capital requirements, 
advertising and the concentration levels. He finds that high capital requirements, advertising 
expenditures and industry concentration significantly deter entry, while a large market size 
encourages entry. On's model predicts an entry rate of 2.27 banks per year over the period 1963- 
1967, but the actual entry rate was only 0.5 banks per year. Orr therefore concludes that other 
factors must explain the entry process in banking markets. 
Hannan (1983) examines the relationship between market characteristics and entry decisions 
using US banking data for Pennsylvania for 1968-1970. Using a conditional logit model, entry is 
explained by a vector of market structure variables. Hannan finds in general that entry is deterred 
in markets when incumbents charge low prices and invest in expanding branch networks. This 
suggests that limit pricing and increasing capacity are important price and non-price entry 
deterring strategies.? 
In the simulation model estimated in this section the average rate of entry is denoted by the 
parameter A. which is defined as the average number of new banks entering the industry per 
period. The probabilities that X=0,1.2... banks enter in each time period are defined by the 
Poisson distribution. 
7 Chapter 3 provides a discussion of these issues in the context of industrial organisation theory, while 
chapter 4 discusses applications to the banking industry. 
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. tr 
p(X=x)= 
e4 
XM 
The average rate of entry is therefore the same for any two time intervals of equal length, and the 
rate in any period is independent of the rate in any other period. It is assumed that all entrants 
begin with s, = 0. (Sil = 1) when entry takes place at time t. An implication is that (except in 
Industry 2) entrants become smaller relative to St as time proceeds. 
The overall effect on market concentration is dependent on two factors: the rate of entry and the 
average size of entrants. Evidence from manufacturing suggests that on average entrants are 
typically smaller than established firms, and that the probability of entry is small (Geroski, 1991). 
In banking, entry is more heavily regulated than in most manufacturing industries, and so in 
general may be an even rarer event However, since the advent of the European Single Market 
Programme for financial services, the rate of entry has increased particularly in countries which 
were previously heavily regulated. This is a consequence of the EU's legislation introducing a 
single banking licence which makes it easier for EU banks to establish cross border presence 
(EU, 1997a). This has also led to increases in the numbers of foreign banks operating in EU 
countries (Table 2.8, chapter 2). 
Table 8.6 repeats the simulations for the seven Industry types introduced in Table 8.1, allowing 
for entry on either a small (. i = 0.5), medium (A =1) and high scale (A = 2). 8 The rows for A =0 
reproduce the results for Industries 1 to 7 in Table 8.1. 
In all Industries, positive rates of entry lead to lower mean size, standard deviation in bank sizes 
and levels of concentration than is the case where entry is zero. The numbers equivalent 
measure of industry concentration indicates that larger numbers of equal sized banks could be 
Data on entry flows into European banking markets were not available from official statistics. However, 
some rough estimates of entry to the Italian banking market were available from Central Bank Reports. 
These suggest that on average over the period 1990-1994, entry was approximately three per cent per 
annum. Given that over this period the Italian market was among the most regulated in Europe, three per 
cent is thought to be a lows rate of entry. As a consequence the assumptions for'medium' and 'high' entry 
are made relative to this benchmark case. 
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Industry 1: J62 =1, fig = 0, Qit = 0.1 
", t ,x Lew =1=0.5 Medium =A =1 Entry. Pr xH~ 
(x = no. of entrants) 
Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 
() t=10 
0 20 1.03 0.33 8.7 
0.5 25 1.02 0.30 7.2 
1 30 1.02 0.29 5.8 
2 40 1.02 0.28 4.7 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.10 0.49 10.5 
0.5 30 1.07 0.44 7.1 
1 40 1.06 0.40 5.6 
2 60 1.05 0.38 4.0 
(iii)t=50 
0 20 1.26 0.91 15.1 
0.5 45 1.18 0.76 8.1 
1 70 1.15 0.69 5.4 
2 120 1.16 0.67 3.3 
Industry 2: P2 = 0.95, /3g = 0, a=0.1 
Highs A -2 
CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
16.1 35.4 18.2 
13.3 29.5 22.2 
10.9 24.3 27.8 
8.7 19.4 35.7 
19.1 40.0 16.7 
13.4 28.5 25.6 
9.8 21.4 35.7 
7.4 15.5 52.6 
25.7 49.0 13.2 26.7 
13.7 26.7 31.3 25.1 
9.4 18.8 50 24.4 
6.1 12.2 90.9 21.4 
High =Aa2 s-x lz Low= A=0.5 Medium =A=1 Entry: Pr ý-x ry) 
X! 
(x = no. of entrants) 
Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.05 0.27 8.2 
0.5 25 1.04 0.25 6.7 
1 30 1.04 0.24 5.5 
2 40 1.03 0.22 3.9 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.09 0.34 8.6 
0.5 30 1.07 0.31 5.9 
1 40 1.06 0.29 4.6 
2 60 1.05 0.27 3.0 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 1.05 0.33 8.8 
0.5 45 1.05 0.31 4.3 
1 70 1.04 0.30 2.9 
2 120 1.04 0.29 1.6 
CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
15.1 33.4 18.9 
12.3 27.2 23.3 
10.3 23.0 28.6 
7.4 16.6 40.0 
16.0 35.3 18.2 
10.8 24.5 27.8 
8.4 18.8 37.0 
5.8 13.1 55.6 
16.2 35.4 18.2 18.4 
8.0 17.6 41.7 17.8 
5.4 11.8 66.7 14.9 
3.1 7.1 111.1 15 
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I Industry 3: ß2 = 1.02, %3g = 0, o=0.1 
,. -2 -, s Lew =1=0.5 Medium = ý. =1 . 11 Entry: Pr (X=x) =G 
X! 
(x = no. of entrants) 
Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.08 0.37 9.0 
0.5 25 1.06 0.33 7.1 
1 30 1.06 0.33 6.2 
2 40 1.05 0.30 4.5 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.19 0.64 11.6 
0.5 30 1.13 0.54 7.8 
1 40 1.12 0.51 5.9 
2 60 1.10 0.48 4.2 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 2.10 2.83 27.2 
0.5 45 1.56 2.04 16.1 
1 70 1.51 1.83 11.3 
2 120 1.40 1.64 7.7 
Industry 4: Q2 0 1,163 =0 , Qit = 0.1+0.02 Sß. 1 
High = A, =2 
CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
16.8 36.4 17.9 
13.1 28.6 23.3 
11.6 25.4 27.0 
8.4 18.5 38.5 
21.1 43.0 15.6 
14.0 29.1 25.6 
11.2 24.0 32.3 
8.1 17.1 50 
40.0 64.8 7.3 30.2 
23.6 39.7 16.9 28.1 
17.8 31.2 27.8 27.9 
12.2 21.4 50 24.5 
High= A=2 e-x Ix Low= I=0.5 Medium =A=1 
Entry: Pr (X x) 
X! 
(x = no. of entrants) 
Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.07 0.35 9.0 
0.5 25 1.06 0.32 7.2 
1 30 1.05 0.31 6.3 
2 40 1.05 0.30 4.7 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.15 0.59 11.7 
0.5 30 1.13 0.52 8.0 
1 40 1.10 0.48 6.1 
2 60 1.09 0.44 4.6 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 1.38 1.20 18.2 
0.5 45 1.24 0.96 9.9 
1 70 1.21 0.98 7.9 
2 120 1.17 0.83 4.7 
CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
16.5 34.2 18.2 
13.1 28.1 22.7 
11.6 24.5 27.0 
8.9 18.3 37.0 
20.8 '42.0 15.9 
14.4 29.2 25.0 
11.7 23.6 32.3 
8.1 16.4 50.0 
29.1 51.7 11.5 25.2 
15.9 28.5 27.8 25.1 
12.1 22.4 43.5 25.2 
7.6 14.4 76.9 23.3 
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Industry 5: Q2 =1, X33 = 0, aft = 0.1-0.02 Sit_1 
--x ,: Lew =1=0.5 Medium = ýi, =1 
Entry: Pr (X=x) =c~ -- 
X! 
(x = no. of entrants) 
Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.05 0.34 8.6 
0.5 25 1.04 0.32 7.1 
1 30 1.03 0.30 5.9 
2 40 1.02 0.28 4.4 
(i) t=20 
0 20 1.09 0.48 10.1 
0.5 30 1.08 0.43 6.8 
1 40 1.06 0.40 5.4 
2 60 1.04 0.36 3.5 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 1.28 0.86 13.2 
0.5 45 1.16 0.66 6.7 
1 70 1.13 0.61 4.1 
2 120 1.10 0.54 2.7 
Industry 6: 82 =1, fl 3=0.1, alt = 0.1 
High = ii -2 
CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
16.0 35.6 18.2 
13.3 29.3 22.2 
11.2 24.4 27.8 
8.5 19.5 35.7 
18.8 39.3 16.7 
13.3 28.2 25 
9.9 22 34.5 
6.7 15.3 52.6 
23.2 47.5 13.9 26.5 
11.9 24.2 33.3 23.6 
8.1 16.9 52.6 23.9 
4.9 10.4 100 22.4 
-x ,s Low= I=0.5 Medium= 
A=1 
Entry: Pr (X=x) u 
(x = no. of entrants) 
Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.07 0.39 9.5 
0.5 25 1.06 0.36 7.8 
1 30 1.06 0.34 6.8 
2 40 1.03 0.31 5.1 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.12 0.56 11.3 
0.5 30 1.12 0.51 7.8 
1 40 1.10 0.47 6.2 
2 60 1.08 0.43 4.3 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 1.30 1.03 16.3 
0.5 45 1.25 0.94 9.1 
1 70 1.22 0.83 6.0 
2 120 1.17 0.75 3.6 
Highen A, =2 
CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
17.3 36.9 17.9 
14.2 30.6 21.3 
12.5 26.9 25.6 
9.2 19.6 37.0 
20.0 41.6 16.1 
14.6 30.8 23.3 
11.2 23.4 32.3 
7.7 16.2 52.6 
27.0 50.8 12.5 26.3 
15.3 29.3 27.8 23.2 
10.5 20.5 47.6 23.9 
6.6 13.4 83.3 24.6 
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Industry 7: 132 =1,133 = -0.1, Qn = 0.1 
g-x2x Low = 2. = 0.5 Medium = .% =1 High= A. =2 Entry: Pr (X=x) = 
X! 
(x = no. of entrants) 
A Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.04 0.31 8.4 15.7 34.8 18.5 
0.5 25 1.03 0.27 6.9 12.9 28.5 22.7 
1 30 1.02 0.23 5.3 10.0 22.1 29.4 
2 40 1.02 0.21 4.3 8.0 17.5 38.5 
(i) t=20 
0 20 1.08 0.45 10.1 18.3 39.1 16.9 
0.5 30 1.05 0.35 6.8 12.2 25.9 27.0 
1 40 1.03 0.30 5.1 9.2 19.4 37.0 
2 60 1.02 0.25 3.6 6.4 13.5 55.6 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 1.23 0.83 14.2 24.8 47.6 13.7 23.6 
0.5 45 1.10 0.55 7.2 12.4 23.8 34.5 24.6 
1 70 1.06 0.43 4.6 7.9 15.1 58.8 24.8 
2 120 1.03 0.32 2.7 4.7 8.9 111.1 26.4 
Notes: 
In each panel, the results are generated from 20 replications of the development over 10,20 and 50 time periods of 
a market comprising of 20 banks, each of which starts from an initial size of 1 unit, and whose subsequent evolution 
is driven by the model: Asit =, 62sir-t +ß3. s1_1 +ua. Uit -N (0, QK2) alt = 0.1 
Mean and st. dev denote the mean and standard deviation of actual bank size. 
CR. 1, CR. 2 AND CR. 5 are concentration ratios measuring the market share of the top 1,2, and 5 banks 
respectively. 
Num. equiv is the numbers equivalent version of the Herfindahl - Hirschman index. 
Top denotes the number of periods in which one bank retains the largest market share through time. 
A is the average number of new banks entering the industry per period. 
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supported than is initially the case when entry is zero. 9 Entry, even at the lowest rate, moderates 
quite substantially the effect of the LPE on trends in concentration in Industry 1. The 
concentration ratios (CR's) are quite stable when A. = 0.5, while for A=1 or A. =2 there Is a 
tendency towards de-concentration over time. Therefore, for an industry of 20 banks, an entry 
rate of 0.5 banks per period (2.5% of initial industry numbers) is roughly what is needed to 
neutralise the effect which the LPE would otherwise have on concentration. In Industry 2, in which 
there is no tendency towards increased concentration in the long-run with zero entry, any positive 
rate of entry gives rise to de-concentration because more banks of equal size (on average) are 
joining the industry. The pattern for Industries 4,5,6 and 7 is that entry reduces the mean and 
standard deviation of bank sizes, leading to a fall in the levels of concentration. In Industry 3, the 
explosive growth in the variance in sit means that even when entry is at high levels, 
concentration increases rapidly (albeit less so than when entry is zero). This Is because the 
average entrant is extremely small compared to S, after only a short period of time. 
iL1o 
In a theoretical sense, exit should be easy if incumbent banks have no sunk costs. In reality this Is 
often not the case. In Europe, regulators consider many banks to be 'too big to fail' (Gardener and 
Molyneux, 1997). Evidence for manufacturing suggests that exit is higher from Industries In which 
profits are low, and in which sunk costs are insignificant (Dunne, Roberts and Samualson, 
1988). " In banking there is some evidence to suggest that the probability of exit Is inversely 
related to size. Using US data for the period 1946-1975, Rose and Scott (1978) find that the 
probability of exit through failure is inversely related to bank size, market size and profitability. 
It is also possible that there is an association between the entry and exit rates in any time period, 
if the entrants are displacing incumbent banks by capturing market share. Using US 
manufacturing data over the period 1963-1982, Dunne, Roberts and Samualson (1988) find a 
9 This assumes that the overall industry size is increased as new banks are not displacing existing ones. 10 For the purposes of the simulations, exit refers to banks leaving an industry through bankruptcy as their 
size declines. Merger Is considered separately below. " Porter (1980) and the review of contestable markets in chapter 3 of this thesis provide an extended 
discussion of these issues. 
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negative correlation between annual entry and exit rates. Entry and exit rates are unlikely to be 
strongly correlated in banking markets, given that regulators are generally unwilling to allow banks 
to fail given the negative spillover effects across the rest of the banking industry (Rose, 1987). 
In the simulation model, the pattern of exit is controlled by the parameters y, and 72. The 
probability that a bank exits in period t is governed by two factors, namely: the size an individual 
bank has attained at the end of period t-1, and the overall propensity to exit. The probability is 
expressed as follows: 
p (bank i exits during period t) = y2 e"r' s"' 
where: y, measures the strength of the relationship between sit., and the probability of exit, and 
72 controls the overall magnitude of the probability of exit. If yj = 0, there is no relationship 
between bank size and probability of exit. yi > 0, implies that large banks are less likely to exit 
than smaller banks, while y, <0 implies the opposite. Insofar as recent growth affects size, y, >0 
ensures that the probability of exit is higher if the bank experienced significant negative growth 
during the previous year, which is in accordance with the formulation of Mansfield (1962). 
For the purposes of the simulation model three exit scenarios are discussed. For simplicity y, is 
held constant at 1, while y2 can take values of 0.005,0.01 and 0.02 to allow variation in the 
overall rate of exit. These results are shown in Table 8.7(a). The lines for y2 =0 reproduce the 
results for Industries 1 to 7 in Table 8.1. 
In Industry 1, exit in accordance with the pattern described above, by depleting the population of 
smaller banks faster than the population of large banks, tends to accelerate the tendency (which 
is evident anyway as a result of the LPE) towards increased concentration. The same is true for 
the other Industries. Even in the case of Industry 2, for which there is no tendency towards 
increased concentration when exit is zero, concentration does not increase progressively when 
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Industry 1: ß2 =1, ß3 = 0, o=0.1 
p (exit) = 72 e'r' '"a Low = y2 = 0.005 Medium= y2 = 0.01 High = y2 = 0.02 
Y2 Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.03 0.33 8.7 16.1 35.4 18.2 
0.005 19.2 1.03 0.33 9.0 16.7 36.6 17.5 
0.01 17.8 1.04 0.33 9.8 18.1 39.3 16.1 
0.02 16.1 1.05 0.33 10.6 19.6 42.8 14.5 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.10 0.49 10.5 19.1 40.0 16.7 
0.005 18 1.11 0.49 11.4 20.7 42.9 15.2 
0.01 16.1 1.11 0.50 12.8 23.0 47.3 13.3 
0.02 12.9 1.17 0.51 15.0 27.3 56.0 10.6 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 1.26 0.91 15.1 25.7 49.0 13.2 26.7 
0.005 15.5 1.34 0.92 17.9 30.3 56.7 10.4 26.8 
0.01 11.8 1.37 1.02 23.6 39.5 68.7 7.4 28.6 
0.02 6.7 1.56 0.98 32.5 53.0 88.8 4.6 27.5 
Industry 2: X32 = 0.95, ßi3 = 0, Qft =0 .1 
p (exit) = y2 e'1' '"-' Low= Y2 = 0.005 Medium = Y2=0.01 High -y2 = 0.02 
Y2 Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.05 0.27 8.2 15.1 33.4 18.9 
0.005 19.2 1.05 0.27 8.5 15.6 34.6 17.9 
0.01 18.3 1.05 0.27 8.8 16.3 35.9 17.2 
0.02 16.1 1.04 0.27 9.9 18.3 40.3 14.9 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.09 0.34 8.6 16.0 35.3 18.2 
0.005 18.4 1.10 0.34 9.2 17.2 37.9 16.7 
0.01 16.5 1.10 0.35 10.3 19.0 41.7 14.7 
0.02 13.1 1.08 0.34 12.6 23.6 50.9 11.8 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 1.05 0.33 8.8 16.2 35.4 18.2 18.4 
0.005 16.2 1.06 0.32 10.3 19.2 42.0 14.7 18.4 
0.01 11.8 1.09 0.34 14.0 25.7 55.0 10.5 18.8 
0.02 7.9 1.06 0.32 19.8 36.6 75.6 6.9 19.1 
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Industry 3: X32 =1.02, #f3 = 0, Q; t = 0.1 
p (exit) = y2 e-r' 44 Low= y2=0.005 Medium= y2=0.01 High =y2= 0.02 
Y2 Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
() t=10 
0 20 1.08 0.37 9.0 16.8 36.4 17.9 
0.005 18.8 1.08 0.37 9.4 17.7 38.3 16.7 
0.01 18.5 1.07 0.36 9.5 17.7 38.6 16.7 
0.02 15.7 1.10 0.37 11.1 20.5 44.2 13.9 
(ii) t--20 
0 20 1.19 0.64 11.6 21.1 43.0 15.6 
0.005 18.1 1.20 0.64 12.6 22.9 46.6 14.1 
0.01 16.1 1.22 0.64 14.2 24.8 50 12.5 
0.02 13.0 1.28 0.64 15.4 28.6 57.6 10.4 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 2.10 2.83 27.2 40.0 64.8 7.3 30.2 
0.005 14.8 2.42 3.10 31.5 45.7 72.5 5.9 30.5 
0.01 11.4 2.57 2.96 34.8 50.0 78.3 4.9 32.0 
0.02 7.3 3.00 2.87 39.0 59.4 90.7 3.8 30.3 
Industry 4: ßi2 =1, Q3 = 0, Q4 = 0.1+0.02 Sit., 
p (e)it) = y2 e-r' `"-' Low= y2 = 0.005 Medium = Y2 = 0.01 High= y2 e 0.02 
72 Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.07 0.35 9.0 16.5 34.2 18.2 
0.005 19.3 1.07 0.35 9.3 17.2 34.8 17.2 
0.01 18.2 1.07 0.35 9.9 18.0 37.1 16.4 
0.02 15.5 1.07 0.33 10.9 20.0 43.6 14.1 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.15 0.59 11.7 20.8 42.0 15.8 
0.005 18.1 1.16 0.60 12.8 22.7 45.5 14.3 
0.01 16.5 1.16 0.59 13.4 23.9 48.5 12.9 
0.02 12.7 1.19 0.60 17.1 30.0 58.5 9.8 
(ii) t=50 
0 20 1.38 1.20 18.2 29.1 51.7 11.5 25.2 
0.005 14.8 1.50 1.27* 22.3 35.5 61.1 8.6 25.2 
0.01 12.3 1.51 1.22 24.0 37.4 67.9 7.5 24.9 
0.02 7.0 1.78 1.44 36.6 57.7 89.1 4.2 24.2 
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Industry 5: ß2 =1, ßi3 = 0, alt = 0.1-0.02 Sit. 1 
p (exit) = y2 e-7' '"-' Low= 72 = 0.005 Medium = y2 = 0.01 High= Y2 = 0.02 
Y2 Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.05 0.34 8.6 16.0 35.6 18.2 
0.005 19.2 1.06 0.34 9.0 16.6 36.9 17.5 
0.01 18.1 1.06 0.34 9.4 17.4 38.6 16.4 
0.02 16.4 1.06 0.35 10.4 19.4 42.5 14.7 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.09 0.48 10.1 18.8 39.3 16.7 
0.005 18.1 1.10 0.49 11.1 20.7 43.1 14.9 
0.01 15.9 1.11 0.49 12.3 22.5 47.5 13.2 
0.02 12.4 1.14 0.49 15.1 27.2 57.5 10.2 
(ii) t=50 
0 20 1.28 0.86 13.2 23.2 47.5 13.9 26.5 
0.005 14.9 1.40 0.87 16.6 28.5 56.6 10.4 27.4 
0.01 11.2 1.47 0.87 20.1 35.0 69.0 7.9 26.9 
0.02 5.8 1.55 0.81 32.3 54.4 92.3 4.2 27.3 
Industry 6: Q2 =1, Q3 = 0.1, aft = 0.1 
p (exit) = y2 e-r' s Low= 72 = 0.005 Medium = Y2 = High =y 2=0.02 
0.01 
72 Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
()t=10 
0 20 1.07 0.39 9.5 17.3 36.9 17.9 
0.005 19.2 1.07 0.38 9.7 17.7 38.0 16.9 
0.01 18.2 1.08 0.38 10.1 18.4 39.5 16.1 
0.02 16.1 1.08 0.38 11.2 20.6 44.1 14.3 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.12 0.56 11.3 20.0 41.6 16.1 
0.005 18.3 1.14 0.56 12.0 21.3 44.3 14.7 
0.01 16.5 1.16 0.57 13.3 23.4 48.1 13.2 
0.02 13.3 1.19 0.58 15.7 28.1 57.1 10.4 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 1.30 1.03 16.3 27.0 50.8 12.5 26.3 
0.005 15.4 1.37 1.07 19.9 32.6 60.0 9.6 26.2 
0.01 11.9 1.44 1.07 22.7 37.3 68.9 7.8 26.7 
0.02 7.4 1.61 0.98 28.1 48.3 85.3 5.3 23 
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Industry 7: Q2 =1, ß3 = -0.1, Qd = 0.1 
P (exit) =y2 e-7 f. a Low = Y2=0.005 
y2 Bank No. Mean Skdev CR1 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.04 0.31 8.4 
0.005 19.2 1.04 0.31 8.8 
0.01 18.1 1.04 0.31 9.1 
0.02 16.6 1.05 0.31 9.8 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.08 0.45 10.1 
0.005 18.1 1.09 0.46 11.1 
0.01 16.3 1.10 0.45 11.9 
0.02 13.0 1.12 0.45 14.2 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 1.08 0.83 14.2 
0.005 14.6 1.36 0.86 17.3 
0.01 11.5 1.37 0.87 21.8 
0.02 6.7 1.53 0.87 30.8 
Medium= y2 = 0.01 High = 72 = 0.02 
CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
15.7 34.8 18.5 
16.4 36.2 17.5 
17.1 37.7 16.7 
18.3 40.5 15.2 
18.3 39.1 17.0 
20.1 42.3 15.4 
21.7 45.7 13.9 
25.8 54.1 11.0 
24.8 47.6 13.7 23.6 
30.7 58.4 10.1 24.2 
36.0 66.3 7.9 24.8 
51.4 88.1 4.8 24.9 
Notes: 
In each panel, the results are generated from 20 replications of the development over 10,20 and 50 time periods of 
a market comprising of 20 banks, each of which starts from an initial size of I unit, and whose subsequent evolution 
is driven by the model: ASit = Q2S t-t + Q3I&Sit -1 + Uit " Uit -N (0,0It2) ojt 1: 1 0.1 
Mean and st. dev denote the mean and standard deviation of actual bank size. 
CR. 1, CR. 2 AND CR5 are concentration ratios measuring the market share of the top 1,2, and 5 banks 
respectively. 
Num. equiv is the numbers equivalent version of the Herfindahl - Hirschman index. Top denotes the number of periods in which one bank retains the largest market share through time. 
rl measures the strength of the relationship between Sit. t and the probability of exit. 
Y2 controls the overall magnitude of the probability of exit. 
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exit is included in the simulations. However, in this case there is little change in average bank size 
in comparison with the case when exit is zero, whereas in the other six Industries, the effect of 
exit is to increase the average size of the surviving banks after any number of years. 
In all of the seven Industries, exit leads to higher mean size and concentration levels. Even low 
exit rates in most Industries tend to accelerate the tendency towards higher levels of 
concentration than under Industry 1. The dispersion of bank sizes tends to increase in Industries 
where the LPE holds, where large banks enjoy systematic growth advantages or have more 
stable growth rates through time (i. e. Industries 1,3 and 4). The dispersion of bank sizes falls in 
Industries where the growth process favours smaller banks, making exiting banks similar to those 
banks left in the Industry causing the dispersion of bank sizes to remain relatively narrow. 
Table 8.7b shows the effects of varying the parameter y, over the range of values 0,2 and 4, 
with higher values of y, imply a stronger inverse relationship between size and the probability of 
exit. For simplicity y2 is held constant at 0.01. Higher values of yj imply that overall, the rate of 
exit is reduced in all cases, and larger values are observed for mean bank size. 
Merger 
There are three main types of merger horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. For the purposes of 
the present model, the primary interest is in simulating the effects of horizontal mergers (where 
two banks join together). Such merger activity can increase efficiency through lower costs and 
increased revenues or bring enhanced market power to the new merged entity. Akhavein, Berger 
and Humphrey (1997) suggest that horizontal mergers lead to substantial increases in profitability 
in banking. In recent years there has been a marked increase in merger activity within banking 
(chapter 2). In Europe, merger and acquisition activity has been particularly strong in the run up to 
EMU (EU, 1997a). 
In the simulations, the probability that a merger takes place in period t is controlled by the 
parameter 0 as follows: 
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Industry 1: Q2 =1, f33 = 0, o=0.1 
p (exit) =Y2 e-T' 2114 72 =0.01 
Ti Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 CR. 2 
CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
O t=10 
0 18.7 1.02 0.32 9.2 17.1 37.4 16.9 
2 17.7 1.04 0.33 9.8 18.0 39.4 15.9 
4 17.4 1.06 0.32 9.7 18 39.6 15.9 
(ii) t=20 
0 16.7 1.07 0.47 12.4 22 45.6 13.9 
2 15.7 1.14 0.51 12.9 23.5 48.2 12.9 
4 14.3 1.23 0.48 13.1 23.8 49.7 12.3 
(ii) t=50 
0 12.5 1.20 0.80 20.4 35.0 65.3 8.4 26.8 
2 10.3 1.60 1.02 23.3 39.1 70.7 7.2 26.7 
4 9.5 1.71 0.97 23.4 39.3 73.0 6.9 27.2 
Industry 2: 232 = 0.95, X33 = 0, o=0.1 
p (exit) =Y2 e-7' 364 Y2 =0.01 
Yt Bank No. Mean Stdev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 17.9 1.05 0.27 9.1 16.9 36.9 16.7 
2 17.8 1.06 0.27 9.1 16.8 36.9 16.7 
4 17.6 1.06 0.27 9.1 16.8 37.2 16.4 
(ii) t=20 
0 15.6 1.10 0.33 10.6 19.9 43.7 14.1 
2 15.9 1.11 0.35 10.7 19.7 42.9 14.3 
4 14.9 1.14 0.34 11.0 20.5 44.7 13.5 
(iii) t=50 
0 12.1 1.08 0.35 14.0 25.4 54.8 10.5 18.8 
2 11.3 1.09 0.33 14.7 26.9 57.9 9.7 19.3 
4 8.9 1.11 0.30 17.3 32.1 68.9 7.8 19.6 
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Industry 3: 132 = 1.02,163 a 0, Q; t = 0.1 
p (exit) =Y2 e'r' '. a Y2=0-01 
Ti Bank No. Mean Stdev CR. 1 
CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 18 1.07 0.37 9.9 18.5 39.9 16.1 
2 17.8 1.10 0.37 10 18.6 40.1 15.9 
4 18.1 1.10 0.37 9.8 18.3 39.3 16.1 
(ii) t=20 
0 16.3 1.18 0.63 14.0 24.8 50.3 12.5 
2 15.6 1.26 0.65 14.1 25.2 51.2 12.3 
4 14.7 1.32 0.63 14.2 26.0 52.1 11.6 
(iii) t=50 
0 12.2 2.05 2.75 36.1 52.3 81.2 4.5 28.8 
2 10.6 3.11 3.34 33.8 49.8 78.4 5 31.7 
4 10 3.34 3.35 34.5 50.8 79.2 5 32.3 
Industry 4: X32 =1, ß=0, a=0.1+0.02 Si1.1 
p (exit) =Y2 eri °w Y2=0-01 
Yl Bank No. Mean Stdev CR. 1 
CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 18 1.06 0.34 9.9 18.0 36.9 16.4 
2 17.9 1.09 0.35 10.0 18.3 37.7 16.1 
4 17 1.10 0.35 10.3 18.3 39.8 15.4 
(ii) t=20 
0 16.2 1.13 0.60 14.5 25.3 48.6 12.3 
2 15.9 1.20 0.61 14.1 24.9 49.5 12.7 
4 13.9 1.28 0.57 14.2 26.1 52.4 11.4 
(iii) t=50 
0 11.4 1.36 1.09 25.2 40.5 70.7 6.8 27.7 
2 11.7 1.66 1.28 24.6 39.3 67.3 7.4 26.1 
4 9.0 2.02 1.43 28.6 44.4 76.4 5.9 23.9 
4 
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Industry 5: X32 =1, ß3 = 0, ait = 0.1-0.02 Sit_, 
p (exit) = 12 e-7' 214 Y2 =0.01 
Ti Bank No. Mean St. dev CR1 
CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 17.6 1.06 0.34 9.7 17.5 40 15.9 
2 18.3 1.06 0.34 9.4 17.3 38.2 16.7 
4 17.4 1.09 0.34 9.7 18.0 39.9 15.9 
(ii) t=20 
0 15.6 1.09 0.48 12.7 23.4 48.3 13 
2 15.8 1.14 0.47 12.1 22.4 47.2 13.3 
4 13.9 1.22 0.46 13.0 24.1 50.0 11.9 
(iii) t=50 
0 11.7 1.30 0.88 20.7 36.2 68.4 7.9 26.7 
2 10.3 1.56 0.84 19.5 36.6 69.9 7.7 27.8 
4 8.4 1.80 0.86 22.8 38.9 75.6 6.6 27.1 
Industry 6: ß2 =1,133 = 0.1, ad = 0.1 
p (exit) =y2 e7' '"-' Y2=0-01 
Yl Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 
CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 17.8 1.06 0.39 10.7 19.2 40.6 15.6 
2 18.3 1.07 0.39 10.4 18.7 39.8 16.1 
4 16.9 1.11 0.38 10.8 19.6 41.8 14.9 
(ii) t=20 
0 16.4 1.11 0.54 13.2 23.4 48.4 13.2 
2 16.0 1.18 0.56 13.1 23.4 48.3 13.2 
4 14.2 1.25 0.57 14.7 25.9 52.5 11.5 
(iii) t=50 
0 12.4 1.30 1.03 23.7 38.1 67.8 7.5 25.7 
2 10.3 1.67 1.14 24.6 40.1 71.8 6.9 27.1 
4 9.0 1.81 1.10 26.1 42.7 76.9 6.1 27.5 
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Industry 7: , 32 = 1,163 = -0.1, Qd = 0.1 
p (exit) = y2 e'r" $. a y2 =0.01 
ri Bank No. Mean Stdev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
O t=10 
0 18.6 1.04 0.31 8.9 16.7 36.9 16.9 
2 17.8 1.05 0.31 9.3 17.4 38.2 16.4 
4 16.8 1.07 0.31 9.7 18.3 40.2 15.4 
(ii) t=20 
0 17 1.09 0.46 11.6 21.0 44.7 14.3 
2 15.9 1.10 0.43 11.8 21.5 46.0 13.7 
4 13.6 1.19 0.44 13.5 24.2 51.3 11.8 
(iii) t=50 
0 12.2 1.22 0.80 20.8 35.1 64.5 8.3 24.5 
2 11.2 1.40 0.78 19.8 34.1 65.8 8.4 23.1 
4 8.5 1.66 0.84 24.1 41.4 76.3 6.3 24.2 
Notes: 
In each panel, the results are generated from 20 replications of the development over 10,20 and 50 time periods of 
a market comprising of 20 banks, each of which starts from an initial size of I unit, and whose subsequent evolution 
is driven by the model: ASit = Q2Sit-1 + 463ASa -1 
+ fit U. Uit -N (0, (Tit2) Qit = 0.1 
Mean and st. dev denote the mean and standard deviation of actual bank size. 
CR. 1, CR2 AND CR5 are concentration ratios measuring the market share of the top 1,2, and 5 banks 
respectively. 
Num. equiv is the numbers equivalent version of the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index. Top denotes the number of periods in which one bank retains the largest market share through time. 
7j measures the strength of the relationship between Sit_t and the probability of exit. 
72 controls the overall magnitude of the probability of exit. 
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p(merger) = O(n, -1) /no 
where n1 = the population of banks in period t; no = the initial population of banks. 
In other words, the probability that a merger happens is directly proportional to the number of 
surviving banks in the industry. If a merger takes place, the partners are chosen randomly from 
the existing population of banks, with the probability of being a partner the same for all banks 
regardless of size or previous growth. The size of the merged bank in subsequent periods is the 
summation of the sizes that would have been achieved if the two banks had remained separate. 
The implications for the size distribution of banks of low, medium and high rates of merger are 
reported in Table 8.8. Low, medium and high rates of merger are generated by setting 0=0.1, 
0.2 and 0.4 respectively. The lines for 0=0 reproduce the results for Industries I to 7 in Table 
8.1. 
From Table 8.8, as 0 increases, the mean and standard deviation of bank size become higher 
for all Industries. Overall, there is a positive relationship between O and concentration, as one 
would expect. The dominance of the top bank tends to lessen, as for the purposes of calibrating 
this measure, partner banks are assumed to acquire a new identity after the merger has taken 
place. With high rates of merger, the identity of the largest bank is therefore more susceptible to 
change than when merger activity is low. 
8.5 The Evolution Of The EU Banking Industry 
As seen previously (in chapter 2), there have been significant changes in European banking 
markets in recent years. In many countries the number of banks has fallen and the size of branch 
networks has also contracted. There has also been an increase in merger and acquisition activity. 
This has led to increases in average bank size and industry concentration. 
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Industry 1: /32 =1. ß3 = 0, Qd = 0.1 
Merger. ß(n1-1)/n0 Low= =0.1 
0 Bank No. Mean Stdev 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.03 0.33 
0.1 19.1 1.39 1.18 
0.2 18.3 1.51 1.29 
0.4 16.5 1.79 1.78 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.10 0.49 
0.1 18.1 2.09 2.49 
0.2 16.4 2.45 2.75 
0.4 13.6 3.19 3.56 
(ii) t=50 
0 20 1.26 0.91 
0.1 14.8 5.78 9.76 
0.2 12.7 7.09 11.06 
0.4 7.2 13.55 17.81 
Industry 2: Q2 = 0.95, #83 = 
0, Qq = 0.1 
Merger. c (nt -1)/n0 Low= =0.1 
0 Bank No. Mean St. dev 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.05 0.27 
0.1 18.9 1.40 1.08 
0.2 17.9 1.54 1.20 
0.4 16.3 1.83 1.48 
(i) t=20 
0 20 1.09 0.34 
0.1 18.3 1.74 1.62 
0.2 16.3 2.09 1.88 
0.4 13.1 2.88 2.84 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 1.05 0.33 
0.1 15.5 2.12 1.86 
0.2 11.7 3.16 3.04 
0.4 7.4 5.98 5.62 
Medium =O=0.2 High= 0=0.4 
CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
8.7 16.1 35.4 18.2 
18 29.5 54.9 11.2 
18.1 30.1 57.4 10.8 
22.6 37.4 63.9 8.3 
10.5 19.1 40.0 16.7 
24.3 38.5 65.3 7.9 
25.1 40.1 68.0 7.4 
27.8 45.9 75.2 6.3 
15.1 25.7 49.0 13.2 26.7 
39.9 57.5 83.1 4.1 23.2 
39.7 59.6 85.2 4 23.1 
49.3 72.8 95.5 2.8 20.1 
Medium =O=0.2 High =0=0.4 
CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
8.2 15.1 33.4 18.9 
16.8 29.3 52.4 12.0 
17.4 30.1 54.8 11.1 
18.6 32.9 61.1 9.8 
8.6 16.0 35.3 18.2 
19.5 32.5 57.7 9.8 
21 34.8 61.9 8.9 
26.4 40.9 70.6 6.7 
8.8 16.2 35.4 18.2 18.4 
20.1 35.6 63.6 8.7 22.3 
27.5 45.9 77.6 5.9 19.6 
38.4 62.2 92.0 3.8 18 
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Industry 3: X32 = 1.02.463 = 0, a it = 0.1 
Merger. &i -1)/no Low =0.1 Medium= =0.2 
High 0 =0.4 
0 Bank No. Mean Stdev CR1 - CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
O t=10 
0 20 1.08 0.37 9.0 16.8 36.4 17.9 
0.1 19 1.62 1.54 19.3 33.0 58.9 9.9 
0.2 18 1.79 1.77 21.1 34.6 60.9 8.7 
0.4 15.9 2.15 2.13 22.7 37.0 66.0 8.1 
(i) t=20 
0 20 1.19 0.64 11.6 21.1 43.0 15.6 
0.1 18.2 2.83 3.87 27.2 43.6 _ 
71.3 6.5 
0.2 16.9 3.09 4.48 31.8 47.3 73.1 5.4 
0.4 13.1 4.37 5.05 29.7 48.2 78.7 5.7 
(ii) t=50 
0 20 2.10 2.83 27.2 40.0 64.8 7.3 30.2 
0.1 15.6 72.47 228.50 63.2 77.3 94 2 28.4 
0.2 12.5 82.84 241.80 64.8 80.8 95.8 1.9 28.6 
0.4 7 171.49 346.68 67.8 87.4 98.8 1.8 20.6 
Industry 4: Q2 =1- ßi3 = 0. Qit = 0.1 +0.02 Sit., 
Merger. q(n, -1) / n0 Low= 0 =0.1 Medium =0=0.2 High= 
0=0.4 
Bank No. Mean Stdev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.07 0.35 9.0 16.5 34.2 18.2 
0.1 18.9 1.60 1.56 20.9 33.0 55.4 9.9 
0.2 17.8 1.75 1.70 21.1 33.9 58.3 9.3 
0.4 16.3 2.04 1.92 21.7 36.1 63.7 8.7 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.15 0.59 11.7 20.8 42.0 15.9 
0.1 18.3 2.60 3.96 29.1 45.3 71.7 5.9 
0.2 16.1 3.12 4.47 30.4 48.2 75.7 5.6 
0.4 12.9 4.09 4.93 29.6 47.0 78.3 5.5 
(iii) t=50 
0 20 1.38 1.20 18.2 29.1 51.7 11.5 25.2 
0.1 15.7 10.38 26.00 49.40 65.60 85.8 2.8 23.5 
0.2 11.4 14.23 30.63 53.60 71.50 91.7 2.6 25.4 
0.4 7.4 23.0 39.00 52.40 71.30 94.9 2.5 19.9 
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Industry 5:. 82 =1, Q3 = 0. Qd = 0.1-0.02 Sit_, 
Merger. &t-1)/no Low= ci =0.1 Medium= cl =0.2 High= 0 =0.4 
0 Bank No. Mean Stdev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.05 0.34 8.6 16.0 35.6 18.2 
0.1 19.1 1.53 1.34 17.2 30.1 56.4 10.9 
0.2 18.3 1.63 1.38 17 30.2 57.8 10.8 
0.4 16.7 1.90 1.75 19.8 33.5 61.9 9.3 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.09 0.48 10.1 18.8 39.3 16.7 
0.1 18.2 2.06 2.24 22.4 37.2 64.7 8.3 
0.2 16.3 2.40 2.72 24.8 41.4 69.4 7.2 
0.4 13.3 3.28 3.51 27.4 45.3 76.7 6.3 
(ü) t=50 
0 20 1.28 0.86 13.2 23.2 47.5 13.9 26.5 
0.1 16.3 4.83 7.01 32.5 49.6 78.5 5.2 28.0 
0.2 12.1 6.82 9.42 37.8 56.9 86.3 4.3 22.6 
0.4 7.1 13.60 12.87 41.9 67.9 96.7 3.3 20.9 
Industry 6:. 82 =1, #33 = 0.1, Q; t = 0.1 
Merger. O(n1-1)/n0 Low= 0=0.1 Medium= 0 =0.2 High 0=0.4 
0 Bank No. Mean St. dev CR. 1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
C) t=10 
0 20 1.07 0.39 9.5 17.3 36.9 17.9 
0.1 18.9 1.64 1.70 21.1 34.0 59.1 9.3 
0.2 18.3 1.75 1.84 21.3 36.0 62.0 8.9 
0.4 15.8 2.21 2.30 22.8 38.4 68.2 7.8 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.12 0.56 11.3 20.0 41.6 16.1 
0.1 17.2 2.76 3.69 27.6 41.8 68.7 6.8 
0.2 16.5 2.83 3.77 27.7 43.5 72.1 6.5 
0.4 13.1 3.86 4.83 31.6 49.2 78.6 5.5 
CIO t__50 
0 20 1.30 1.03 16.3 27.0 50.8 12.5 26.3 
0.1 13.7 8.46 16.05 42.2 59.9 85.6 3.61 25.4 
0.2 12.5 9.04 16.79 43.8 63.2 88.3 3.45 24.0 
0.4 6.7 18.53 30.82 58.9 81.3 98.4 2.14 18.0 
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Industry 7: /32 =1, . 
83 = -0.1. Qit = 0.1 
Merger. &t-1)/n0 Low =g =0.1 Medium =0.2 High 0 =0.4 
0 Bank No. Mean Stdev CR1 CR. 2 CR. 5 Num Top 
Equiv. 
(i) t=10 
0 20 1.04 0.31 8.4 15.7 34.8 18.5 
0.1 18.5 1.50 1.21 16.9 29.0 54.2 11.4 
0.2 18.4 1.51 1.22 17.3 29.4 54.8 11.2 
0.4 16.2 1.88 1.65 20.3 34.1 62.3 9.2 
(ii) t=20 
0 20 1.08 0.45 10.1 18.3 39.1 17.0 
0.1 17.8 2.01 2.24 23.6 37.3 64.9 8.1 
0.2 16.6 2.22 2.38 24.2 38.2 65.4 7.9 
0.4 13.1 3.12 3.32 26.2 43.9 74.9 6.3 
(ii) t=50 
0 20 1.23 0.83 14.2 24.8 47.6 13.7 23.6 
0.1 15.3 5.08 8.20 35.4 54.1 81.3 4.5 22.3 
0.2 12.3 6.53 9.12 37.8 56.6 83.4 4.3 19.7 
0.4 7.0 12.55 14.92 47.5 71.9 95.7 2.9 19.6 
Notes: 
In each panel, the results are generated from 20 replications of the development over 10,20 and 50 time periods of a 
market comprising of 20 banks, each of which starts from an initial size of 1 unit, and whose subsequent evolution Is 
driven by the model: ASit = &32Sa-1 + fi30Sit -1 
+ Uit " ud -N (0, °it2) ait = 
0.1 
Mean and stdev denote the mean and standard deviation of actual bank size. 
CR. 1, CR. 2 AND CR. 5 are concentration ratios measuring the market share of the top 1,2, and 5 banks respectively. 
Num. equiv is the numbers equivalent version of the Herfindahl - Hirschman index. Top denotes the number of periods In which one bank retains the largest market share through time. 
controls the probability that a merger takes place in period t. 
II1 is the population of banks in period t. 
Il p is the initial population of banks. 
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The underlying reasons for these developments are well known: banks have been facing an 
increasing competitive environment in the wake of wide ranging deregulation and a quickening 
pace of financial innovation. The lifting of constraints on balance sheets, interest rates and 
commissions, the reduction in geographical and functional barriers and technological advantages 
have unleashed unprecedented forces working towards a major restructuring and consolidation in 
the banking industry.... The implication of these powerful trends in de-regulation and technology is 
that the restructuring and consolidation under way in the banking industry will extend well into the 
future.... Less clear are the speed and limits of these trends. 02 
Using the simulations methodology described in sections 8.2 to 8.4, this section presents some 
hypothetical projections for the possible future evolution of the five major EU banking markets of 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK The assumptions for the simulations are based on official 
statistics concerning trends in average bank size and growth, entry, exit and merger activity, as 
well as other, sometimes anecdotal evidence. The aim is to generate projections which give an 
indication as to how the structure of each country's banking industry might evolve in the future if 
the patterns of growth, entry, exit and merger which are implicit in the assumptions were to be 
realised. 
8.5.1 Entry. Exit and Merger in EU Banking 
Ent4C 
Since 1992, entry has increased in most European banking markets. Berger, Demsetz and 
Strahan (1999) argue that'... there maybe an increase in the degree of contestability of financial 
services markets because of the removal of geographic restrictions on banking organizations 
allow existing institutions to enter or threaten to enter more local markets. ' 13 
In many countries, the majority of entrants have been foreign banks. The number and market 
shares of foreign banks increased in most EU banking markets between 1980 and 1994, (chapter 
2, Tables 2.8 and 2.9). This was especially so in France, and to a lesser extent in Italy, Germany, 
12 Bank of International Settlements (1996), p. 83-85. 
13 Berger. Demsetz and Strahan (1999), p. 15. 
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Spain and the UK (EU, 1997a). Foreign banks account for a substantial share of banking industry 
assets particularly in the UK (57.4%). In France, Germany, Italy and Spain foreign bank influence 
has also increased, but at a slower rate. The assets shares of foreign banks in these four 
countries are 14.1%. 4.5%, 3.5% and 10% respectively (chapter 2, Table 2.9). 
Ea 
Exit by bankruptcy or other cause of failure is generally low in banking markets. 
` ... the banking industry is arguably characterised by an exit problem. Firms are less subject than 
in other sectors to the market mechanisms designed to discipline behaviour. 04 
However, some exit can be observed indirectly by changes in bank numbers and the size of 
branch networks, which are caused by the expansion or contraction of multinational banks' 
operations in selected countries. Over the period 1980 to 1995, the largest reductions in bank 
numbers were in the UK, France and Germany (where numbers fell by 24.1%, 17.6% and 18.1 % 
respectively) followed by Spain and Italy (where numbers fell by 13.2% and 8.9% respectively). 15 
The numbers of branches also fell in France and the UK, but increased in Germany, Italy and 
Spain (Chapter 2, Table 2.7). However, these figures must be treated with caution, given that re- 
organisation and consolidation of branch networks is often a consequence of a merger between 
existing banks, rather than outright closure. 
Mergers 
Mergers and acquisition activity has increased substantially in recent years as banks have sought 
to increase size to realise potential economies of scale and other efficiency savings, or to extend 
market power. 1° Over the period 1985 to 1995 the highest level of merger and acquisition activity 
among EU banking markets was in the UK (where 380 mergers or acquisitions in banking, 
14 Bank of International Settlements (1996), p. 89. See also Tirole (1994b), and Gardener and Molyneux(1997) who discuss this exit problem for European and US banks. 
These figures are calculated from Table 2.6 in chapter 2. 16 Recent examples Include the merger of Union Bank of Switzerland with Swiss Bank Corporation and Credit Lyonnaiss with Paribas. 
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insurance and other types of financial services took place), followed by France, Spain, Italy and 
Germany with 77,26,22 and 22 deals respectively. In 1995 the value of merger and acquisition 
deals was worth $21.7 billion in the UK, followed by $3.2 billion in France, $3billion in Italy, $2.1 
billion in Spain and $0.7 billion in Germany (Bank of International Settlements, 1996). 
The net effect of entry, exit and merger and acquisition activity is reflected in changes in the 
overall level of industry concentration. Table 8.9 shows CR5 and CR10 in 1980 and 1995 for 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. Overall, concentration has fallen in France and the 
UK, remained stable in Germany, and risen in Italy and Spain. 
Table 8.9: Effects of Entry. Exit and Merger on Concentration 
Country Five-Bank Concentration 
Ratio (CR5) 
Ten-Bank Concentration 
Ratio (CR10) 
Change in Concentration 
1980 1995 1980 1995 % change 
in CR5 
% Change 
in CR10 
France 57 47 69 63 -10 -6 
Germany 18 17 28 28 -1 - 
Italy 26 29 42 45 +3 +3 
Spain 38 49 58 62 +11 +4 
UK 63 57 80 78 -6 -2 
Adapted from Bank of International Settlements (1996), Table v. 8, p. 86. 
Tentative conclusions can be drawn for each banking market. In France, there appears to have 
been relatively high levels of entry and merger activity, and low exit. The banking market is 
relatively concentrated. Consolidation has progressed rapidly in recent years with decreases in 
branch numbers and a relatively high degree of merger and acquisition activity. In recent years 
the numbers employed have fallen by less than in the UK, as a consequence of strict labour laws 
(Morgan Stanley, 1996). 
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The German banking system is the least concentrated of the five countries considered. Entry Into 
the German market has been relatively low, exit has also been low, while the rate of merger and 
acquisition activity was, until recently, the lowest in Europe. Although, some consolidation has 
taken place in commercial banking, - the savings and co-operative banking sectors are still highly 
fragmented (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 1998a). 
In Italy, entry, exit and merger activity have been low historically (Williams, 1996). The market has 
historically been tightly regulated, and is among the most fragmented in Europe. The level of 
concentration is low relative to France, Spain and the UK. Recent research suggests that the 
Italian banking system could benefit greatly from efficiency gains if substantial consolidation takes 
place (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 1997b). During 1998, the Italian banking market experienced 
a wave of large bank mergers (Williams, 1998). 
In Spain, the rate of entry has been moderate, while exit has been low. Merger and acquisition 
activity has been low historically. However, in recent years some degree of consolidation through 
merger and acquisition has taken place, leading to increased levels of concentration (de la 
Fuente, 1998). Some research argues that since the Spanish banking market is one of the most 
profitable, at present there may be little real pressure for further consolidation (Morgan Stanley 
Dean Witter, 1997c). However, this feature appears to be changing as EMU creates enhanced 
competitive pressure through the further integration of European banking markets. '? 
The UK banking market has traditionally been one of the most open banking markets, 
characterised by a rapidly increasing foreign bank presence, and by the widespread conversion of 
building societies into banks. As a consequence the market has experienced relatively high levels 
of entry, exit and merger activity. Concentration levels in the UK retail sector are relatively high. In 
recent years there has been a high level of merger and acquisition activity both within banking, 
and across banking and insurance (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 1998b). Consequently, at 
present there appears to be a tendency for the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to adopt a more 
interventionist regulatory stance. 
17 In February 1999. Spain's two largest banks, Banco Santander and BCH merged. 
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8.5.2 Market Structure Projections 
The assumptions used to calibrate the market structure projections are based on Information 
concerning: a) recent bank size distributions for each of the five countries (discussed below); b) 
the relationship between a bank's current size and growth rate based on the empirical results 
presented in chapter 7; c) the relationship between a bank's lagged and current growth rates, also 
based on the empirical results presented in chapter 7 and d) entry, exit and merger rates based 
on the evidence discussed above. For each market, entry, exit and merger are categorised as 
'high', 'medium' or 'low' and parameter values that control entry, exit and merger in the 
simulations are assigned in accordance with the discussion in sections 8.4 and 8.5.1. 
To calibrate the simulations, an initial size distribution of banks for each country Is defined. Data 
on total assets of all banks (ECU billion) and total bank numbers was collected from Central Bank 
Reports for each country in 1995. Data was also collected on the asset size of the five largest 
banks in each country. This enabled a five bank concentration ratio (CR5) to be calculated. The 
data are shown in Table 8.10. 
Country Total Assets of 
all banks (ECU 
Billion) 
Assets of Top 
Five Banks 
(ECU Billion) 
CR5 (%) Total Number of 
Banks 
France 3102.3 1352.2 43.6 593 
Germany 4307.9 1357.9 31.5 3487 
Italy 1327.4 510.9 38.5 941 
Spain 1027.5 430.5 41.9 318 
UK 2265.8 1035.6 45.7 560 
Notes: 
Asset size data and bank numbers from Central Bank Reports of each respective country In 
1995. Assets of top five banks in 1995, calculated from The Banker, September 1996. CR5 
denotes the % of total assets held by the five largest banks in 1995. 
The concentration data in Table 8.10 is similar, but not Identical to the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) data quoted in Table 8.9. It is unclear how the size of the market was 
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measured in the BIS data and whether consolidated or unconsolidated accounts data Is used to 
calculate concentration. Consequently, for the purposes of model calibration it was necessary to 
collect assets data for all banks from Central bank reports, and the consolidated asset sizes of 
the five largest banks in each market from The Banker. 
From the information on bank numbers, market sizes and concentration, it was possible to 
choose the parameters of the lognormal distribution to match the average size of banks, and the 
market share of the top five banks with the data obtained from various central bank reports. The 
assumptions used to calibrate the simulation model for each banking market are reproduced 
schematically in Table 8.11. 
It is assumed that the initial logarithmic sizes, s; o, are distributed s1o - (sa , vo2 ). The mean and 
standard deviation, so and vo are chosen by trial and error to satisfy the following criteria: 
(i) E (S, 
0) = total assets 
/ total number of banks, where Sr0 = e''° . 
(ii) F, (x)=1- (5 / total number of banks), and 
FS(x)=CR5/100 
where X= ex and F. ( ) and FS () are the distribution functions of sj0 and St0 
respectively. 
Table 8.11 shows the values of so and vo which meet these conditions for each of the five 
countries, together with the assumed values of the parameters ß2 and 83, and the entry, exit 
and merger assumptions in each case. 18 Figure 8.2 illustrates the calculation of so and vo using 
the data in Table 8.10 for France. 
1e A 'time period' in the simulation represents two years because of the way the data is organised In the 
empirical analysis. 
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Country So vo ß2 Qs ai, Yz 0 
France 5.81 2.4 0.99 0.125 0.34 1 0.005 0.6 
Germany 2.61 3.1 1 0.125 0.19 0.6 0.005 0.4 
Italy 4.51 2.4 0.98 0.125 0.48 0.8 0.005 0.6 
Spain 6.11 2 0.99 0.125 0.28 0.8 0.005 0.6 
UK 5.51 2.4 1 0.125 0.29 1 0.005 0.8 
Notes: 
The data generating process for bank size and growth is: 
As; t = (ß2 -1)s1i_t +ß30sit_1 +uit where: E (u; t) ®0 and var (uit)   Q? 
So and vo are the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution from which the initial logarithmic sizes of 
banks are drawn randomly. 
e-A2x Entry: p (X = x) _, where A denotes the average rate of entry. 
X! 
Exit: p (exit) = y2 e'r'(°"'' '`), where yt measures the strength of the relationship between (sit. t - 
st ) and the 
probability of exit, and y2 controls the overall magnitude of the probability of exit. 
Merger. 0 controls the probability that a merger takes place. p(merger) _ O(n -1) /n 0, where nr  the population of 
banks in period t; no = the initial population of banks. 
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Figure 8.2: Calculation of and v0 for France 
f(s; o) 
f`, ""JýS: r"zte. 'f:, r,; , 4,. 
>,, fr=-nr 
. 
ýSVý. 'ý"`''11 , 'i: Jc ^y. _, ýý, 
ýý{J. ý 
y"'x . "ý'wu 
, Iý^^`+. q. 
lit°' n, ", 'n C, sir; "-, r"`. 
74kM 
1 ý, 
y pari 
,^ "1''^Tý,. n. 
ý"i" ýw'ý'ý;, ý:. 'ý; t ý" -; 
Gfu^ý) .`ý.; zF "n . ß.:, 3 
ý, 
ý»rr iý, 1 Yý,. nsä"'ý. 
x` Rp: ; "-i` ". -: 
K; 
f y^ý', `'yý 
ýý, 
ýrý. -n 
`ý. ýý 
-aww I, 
r ,, cýPw. +ýý:?., 
. 
'; 
ý 
ý. 'i t..: i ýr r'a , yo-'. =,. 
'ä, ý.. Ig "ý M"iý ý: 1 M'. 
ý; +v 'AE°`- 
º". 'a'"r',,.;, 
-ýr, *,,., ý; 
1 
r, JM.. reyr. c,, eýL I. v^d 
rr.: 
lax w1KKa 
ýy. 
r. 
wa 
.dq. m' 1+. 
1r o- w 
MOW too 
10-vo=3.41 go=5.81 so+v0 8.21 X 
=11.37 
Notes: So and VO are the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution from which the initial logarithmic size 
of banks are drawn randomly (see Table 8.10). 
The top five banks represent 0.8% of the total population of banks defined In Table 8.10. 
E(S1o) Is the total assets of the all banks in France / the total number of banks. 
X= e" denotes the cut off point between the top five banks in the lognormal distribution and the remainder of the 
population of banks. To the right of the cut off point, the top five banks (which make up for 0.8% of the total number of 
banks), account for 43.6% of all bank assets. To the left of the cut off point (the remaining 99.2% of banks) account for 
57% of total assets 
For each country 500 runs of a simulation which traces the evolution of 20 representative banks 
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8.12 shows the projections for each country. 
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France: Ql = sp(1-132), Q2 =0.99 , 
Q3 =0.125, alt =0.34, %s1 , 71' It Y2=0.005 ,O  0.6 
t n Mean St. dev Ut Mt Lt MS1 MS2 MS5 Num. Equiv 
0 20.0 6096 19754 3616 340 32 50.4 68.5 88.4 2.8 
1 20.3 6826 22398 3849 361 34 50.2 68.2 88.6 2.8 
2 19.7 7342 23612 4260 463 50 50.2 68.1 88.6 2.9 
3 19.6 7459 23410 4595 525 60 49.6 67.6 88.3 2.9 
4 19.5 7972 25157 4954 582 68 49.8 67.6 88.2 2.9 
5 19.6 8130 25320 5250 626 75 49.1 67.1 87.8 2.9 
6 19.6 8626 26954 5627 669 80 49.3 66.7 87.6 2.9 
7 19.6 9026 28424 5957 715 86 48.6 68.4 87.3 2.9 
8 19.7 9595 30502 6236 755 91 48.4 68.3 87.3 2.9 
9 19.8 9575 29900 6531 791 96 48.6 66.2 87.1 2.9 
10 19.8 9993 31286 6838 831 101 48.4 66.1 87.1 2.9 
Germany: Qt = 0, ß2 =1, Q3 - 0.125, Qg - 0.19, Aa0.6, Y I='s Y2 0 0.005,0 . 0.4 
t n Mean St. dev Ut mt. Lt MS1 MS2 MS5 Num. Equiv 
0 20.0 1351 5175 279 13 0.6 59.9 77.1 93.6 2.2 
1 20.1 1402 5344 293 13 0.6 59.5 76.9 93.5 2.2 
2 18.6 1588 5790 346 23 1.6 59.6 77.1 93.4 2.2 
3 18.1 1692 6022 380 28 2.0 59.5 77.2 93.4 2.2 
4 17.9 1917 6940 414 31 2.0 59.4 77.1 93.4 2.2 
5 17.8 1961 6967 450 35 3.0 58.9 76.8 93.3 2.2 
6 17.6 2020 7050 487 38 3.0 58.9 76.9 93.4 2.2 
7 17.5 2066 7100 525 42 3.0 58.6 76.8 93.3 2.2 
8 17.5 2203 7635 559 44 4.0 58.5 76.5 93.3 2.2 
9 17.5 2987 10567 599 47 4.0 58.4 78.4 93.3 2.2 
10 17.4 3074 10771 639 51 4.0 58.3 76.2 93.2 2.2 
Italy: ß1 ° So (1- 162 ), j62 = 0.98. 
ß3 = 0.125, apt i 0.48, . 
%0.8, Yin1.720005.0 -0.6 
t n Mean St. dev Ut mt Lt MS1 MS2 MS5 Num. 
Equiv 
0 20.0 1650 5193 978 89 8 50.7 69.5 89.3 2.8 
1 20.1 1659 5052 1034 93 8 49.5 68.5 88.9 2.9 
2 19.3 1798 5371 1124 119 13 49.9 68.5 88.8 2.9 
3 18.9 1862 5428 1236 138 15 49.4 68.2 88.6 2.9 
4 18.7 2063 5801 1348 152 17 48.5 67.6 88.6 2.9 
5 18.6 2186 6403 1470 170 20 47.9 67.0 88.3 2.9 
6 18.5 2274 6668 1573 182 21 48.0 67.1 88.2 3.0 
7 18.3 2369 6754 1680 196 23 48.8 67.5 88.2 2.9 
8 18.2 2438 6820 1801 212 25 48.9 67.6 88.2 2.9 
9 18.1 2531 7061 1895 223 26 48.5 67.3 88.2 2.9 
10 18.2 2729 7717 2024 236 27 48.3 67.3 88.1 2.9 
Top 
7.7 
Top 
9.0 
Top 
7.3 
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Spain: X31 = sp (1-132), J62 =0.99, J63 =0.125, alt 
0.28, Ae0.8, Y1 1, Y2`0.005,0 0.6 
t n Mean St. dev Ui Mt 1, t 
MS1 MS2 MS5 Num. Top 
Equiv 
0 20.0 3166 8289 3160 443 62 44.9 62.6 84.3 3.3 
1 20.1 3214 8302 3253 458 65 44.4 62.1 84.0 3.4 
2 19.7 3368 8466 3492 530 80 44.2 61.6 83.8 3.4 
3 19.5 3566 8843 3720 585 92 43.7 61.4 83.7 3.4 
4 19.4 3756 9127 3987 634 101 43.3 61.3 83.7 3.4 
5 19.3 3930 9431 4228 677 108 43.2 61.3 83.7 3.6 
6 19.2 4075 9705 4442 714 115 42.9 61.0 83.5 3.6 
7 19.1 4196 9882 4696 762 124 42.7 60.7 83.2 3.6 
8 19.1 4326 10076 4910 800 130 41.9 60.2 83.1 3.7 
9 18.9 4582 10640 5166 849 140 41.5 60.0 83.1 3.7 
10 18.9 4742 10977 5417 894 147 41.9 60.2 82.9 3.7 7.8 
UK: Ql = 0, j62 `1s Q3 = 0.125, alt = 0.29, 
A=l, 7 1, Y2 ` 0.005,0 -0.8 
t n Mean St. dev Ut Mi Lt MS1 MS2 MS5 Num. Top 
Equiv 
0 20.0 4012 12566 2598 248 24 49.8 68.3 88.4 2.9 
1 20.0 4367 13783 2811 264 25 49.6 68.1 88.4 2.9 
2 19.4 4893 14848 3210 341 36 49.3 67.9 88.4 2.9 
3 19.0 5642 17350 3600 400 44 49.4 67.8 88.4 2.9 
4 18.9 6288 19239 4057 452 50 49.5 67.5 88.5 2.9 
5 18.7 7179 22133 4421 497 56 49.2 67.6 88.5 2.9 
6 18.5 7617 23281 4876 543 60 50.1 68.0 88.8 2.9 
7 18.5 8440 26042 5373 587 64 50.2 67.9 88.8 2.9 
8 18.5 9763 31076 5845 625 67 50.7 68.3 88.9 2.8 
9 18.4 10425 33088 6286 674 72 50.9 68.7 89.2 2.8 
10 18.3 11137 35526 6776 724 77 50.5 68.6 89.1 2.8 7.8 
Notes: 
In each panel, the results are generated from 500 replications of the development over 10 time periods of a market 
comprising of 20 banks, which start from an Initial size distribution as defined In Table 8.11, and whose subsequent 
evolution is driven by the model. OS; t =662 -1)s it_t + 
Q3 &it. t +U it ;U it -N (0, a2) ail as shown. 
Mean and st. dev denote the average and standard deviation of actual bank size. 
Mt denotes the actual size of a bank whose logarithmic size Is the mean for the population of banks. 
Ut denotes the actual size of banks whose logarithmic size is one standard deviation above the mean logarithmic size. 
Lt denotes the actual size of banks whose logarithmic size Is one standard deviation below the mean logarithmic size. 
MS1, MS2 and MS5 denote the market share of the top 1,2, and 5 banks respectively. 
Num. equiv is the numbers equivalent version of the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index. 
Top denotes the number of periods In which one bank retains the largest market share through time. 
ýx e-A Entry: p(X = x) = 
X! , 
where A denotes the average rate of entry. A=0.6,0.8 and I respectively. 
Exit: p (exit) = Ti e"rt(s,,., "ä, )ý where Ti measures the strength of the relationship between si,, l " s, and the 
probability of exit, and Ti controls the overall magnitude of the probability of exit. Ti   1, while y2   0.005. 
Merger: p(merger) = S(n1 -1) /n0; where nr = the population of banks In period t; no   the Initial population of banks. 
0 denotes the likelihood of a merger taking place. 0=0.4,0.6 and 0.8 respectively. 
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In France, the projections suggest a small decrease in the total number of banks over the ten 
periods. The cohort of 20 representative banks declines in number to an average (over the 500 
simulations) of 19.8 in Table 8.12. Mean bank size increases from ECU 6096m to ECU 9993m 
mainly as a consequence of merger activity. The standard deviation of bank sizes also increases. 
Around two-thirds of the population of banks are typically located within the range of sizes 
between U1 and L1 (which denote the actual size of banks whose logarithmic size is one 
standard deviation above and below the mean logarithmic size respectively). Mt (which denotes 
the actual size of a bank whose logarithmic size is the mean for the population of banks) 
increases from ECU 340m to ECU 831m. The market share of the top bank (denoted by MS1 
measures the market share of the top 5% of banks at the beginning of the ten periods) is 
projected to decrease, as a consequence of the assumed growth advantages of smaller banks, 
and the entry of new banks; MS1 falls from 50.4% to 48.4% over the ten periods. 19 
A faster rate of decline in the total number of banks is projected for Germany. The cohort of 20 
representative banks is depleted to an average (over 500 simulations) of 17.4 by the end of ten 
periods. Mean bank size is projected to increase quite rapidly from ECU 1351m to ECU 3074m 
over the ten periods. M, increases from ECU 13m to ECU 51m. This is mainly as a 
consequence of the operation of the LPE, which was found to hold in the case of Germany in 
chapter 7. With a relatively low rate of entry being assumed, the trend towards increased market 
dominance of the top banks is not offset to any great extent by the appearance of new firms. MSI 
declines slightly from 59.9% to 58.3% over the ten periods. 
In Italy, the projections suggest a decrease in the total number of banks over the ten periods. The 
cohort of 20 representative banks declines to an average of 18.2 in Table 8.12. The mean of bank 
size is projected to increase from ECU 1650m to ECU 2729m mainly as a consequence of 
merger activity. The standard deviation of bank size increases, as do Ut , 
Mt and Lt. The 
19 MS1, MS2 and MS5 are the market shares of the top one, two and five banks as a proportion of a 
population of 20 banks. In other words, MS1, MS2 and MS5 are the % of assets held by the top 5%, 10% 
and 25% of banks at the beginning of the simulation. In contrast, CR5 in Table 8.10 is the market share of 
the top five banks as a proportion of all banks in each country respectively. 
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combination of the systematic growth advantages held by small banks (evidenced by a rejection 
of the LPE in chapter 7), entry, exit and merger leads to a decline in MSI from 50.7% to 48.3% 
In Spain, the cohort of 20 representative banks is depleted to an average (over 500 simulations) 
of 18.9. Although small banks grow proportionately faster than larger banks, their advantages are 
not sufficient to prevent increases in the mean and standard deviation of bank sizes. Mean bank 
size increases from ECU 3166m to ECU 4742m. This is in part a consequence of merger activity. 
MS1 declines from 44.9% to 41.9% over the ten periods. 
Finally, in the UK, the cohort of 20 representative banks is depleted to an average (over 500 
simulations) of 18.3. Mean bank size more than doubles from ECU4012m to ECU 11137m, partly 
as a consequence of the operation of the LPE (which was found to hold for UK banks in chapter 
7), and partly as a consequence of the relatively high level of merger activity which is assumed to 
in the case of the UK. The operation of the LPE, together with the assumed patterns of entry and 
merger activity also leads to a large increase in the standard deviation of bank size. MS1 
increases over the ten periods, as the increased size of the largest banks is augmented by the 
high rate of merger. 
Overall, the projections suggest that if the assumptions on which they are based are correct, then 
bank numbers are likely to decline in all of the countries considered. The mean and standard 
deviation of bank sizes increases in all cases. These increases are particularly pronounced in 
Germany and the UK, where the LPE was previously found to hold. The asset share (measured 
by MS1) of the top banks is expected to decline in all cases, with the exception of the UK. The 
rate of decline is greatest in cases where small banks are assumed to grow proportionately faster 
than larger banks, and / or where entry is assumed to be high. This is particularly evident in the 
case of Italy and Spain. 
8.6 Conclusions 
Using stochastic simulation techniques, this chapter has examined the implications for market 
structure of various departures from the LPE In its strictest form. The simulations illustrated the 
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effects of firm growth, entry, exit and merger activity on the evolution of bank sizes and market 
concentration, for seven simulated industry types. Using a simulated industry in which the LPE 
holds as the benchmark, the implications of various alternative assumptions regarding bank 
growth were examined. In simulated industries in which large banks tend to grow faster than 
small banks, concentration naturally increases faster than under the LPE. If small banks grow 
faster than large banks, there is no long-term tendency for concentration to increase. The 
tendencies toward increasing concentration develop more quickly when large firms experience 
more variable growth rates than their smaller counterparts, and where there is positive 
persistence of growth. The same tendencies develop more slowly when small firms have more 
variable growth rates than their larger counterparts, and where there is negative persistence of 
growth. 
Superimposition of entry, according to the assumptions used in the simulations tends to lead to a 
lower mean bank size and less dispersion of bank sizes, and results in lower levels of 
concentration in all simulated industries. Entry, even at the lowest rate, moderates quite 
substantially the effect of LPE on concentration in the benchmark case, and there is a tendency 
towards de-concentration over time in the cases of 'medium' and 'high' rates of entry. However, in 
simulated industries where large banks tend to grow faster than their smaller counterparts, 
concentration continues to increase, even with 'high' rates of entry. 
If small banks are more likely to exit than large banks, then exit naturally leads to higher mean 
bank size and increased concentration among the survivors. As a result of exit, the dispersion of 
bank sizes increases in simulated industries where large banks grow faster than smaller banks, 
or where there is less inter-firm variation in the growth of large banks. The opposite is found in 
simulated industries where the growth process favours smaller banks. Finally, mergers lead to 
increases in mean bank size and in the dispersion of bank sizes in all simulated industries. 
Using the simulations methodology, projections were carried out which show how the structures 
of the French, German, Italian, Spanish and UK banking markets might evolve in the future under 
assumptions governing growth, entry, exit and merger. The simulations were calibrated using 
267 
official statistics on bank sizes, our own estimated parameters which measure the size-growth 
relationship from earlier chapters, and recent anecdotal evidence on entry, exit and merger 
activity, 
In France, increased entry, reductions in bank and branch numbers and medium rates of merger 
and acquisition activity have led to a fall in concentration in recent years. In chapter 7, it was also 
found that smaller French banks grew faster than their larger counterparts in the early 1990s. 
This may be explained by the adjustments made by larger banks in the light of the sluggish 
performance of the national economy in the early 1990s, which may have inhibited the growth of 
the banks concerned. This study also finds that banks which enjoyed above average levels of 
growth in the period 1990-1992 enjoyed above average growth again in 1992-1994. Using our 
own estimated parameters, summary statistics on bank sizes, and stylised facts on entry, exit, 
and merger, projections of the possible future evolution of the French banking market suggest a 
small reduction in the number of banks over ten periods. Mean size is projected to increase, 
mainly as a consequence of merger activity. The market share of top banks is projected to fall in 
response to the systematic growth advantages held by small banks, and the entry of new banks. 
Historically, entry has been low in the German banking market. In recent years there has been a 
fall in bank numbers, but an increase in the number of branches. The rate of acquisition and 
merger has been one of the lowest in Europe, but has increased in recent years. In chapter 7 it 
was found that the LPE holds for German banks, and that there is positive persistence in growth 
rates through time. Using our estimated parameters along with other evidence on entry, exit and 
merger, and summary statistics on bank sizes, projections of the possible future structure of the 
German banking market show a significant decline in the number of banks of more than 10% 
over ten periods. A large increase in the mean and standard deviation of bank size is projected, 
and entry has little effect on the high market shares of the top banks. 
Entry has taken place at a slower rate in the Italian banking market than in more de-regulated 
markets like the UK. There has been a reduction in the number of banks in Italy, but an increase 
in the number of branches. Tight regulation has meant that entry, exit and merger activity has 
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been historically low, although recently rates of entry and merger have increased. In chapter 7 it 
was found that small Italian banks grew faster than larger banks in the early 1990s. This may be a 
reflection of the substantial restructuring which took place in Italy in the response to the EU's 
Single Market programme. Large Italian banks had to adjust their operations more significantly 
than their smaller counterparts, because of the threat of potential competition from foreign banks. 
These adjustments acted as a drag on the growth of large banks relative to their smaller 
counterparts. Using these empirical findings and evidence on entry, exit and merger rates, the 
market structure projections suggest a moderate decrease in the number of banks, and increases 
in the mean and median bank size. However, the rate of entry and the systematic growth 
advantages held by smaller banks, result in the market share of the top banks declining slightly. 
There has been an increasing tendency for foreign banks to enter the Spanish banking market in 
recent years. There has also been a small reduction in the total number of banks, but an increase 
in the number of branches. Merger activity has also increased. In chapter 7, it was found that 
smaller Spanish banks grew faster than their larger counterparts. As in the case of Italy, this may 
be a reflection of restructuring which took place in response to the EU's Single Market 
programme. Using this empirical finding, together with other information on entry, exit and 
merger, the Spanish market structure projections show a moderate decrease in bank numbers. 
There is an increase in mean and median bank size and a slight decrease in the market shares of 
the top banks. 
The UK banking market has experienced high rates of entry, exit and merger activity in recent 
years. There has been substantial foreign bank entry and large reductions in the number of banks 
and the number of bank branches. In chapter 7, it was found that the LPE holds for the UK 
banking market. Here the projections suggest a decrease in bank numbers over ten periods. The 
mean, median and standard deviation of bank size also increases, through the workings of the 
LPE. The market share of the top banks increases as a result of the workings of the LPE, and the 
moderately high rates of merger which are assumed in the simulations. 
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Overall, the simulation results presented in this chapter provide useful insights into the role of 
stochastic and systematic factors in determining the evolution of market structure. Nevertheless, 
the results are only as good as the assumptions on which they are based, although care has been 
taken to ensure that the assumptions are based on factual empirical evidence. The projections 
suggest that the EU banking industry is likely to be characterised by a market structure with 
smaller numbers of banks arising from the merger of existing banks. Mean and median bank size 
is likely to increase in response to the increasingly competitive conditions. This may result in an 
increased number of mergers as banks attempt to gain a competitive advantage through the 
realisation of scale and scope economies. However, this does not mean that concentration will 
necessarily increase. Increased competition may lead to a decline in the market dominance of the 
top banks. 
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CHAPTER 9 
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The aim of this thesis is to test the extent to which the Law of Proportionate Effect holds for 
European banks and manufacturing firms. Based on the findings of this empirical investigation, 
possible implications for the future structure of European banking markets have been 
investigated. In this chapter, the major empirical findings of the thesis are summarised. In doing 
so the relevance of the results from a theoretical and empirical perspective are highlighted. The 
limitations of the data set and the empirical model(s) estimated are also discussed. Finally, some 
possible directions for future research are forwarded. 
This thesis has tested whether or not an empirical relationship exists between firm size and 
growth in European banking and manufacturing. The approach adopted has more in common 
with the studies of the LPE (reviewed in chapter 5), than with the traditional industrial organisation 
literature and its application to banking (reviewed in chapters 2,3 and 4). However, a review of 
the traditional industrial organisation literature on the determinants of concentration provides an 
essential background to this study. 
In chapter 2 the effects of globalisation, de-regulation, dis-intermediation, technological change 
and EMU on the structure and performance of European banking are examined. These changes 
have led to consolidation at the bank and branch level as banks have placed a greater strategic 
focus on cost and profit efficiency, and the maximisation of shareholder value. There has also 
been an increased emphasis on the pursuit of non-interest income. Overall, European banking 
has been transformed from an industry characterised by protection and limited competition, 
toward a contestable market where banks are strategically focused on improving efficiency, 
strengthening customer relationships and maximising shareholder value. 
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In chapter 3 the role of market structure in determining the ways in which manufacturing firms and 
industries behave and perform is examined. The finding that emerges is that firms in highly 
concentrated manufacturing industries tend to outperform those in industries which are less 
concentrated. Empirical evidence as to whether this is due to collusion between incumbent firms 
or differential efficiencies is inconclusive. An examination of the determinants of market structure 
shows that economies of scale, high levels of product differentiation and advertising, slow 
industry growth, small firm numbers and the operation of random factors lead to increased 
industry concentration, while high entry rates and industry growth lead to falling levels of 
concentration. 
Chapter 4 examines the role of market structure in determining the performance of banks, and 
the forces which may determine banking market structure. Evidence supports the view that 
market concentration and barriers to entry influence performance. Among the determinants of 
market structure, the evidence on economies of scale is mixed. In contrast to manufacturing, 
there is some evidence that high growth leads to increasing concentration in banking markets. 
There is also evidence that technological advances and changes in customer attributes lead to 
increased concentration, as banks grow to meet new competitive challenges. Some evidence 
suggests that stochastic forces play a part in shaping banking market structure. 
Chapter 5 discusses previous literature which has tested the Law of Proportionate Effect (LPE) by 
examining the relationship between firm size and growth for manufacturing industries. The results 
suggest that the LPE plays a substantial part in the evolution of firm sizes, and may outweigh 
systematic explanations of market concentration discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 
In chapters 6 and 7, the thesis investigates whether the LPE holds or not in the European banking 
and manufacturing industries during the period 1990-94, using a data set on size and growth for 
approximately 600 banks and 750 manufacturing firms. For the sample of banks and 
manufacturing firms, a cross-sectional logarithmic growth model is estimated, with the coefficient 
on initial size interpreted as giving an indication of whether or not the LPE held in each of the 
industries investigated. The coefficient on lagged growth shows the extent to which growth rates 
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were correlated through time, while a regression of the squared residuals of the growth equation 
on size, illustrates whether variability in growth across banks or firms is dependent on which point 
of the size distribution a bank or firm is located. The model(s) allow for differences in the size- 
growth relationship between different types of bank, manufacturing firms in different industrial 
sectors, and firms with different countries of origin. 
Across the banking sample, differences in the size-growth relationship were found for various 
countries, so the tests of LPE allow for country specific effects. In the main the LPE was found to 
hold in five of the eight banking markets considered, namely Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This implies that a tendency for concentration to increase 
naturally over time may be at work in each of these countries, even in the absence of factors 
influencing growth, which are related to size. However, the LPE was rejected in France, Italy and 
Spain, where smaller banks grew faster than their larger counterparts, suggesting a tendency for 
mean reversion in the size distribution of banks over the long term. For France, this is thought to 
reflect the adjustments made by large banks in response to the economy wide difficulties 
experienced in the early 1990s. In Italy and Spain, changes in regulation brought about by the 
Single Market Programme may have impinged on the growth prospects of large banks in these 
countries. For the EU as a whole, some evidence was found that bank growth rates persisted 
over time. For total assets, banks which achieved growth above (or below) the norm In the period 
1990-92 were likely to do so again in 1992-94. For off balance sheet business, the opposite was 
case, although no relationship between growth in successive periods is found for the equity 
measure. 
The general conclusion of this thesis is that the LPE holds in the majority of European banking 
markets. This suggests that if the same patterns continue in the future, European banking 
markets may tend to grow more highly concentrated over time, even in the absence of factors 
such as economies of scale, which give large banks cost advantages over their smaller 
counterparts, or strategies on the part of large banks which seek to exploit their market power to 
the detriment of smaller competitors and potential entrants. From a policy perspective these 
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results could suggest a need over the long term for regulatory measures such as market share 
ceilings or the forced divestiture of large market shares, to limit the level of concentration. 
This thesis recognises that the LPE is a long run explanation of market structure. Stochastic 
simulations are used to investigate the possible long run evolution of market structure in 
European banking. In chapter 8, a more general model of bank growth, which encompasses 
assumptions about entry, exit and merger are presented. The implications for the evolution of 
market structure of various departures from the LPE are assessed. The tendency for the LPE to 
create increases in industry concentration are accelerated when large firms grow proportionately 
faster or experience more variable growth rates than their smaller counterparts, and where there 
is positive persistence of growth. In contrast, the tendency for the LPE to produce increases in 
industry concentration is offset when smaller firms grow proportionately faster or have more 
variable growth rates than their larger counterparts, and where there is negative persistence of 
growth. Entry tends to have an offsetting effect on the tendency for the LPE to produce increases 
in industry concentration, while exit and merger accelerate the tendency of the LPE to produce 
increases in concentration. 
Based on the empirical results of the estimated relationship between size and growth and other 
evidence drawn from official sources, simulations of the possible future bank industry structure for 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom are reported in chapter 8. Overall, the 
simulations provide useful insights into the role of stochastic and systematic factors in 
determining the evolution of market structure. The projections presented suggest that the 
European banking industry may in future be characterised by a market structure with smaller 
numbers of banks. Mean and median bank size may increase as banks merge in response to the 
increasingly competitive conditions in the banking industry. The increased competition may also 
lead to a decline in concentration levels. 
This thesis also tests the extent to which the LPE holds for European manufacturing firms. The 
results reported for the manufacturing sample are generally similar to those reported in much of 
the recent literature on the LPE in manufacturing (Dunne and Hughes, 1994 and Hart and Oulton, 
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1996). Differences in the size-growth relationship were found between different industry groupings 
and countries of origin. The LPE was rejected in eight out of the eleven manufacturing groupings 
sampled (alcohol, building materials, chemicals, electricals, engineering, food, paper and textiles) 
and in three countries (Germany, Spain and the UK). Generally, the results suggest that the 
tendency for small firms to grow faster than large firms implies that concentration is not expected 
to increase in most European manufacturing industries. Small firms are found to have more 
variable growth rates than their larger counterparts in manufacturing, suggesting that large firms 
may enjoy advantages associated with diversified operations, which make them less susceptible 
to periods of extremely high or low growth. 
Overall, the differences observed in the results between manufacturing and banking may arise 
from the competitive conditions and regulatory environment prevailing in each case. Small and 
large banks use similar inputs (deposits, labour and capital), to produce similar outputs (loans, 
assets and off balance sheet business), which are priced in accordance with prevailing market 
conditions, leading to banks growing at similar rates, which ultimately leads to an acceptance of 
the LPE. This is not the case for the more heterogeneous and less regulated manufacturing 
industries, in which small firms can often create niche markets and sell differentiated products, 
enabling them to capture market share from their larger counterparts. 
The present study, in common with previous work of this nature, is subject to a number of 
limitations, which arise from the type of model used and the data employed. The approach used 
to test the LPE in the present and previous studies extrapolate from a cross-sectional regression 
to examine the consequences of the cross-sectional relationship between size and growth for the 
evolution of industry concentration in the long run. However, the results presented in chapter 7 do 
not constitute direct evidence that the relationships between bank size and growth hold over any 
time period other than 1990-94. As a consequence, it is difficult to tell whether acceptance or 
rejection of the null hypothesis supporting the LPE is simply an artefact of the sample used, or 
whether it accurately reflects patterns which will dictate the long run evolution of market structure. 
It is therefore slightly anomalous, although understandable in view of the lack of suitable firm level 
data over time that cross-sectional rather than time series methods pre-dominate in the empirical 
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literature. In the past, neither the data nor the empirical techniques have been available to 
address these issues. However, continual improvements in data sets such as BANKSCOPE, and 
recent advances in methods for testing for unit roots and co-integration using panel data, may 
pave the way for hypotheses such as the LPE to be tested within a more dynamic framework in 
the foreseeable future. 
Further research could utilise the recent advances in econometric techniques to test the LPE 
using pooled or panel estimation methods. The standard approach to testing the LPE uses cross- 
sectional regression in which the logarithm of firm growth is regressed against initial size and 
previous growth. Under this approach there is an implicit assumption that the equilibrium mean 
size to which banks revert is the same for all banks. However, it is possible that this is not the 
case. 
A number of papers have developed strategies for testing for unit roots using multi-variate or 
panel data sets (Levin and Lin, 1993; Quah, 1994; Wu and Zhang, 1996; Im, Pesaren and Shin, 
1997). The data sets used in these studies use few cross-sectional observations and large 
numbers of time series observations. In contrast, the present study (along with others which have 
been used to test the LPE) use large numbers of cross-sectional observations, and low numbers 
of time series observations. Future research could exploit the time series dimension of the data 
set by developing pooled or panel methods of estimation. 
The sample used in the current investigation is comprised predominately of large banks and 
manufacturing firms. Although it contains a heterogeneous collection of banks and firms in terms 
of their size characteristics, the present study provides little or no evidence concerning the LPE 
for banks and manufacturing firms at the very smallest end of the size distribution. Furthermore, 
the sample does not include banks or firms which entered or exited the markets during the period 
1990 to 1994. The exclusion of new banks or firms may introduce one form of selection bias, as 
does excluding banks or firms that have exited the market over the period of observation. If the 
size-growth relationship differs between existing, and entering and exiting banks or firms, tests of 
the LPE across a sample which consists solely of banks or firms that have survived over the 
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entire period of investigation may give a misleading picture of the effects of firm size on growth. 
The current data set does not allow the exploration of this bias further in chapter 7. However, the 
effects of superimposing assumptions about entry, exit and merger onto the empirical results on 
the relationship between size and growth for surviving firms have been considered in the 
simulation model(s) described in chapter 8. 
The future evolution of market structure in European banking is undoubtedly a complex 
phenomenon. There are currently many forces generating change in the industry, including 
technology, deregulation, globalisation, securitisation and EMU. Further research of market 
structure should be aimed at examining the effects of each of the aforementioned forces on the 
evolution of bank sizes and concentration. 
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Appendix 1: Results of Selected Studies Testing for the Determinants of Changes and the 
Level of Concentration 
Author Sample Findings 
Weiss (1963) 87 US manufacturing industries for Positive relationship between 
1947-1954. economies of scale and changes In 
concentration. 
Kamerschen (1968) 212 US manufacturing industries for The level of Industry concentration Is 
1947-63. Inversely related to firm numbers and 
Industry growth. 
Orstein, Weston, Intriligator and All US manufacturing industries for Advertising and firm size are positively 
Shrieves (1973) " 1963 related to concentration. Industry 
growth has a negative relationship 
with concentration. 
Dalton and Rhoades (1974) All US manufacturing Industries for Industry growth leads to declines In 
1947-67. concentration, while product 
differentiation leads to Increasing 
levels of concentration. 
Mueller and Hamm (1974) 166 US manufacturing Industries for Strong association between product 
1947-60. differentiation and concentration. 
Industry growth, Industry size, and 
entry are Inversely related to 
concentration. 
Mueller and Rodgers (1980) 166 US manufacturing industries for Positive relationship between changes 
1947-72. In advertising expenditures and 
changes in concentration. 
Caves and Porter (1980) 166 US manufacturing industries for Positive relationship between 
1954-72. economies of scale and 
concentration. A negative relationship 
Is found between Industry growth, 
entry and concentration. 
Hart and Clarke (1980) 76 UK industries 1958-68 Positive relationship between 
economies of scale and 
concentration. A negative relationship 
Is found between market size and 
concentration. 
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Author Sample Findings 
Levy-Garboua and Renard (1977) 94 French banks for 1974. Evidence of increasing returns to 
scale. 
Fanjul and Maravall (1985) 83 Spanish commercial and 54 Find significant economies of scale 
Spanish savings banks for 1979. associated with the number of 
products and services offered 
Dietsch (1988) 243 French banks for 1986. Finds little evidence of economies of 
scale at the firm level, but some 
evidence at the plant level. 
Hardwick (1989) 97 UK building societies for 1985 Finds significant evidence of 
economies of scale for building 
societies less than £280 million in size 
Baldini and Land! (1990) 294 Italian banks for 1987 Find significant evidence of 
economies of scale at branch level, 
which is positively related to bank 
size. They further find that bank level 
economies tend to become significant 
at large output ranges. 
Drake (1992) 76 UK building societies for 1988 Finds some evidence of economies of 
scale for building societies of asset 
size between £120 million to £500 
million. 
Rodriquez, Alvarez and Gomez 64 Spanish banks for 1990 Finds significant evidence of 
(1993) economies of scale for medium sized 
banks, and diseconomies of scale for 
large banks. 
Dietsch (1993) 343 French banks for 1987. Finds significant evidence of 
economies of scale at all output 
levels. 
Vennet (1993b) 2600 EU credit institutions for 1991 Finds evidence of economies of scale 
in the $3-$10 billion asset size range. 
McKillop and Glass (1994) 89 UK building societies which are Economies of scale are found for 
grouped Into national, regional and national and local building societies, 
local categories for 1991, and constant returns for regional 
building societies. 
Lang and Wetzel (1994) 700 German Co-operative banks Finds little evidence for economies of 
scale at any of the output levels. 
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Study Sample Results Additional Information 
Characteristics 
Hart and Prais (1956) UK data covering the Split sample into five sub- Implies concentration in UK 
period 1885 to 1950. periods, and find that LPE manufacturing Is Increasing 
Firm size measured as holds until 1939. From up to 1939, after which the 
the stock exchange 1939-1950 negative relation process stabilises. 
valuation. between size and growth. 
Overall, accepts LPE. 
Hart (1962) UK data covering the LPE tested for various time 
period 1931 to 1954. periods. Finds equal mean 
Sample comprises of growth rates in all periods 
brewing, spinning and considered. However, finds 
drinks firms. Size large brewing firms have 
measured as gross more variable growth rates 
profit - depreciation. than small. Overall, accepts LPE. 
Hymer and Pashigian(1962) US data covering Average mean growth rates 
period 1946-55 for are unrelated to firm sizes. 
1000 largest Variation in firm growth 
manufacturing firms. rates is Inversely related to 
Size measured as firm size. Overall, rejects 
assets. LPE. 
Mansfield (1962) US data covering Tests the LPE for all firms, First study to explicitly 
period 1916 to 1957 for for surviving firms only, and examine the role of attrition. 
firms in steel, for firms operating above Smaller firms are more 
petroleum and tyre the industry minimum likely to die than large firms. 
industries covering efficient scale. LPE only Surviving small firms have 
various sub-periods. accepted for firms operating higher and more variable 
Size measure is firm above the minimum efficient growth rates than their 
output scale. Dispersion of growth larger counterparts. 
rates found to be greater for 
smaller firms. Overall 
re'ects LPE. 
Samuals(1965) Data covering the Larger firms grow faster Examines role of mergers In 
period 1951 to 1960 for than smaller firms through boosting growth rates of 
322 UK manufacturing economies of scale large firms. Part of the 
firms. Size measured advantages. Overall, rejects superior growth of large 
by net assets. the LPE. firms can be explained by 
merger activity. May also be 
caused by large firms 
revaluing assets more 
frequently than small firms. 
Utton (1972) Data on 1527 UK Large firms grow faster than Explores the contribution of 
manufacturing firms smaller firms In five mergers to growth rates of 
drawn from 13 industries, while smaller Industries where large firms 
industries covering the firms grow faster In one were found to grow faster 
period 1954 to 1965. industry. Overall, rejects than small firms. The LPE Is 
Size measured as net LPE. accepted for firms not 
assets. Involved In merger activity. 
Samuals and Chesher (1972) UK data for 2000 firms Large firms grow faster than Examine the role of firm 
drawn from 21 industry small firms. Variation In births and deaths In the 
groups. Size measured growth rates declines with growth-size relationship. 
as net assets. size. Departures from LPE Deaths take place across 
are greatest in industries all size classes, while most 
characterised by an births take place In the 
oligopolistic structure. smallest size class of firms. 
Growth rates persist 
thron h time. 
Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1975) UK data on 233 quoted LPE holds. Addresses problem of 
manufacturing firms heteroscedasticity in firm 
over the period 1959 to growth rates. 
1967. Size measured 
as net assets. 
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Chesher (1979) Data covering the No relationship between Outlines a methodology for 
period 1960 to 1969 for firm size and growth. testing the LPE when firm 
183 UK manufacturing Growth rates persist from growth rates exhibit serial 
firms. one period to the next. correlation. 
Kumar (1985) UK data covering the 12% of growth persists from Similar results for net 
period 1960 to 1976. one period to the next. assets, fixed assets and 
The sample is split Into Negative relationship equity. Differ slightly when 
three sub-periods, between size and growth using employees and sales. 
namely: 1960-65 (1747 for 1960-1965 and 1972 - Examines the relationship 
firms), 1966-1971(1021 1976, but accepts LPE for between firm size and 
firms), 1972-1976 (824 the period 1966-1971. acquisition growth and finds 
firms). Net assets, fixed Growth rates are Inversely a positive relationship for 
assets, total equity, related to firm size. Overall, 1960-1971, but negative 
employees and sales rejects LPE. relation for 1966-1976. 
measure firm size. 
Evans (1987a) US data for 42,339 Failure of firms decreases Examines Influence of age 
small firms over the with age, as does growth on firm growth. Results 
period 1976-1980. Size and variability of growth. suggest that older firms 
measured by number Overall rejects LPE. have less variability In 
of employees. growth rates caused by 
learning economies of 
scale. 
Evans (1987b) US data for 17,339 Finds an Inverse Results suggest the 
small manufacturing relationship between firm usefulness of models 
firms covering the size, and growth and age. Incorporating firm age to 
period 1976-1982. explain differences In 
rowth. 
Hall (1987) US data covering the Negative relationship Addresses estimation 
period 1972 to 1983. between size and growth problems of sample attrition 
Three samples of firms. for all samples. Small firms and measurement error. 
1) 1972-1983 (962 have more variable growth Results are robust with 
firms); 2) 1972-1979 rates than large firms. respect to these. 
(1349 firms); 3) 1976- 
1983 (1098 firms). Size 
is measured as 
employee numbers. 
Dunne, Roberts and Samualson US data for 200,000 Growth declines with plant Examine the probability off 
(1988) US manufacturing size. Growth declines with failure. Small plants grow 
plants over the period age for mulitplant firms. faster, but tend to fail more 
1967-1977. Size Variability of growth frequently. 
measured by number declines with pant size. 
of employees. Overall, younger, smaller 
plants have faster, more 
variable growth rates than 
large firms. 
Contini and Revelli (1989) Italian data for 467 Presents results for 1973- 
small manufacturing 1981 and 1981-1986. LPE 
firms covering the is accepted for lager firms 
period 1973-1986. Size for 1977-1981. LPE Is 
measured as rejected for small firms In all 
employees. industries sampled. Overall, 
small firms grow faster than 
larger firms. 
Acs and Audretsch (1990) US data aggregated at Accepts LPE In 245 of the Authors contend that when 
the industry level for 408 industries sampled. the firm exit Is Incorporated 
408,4-digit Industries. Overall, LPE Is accepted. Into an analysis of size and 
Size measured as growth, the tendency for 
employees. smaller firms to grow faster 
than their larger 
counterparts Is offset by a 
greater propensity of small 
firms to exit. 
Reid (1992) UK data for 73 small Negative relationship 
firms covering the between size and growth. 
period 1985-1988. Size Also finds younger firms 
measured by sales and have higher growth rates. 
employees. Overall, rejects LPE. 
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Wagner (1992) German data on 7,000 
small firms. Sample 
period covers the 
1978-1989. Size is 
measured by the 
number of employees. 
Finds no relationship 
between size and growth. 
However, growth rates of 
firms are correlated over 
time leading a rejection of 
LPE. 
Focuses on three year 
overlapping periods to 
reduce possible biases 
arising from firm exit. 
Dunne and Hughes (1994) UK data comprising of LPE accepted for majority Address role of bias arising 
2,149 firms. Further of size classes in 1980- from the exit of slow 
split into 2 time periods 1985, but rejected in all growing firms, and find that 
1975-1980 and 1980- classes 1975-1980. exit cannot account for the 
1985. Size measured observed results. 
as net assets. 
Hart and Oulton (1996) UK data on 87,100 Negative relation between The first large-scale study 
small independent firm growth and size of small firm size-growth 
firms covering the implying that the smallest relationships In the UK. 
period 1989-1993. Size firms grow the fastest. This 
measured as net finding is robust with 
assets, employees and respect to size category of 
sales. firm examined, and size 
measure used. 
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